Essays on the Role of Institutions in Productivity and Reallocation Dynamics by Schweiger, Helena
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF
INSTITUTIONS IN PRODUCTIVITY AND
REALLOCATION DYNAMICS
Helena Schweiger, Doctor of Philosophy, 2006
Dissertation directed by: Professor John C. Haltiwanger
Department of Economics
Recent empirical work has shown that the success of an economy depends
largely on how successful it is in allocating inputs and outputs across businesses
efficiently with minimum disruption and frictions. Reallocation of factors of pro-
duction plays a major role in productivity growth and it is driven by technological
and market forces, coupled with institutional factors. We examine the impact of
institutions on allocative efficiency, job flows and wage structure, using longitudinal
micro level databases.
First, we estimate the impact of state aid for the rescue and restructuring
of firms in difficulty on productivity and allocative efficiency. We use treatment
effects estimators allowing for selection on unobservables and exploit variables that
affect the chances of getting aid before 2002, but not after, to identify this impact.
The empirical analysis indicates that state aid hindered the efficient allocation of
resources and prolonged the life span of aid-receiving firms.
Next, we assess the importance of technological factors that characterize dif-
ferent industries in explaining cross-country differences in job flows. We find that
industry/technology and size factors explain a large fraction of the overall variability
in job flows, but there remain significant differences in job flows that could reflect
differences in business environment conditions. We use a difference-in-difference
approach to examine the impact of regulations on worker hiring and firing. The
empirical results suggest that stringent hiring and firing costs reduce job turnover
and distort the patterns of industry/size flows.
Finally, we study the structure of wages and the importance of firm and person
fixed effects in explaining the variance of log real hourly wages in Slovenia, using
a longitudinal matched employer-employee database. Most significant changes in
employment and wage setting policies occurred in 1991, but incomes policies still
suppressed the growth of managerial wages until 1997. We find that this change
brought about a change in the wage structure, with an increase in returns to edu-
cation for the most educated workers. Our results also indicate that person fixed
effects account for an overwhelming majority of variation in log real hourly wages,
whereas firm fixed effects are not nearly as important.
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN
PRODUCTIVITY AND REALLOCATION DYNAMICS
by
Helena Schweiger
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor John C. Haltiwanger, Chair
Professor John Shea







I owe my gratitude to all the people who have made this thesis possible and
because of whom my graduate experience has been a pleasant one.
First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Professor John Halti-
wanger for giving me an opportunity to work on many extremely interesting projects
over the course of three years, some of which have resulted in co-authored papers.
He has been a great advisor, always extremely encouraging and helpful, and it has
been a great pleasure to work and interact with him.
I would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey Smith for his support, encourage-
ment and advice. Professor John Shea’s challenging questions pushed me to work
harder and made this thesis better. Thanks are also due to Professor Peter Mur-
rell and Professor Curtis Grimm for agreeing to serve on my thesis committee and
for sparing their invaluable time reviewing the manuscript. I am grateful to other
faculty members in the Department of Economics for attending my presentations
and/or taking the time to discuss my thesis topic.
Without data and a good understanding of the institutional environment, this
thesis would not have been possible, and I will be forever grateful to the following
people and agencies for the help with obtaining the data as well as relevant informa-
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Over the past decade, numerous empirical studies have found evidence sug-
gesting that the reallocation of factors of production plays a major role in driving
productivity growth (see, e.g., Olley and Pakes [1996], Griliches and Regev [1995],
Foster et al. [2001] and Bartelsman et al. [2004b]). The success of an economy
depends largely on how successful it is in allocating inputs and outputs across busi-
nesses efficiently with the minimum disruption and frictions (see, e.g., Eslava et al.
[2004]). Allocation of inputs and outputs is occurring on a daily basis, via the entry
of new firms and exit of unprofitable firms, as well as via the continuing process
of adaptation of incumbent firms in response to the development of new products
and processes, the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive forces
(Davis and Haltiwanger [1999]).
Since such reallocation is part and parcel of aggregate productivity growth, it
is important to understand its nature and what causes the differences in aggregate
productivity growth across countries. Part of the explanation are market condi-
tions and technological factors. For example, some industries have higher job flows
than others and some industries have to replace the technology they use more often
than others. Smaller businesses are more dynamic because they adjust through a
learning-by-doing process. Another part of the explanation is institutional factors,
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which work either in the same or in the opposite direction as the technological and
market driven forces. Caballero and Hammour [2000a] argue that a poor insti-
tutional environment inhibits reallocation and causes stagnation in the process of
creative destruction. For example, if establishing a new firm is costly both in terms
of money and time, entry of new firms will be low, and incumbent, yet unprofitable,
firms will be more likely to stay in business.
Events in the past two decades offer a host of opportunities to study the inter-
twinement of technological and market driven factors with institutional factors in
explaining why certain countries grow faster than others. Studies of the transition
of former socialist and communist economies towards a market economy as well as
deregulation and liberalization in other parts of the world (India, Latin America)
provide evidence for the increased importance of market driven factors as an unfa-
vorable and prohibitive institutional environment improves. Eslava et al. [2004], for
example, find that the net contribution of entry and exit to aggregate productivity
rose slightly after market reforms in Colombia. Research is further fueled by the
increasing availability of longitudinal micro level databases which are instrumental
in applying theoretical advances to empirical work. These data reveal substantial
heterogeneity across businesses and workers.
This thesis makes use of such longitudinal micro level databases in examining
the role of institutions in productivity and reallocation dynamics. For the most part,
it is focused on Slovenia, one of the most successful transition countries, and its
experience during the course of transition with respect to the allocation of resources
and structure of wages. We augment it with findings from a cross-country study of
2
the impact of institutions on job flows. We do not consider welfare implications in
any of the chapters that follow.
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the impact
of state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty on the allocation
of resources. Such aid can postpone the exit of unprofitable firms and thus shift
the burden of structural adjustment onto more efficient firms who are managing
without it. We investigate the impact of this aid on the static and dynamic efficiency
of Slovenian manufacturing by combining the aid data with firm-level accounting
data. Evaluating the impact of state aid on the allocative efficiency of an economy is
difficult due to the lack of a counterfactual and because of selection bias. The latter
arises because firms that receive aid may differ from firms that do not receive aid
along other dimensions. We use treatment effects estimators that assume selection
on observables (linear regression models) and estimators that explicitly allow for
selection on unobservables (instrumental variables). Our identification strategy in
the latter models involves using variables that affect the chances of getting aid
before 2002, but not after. The empirical analysis reveals that state aid hindered
the efficient static allocation of resources, as measured by the Olley and Pakes [1996]-
inspired micro covariance measure. None of the firms that received aid exited, aid
had a positive impact on the growth rate of market shares, but aid did not have a
significant impact on the growth of TFP (total factor productivity). These results
suggest that aid was distortive.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the role of industry, size and regulations in the mag-
nitude of job flows across a sample of 16 industrial and emerging economies over the
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1990s. We exploit a harmonized firm level dataset drawn from business registers and
enterprise census data. The chapter assesses the importance of technological factors
that characterize different industries in explaining cross country differences in job
flows. It shows that industry effects play an important role in shaping job flows at
the aggregate level. Even more importantly, differences in the size composition of
firms within each industry explain a large fraction of the overall variability in job
creation and destruction. However, even after controlling for industry/technology
and size factors there remain significant differences in job flows across countries that
could reflect differences in business environment conditions. We look at one factor
shaping the business environment, namely regulations on the hiring and firing of
workers. To minimize possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems asso-
ciated with cross country regressions, we use a difference-in-difference approach.
The empirical results suggest that stringent hiring and firing regulations reduce job
turnover, especially in those industries that require more frequent labor adjustment.
Regulations also distort the patterns of industry/size flows. Within each industry,
medium and large firms are more severely affected by stringent labor regulations,
while small firms are less affected, probably because they are partially exempted
from such regulations or can more easily circumvent them.
In Chaper 4, we study the structure of wages and the importance of person
and firm fixed effects in explaining the variance of log real hourly wages in Slovenia
in the 1990s, using a matched employer-employee database covering more than 90
percent of the economy. The late 1980s and 1990s were a period of fundamental
political and economic changes in Slovenia, with significant changes in employment
4
and wage policies. Under self-management, wage scales were extremely compressed.
The new, three-component wage setting system, provided more flexibility in 1991,
allowing firm- and worker-specific deviations from the wage guidelines set in col-
lective bargaining agreements. However, the incomes policies still suppressed the
growth of wages, especially of the managerial workforce, until 1997. We exploit this
change in the wage setting system to compare the wage structure in the early 1990s
to the wage structure in the late 1990s. We estimate a model with observable person
characteristics, a model with observable person characteristics and industry or firm
fixed effects, and finally a model with firm and person fixed effects and time-variant
person effects. Our results indicate that the wage structure changed significantly in
the late 1990s compared to the early 1990s, even though the increase in returns to
education was not as large as it was in the first few years of the transition. The
magnitude, however, depends on the model assumed. We show that it is extremely
important to include person fixed effects in the model, as they accounted for more
than 90 percent of the variation in log real hourly wages. Firm fixed effects are
not nearly as important - hence, it appears that although where you work is not of
negligible importance, it matters much more how good you are at what you do.
Chapter 5 provides the conclusion to the thesis.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of State Aid for Restructuring on the
Allocation of Resources
2.1 Introduction
Aggregate productivity growth has been the subject of numerous studies, and
our understanding of it as well as its measurement has improved since Solow [1957].
We now know that the representative firm paradigm, on which the aggregate pro-
duction function approach is based, does not hold in the real world; on the contrary,
there is substantial heterogeneity across businesses. Longitudinal micro business
databases are becoming more widely available, allowing one to study the restruc-
turing of economies due to a continuous process of entry and exit of businesses, and
expansion and contraction of incumbents.
Recent empirical work has shown that the success of an economy depends
largely on how successful it is in allocating inputs and outputs across businesses ef-
ficiently with minimum disruption and frictions (see, e.g., Eslava et al. [2004]). The
process of allocation consists of two complementary components, cross-sectional
(static) allocation and longitudinal (dynamic) allocation of inputs and outputs from
less productive to more productive businesses. Olley and Pakes [1996] investigate the
first component, whether more productive businesses have a higher market share.
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The importance of the second component is explored by, among others, Foster et al.
[2001]. They find that most productivity growth (using a five-year window) is ex-
plained by growth within firms, but that the net contribution of entry and exit is
far from negligible.
Cross-country studies find that there are substantial differences among coun-
tries both in the contribution of continuing, entering and exiting firms to aggregate
productivity growth as well as in their cross-sectional allocative efficiency. Possible
explanations for this heterogeneity lie in different market institutions and market
structures. Caballero and Hammour [2000a] argue that the function of institutions
is twofold, one of efficiency and one of redistribution, and both are important for
macroeconomic outcomes. A poor institutional environment results in technologi-
cal “sclerosis” since it “permits low-productivity units to survive longer than they
would in an efficient equilibrium” (Caballero and Hammour [2000a], p. 20) and
thereby causes stagnation in the process of creative destruction. Escribano and
Guasch [2004] and Haltiwanger and Schweiger [2005] find that an adverse business
climate has a negative impact on static allocative efficiency. Eslava et al. [2004]
find that after market reforms in Colombia, the net contribution of entry and exit
to aggregate productivity rose slightly and that surviving entrants exhibited more
rapid productivity growth than incumbents. Olley and Pakes [1996] reach a simi-
lar conclusion for static allocative efficiency in the telecommunications equipment
industry after a deregulation. Based on the evidence from a number of developing
countries, Tybout [2000] suggests that policies matter: “market share turnover rates
are much higher in Korea and Taiwan than in Latin America, where labor markets
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are relatively regulated” (p. 27).
A problem with the above studies is that they use quite broad measures of
institutions, mostly at the country level, and/or survey data with questionable rep-
resentativeness of the entire economy.1 This chapter is the first to use census micro
level data on a market institution with a potentially very distortive effect, namely
state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty.2 Such aid can post-
pone the exit of unprofitable firms and thus shift the burden of structural adjustment
onto more efficient firms who are managing without it. This problem is relevant not
only in transition and developing economies, but also in developed economies. State
aid provides soft budget constraints to the firms receiving it, and soft budget con-
straints have an influence on the life-cycle of firms and thus market selection, which
in turn affects aggregate productivity growth.3 A study by London Economics [2004]
is the only existing work to evaluate the impact of rescue and restructuring aid on
international competitiveness, but they focus only on a few sectors and case studies.
We investigate the impact of aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms
in difficulty on static and dynamic efficiency4 of Slovenian manufacturing in the
period from 1998 to 2003 by combining firm-level data on state aid with firm-level
accounting data and information on aid legislation. Slovenia is a transition economy,
but major changes in its economy happened prior to 1998, and it is comparable to
1Surveys such as the World Bank’s Productivity and Investment Climate Survey tend to focus
on medium and large businesses, and hence their samples are not necessarily representative of the
entire economy.
2In this chapter, “state aid” and “aid” refer to the state aid for the rescue and restructuring
of firms in difficulty, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
3See Kornai et al. [2003] for a definition and survey of the soft budget constraints literature.
4From the social viewpoint, such aid might have some positive effects, such as keeping people
employed, but we are primarily interested in its impact on allocative efficiency.
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other old EU member countries in terms of state aid per capita and percentage of
sectoral aid in GDP, which includes restructuring and rescue aid.5 The majority
of non-agricultural state aid has been oriented towards manufacturing in almost
all members of the EU, and policy makers in many countries have paid special
attention to manufacturing, either because they view it as “the leading edge of
modernization and skilled job creation, as well as a fundamental source of various
positive spillovers” (Tybout [2000], p.11) or because a lot of restructuring was going
on in manufacturing in the 1990s.
Evaluating the impact of aid on static and dynamic efficiency is difficult due
to the lack of a counterfactual and the need to handle selection bias. The latter
arises from the fact that firms that receive aid usually differ from firms that do
not receive aid along other dimensions. We use treatment effects estimators that
assume selection on observables and estimators that explicitly allow for selection on
unobservables. Our identification strategy in the latter models involves firm-level
variables that affect the likelihood of receiving aid prior to 2002, but not after 2002,
when Slovenia sharply scaled back its aid in order to comply with EU regulations.
None of the firms that received aid ceased to exist during this period and, overall,
exit rates were low compared to those in the OECD countries, so most of the “action”
happened among the continuing firms and the allocation of resources among them.
The empirical analysis reveals that state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms
in difficulty hindered the efficient allocation of resources, and that it had a positive
5This can be seen from the data on state aid in Commission of the EC [2004], presented in
Appendix A.
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impact on the growth rate of market shares of weak firms. This indicates that aid
had a distortive effect.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we review related litera-
ture on static and dynamic efficiency. We describe the background and data sources
in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, estimation methods are discussed and Section 2.5
presents the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Allocative Efficiency
Aid can postpone the exit of unprofitable firms and thus shift the burden
of structural adjustment onto more efficient firms who are managing without it.
Hence, aid can have an impact not only on the exit decision of firms, but also on
the allocation of inputs and outputs across firms. Aggregate productivity growth
depends on both, as we explain in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Static Allocative Efficiency
Aggregate productivity and its growth depend not only on how productive
businesses are on average, but also on whether more productive businesses have a
higher market share. Olley and Pakes [1996] show this formally by decomposing
aggregate productivity P in an industry j at time t as follows:




∆sit,j = sit,j − s̄t,j ∆pit,j = pit,j − p̄t,j (2.1)
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where i denotes firm, t denotes time, j denotes 2-digit industry, bar denotes un-
weighted average, H represents the number of firms, s is firm i’s domestic market
share in industry j and p is a measure of productivity.
The first term in (2.1) is unweighted average productivity in industry j at time
t and the second term is a covariance term, which measures cross-sectional allocative
efficiency. Ideally, this covariance would be positive, which happens when firms with
higher (lower) productivity than average have higher (lower) than average market
shares. Besides providing an intuitive and compact measure of allocative efficiency,
another advantage of the covariance is that it is more comparable across sectors
than average productivity itself, since the first moment differences across sectors are
differenced out. It is a cross-sectional measure, but it makes sense to compare its
values over time: a higher covariance in year t than in year t − 1 implies that the
economy has improved its allocative efficiency.
Based on equation (2.1), there are two sources of aggregate productivity growth:
improvements in productivity of the average firm and improvements in allocative
efficiency:








Olley and Pakes [1996] find that in the US telecommunications equipment industry,
the source of aggregate productivity growth was the reallocation of output from less
productive to more productive plants. Following the deregulation of the industry,
the allocation of output improved significantly.
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A burgeoning literature of cross-country studies, such as Bartelsman et al.
[2005] using a World Bank dataset on firm demographics and productivity,6 find
that there is substantial heterogeneity in static allocative efficiency among countries.
Escribano and Guasch [2004] and Haltiwanger and Schweiger [2005] use firm-level
data from the World Bank’s Productivity and the Investment Climate Survey and
come to a similar conclusion.
We use TFP as a measure of productivity. Labor-productivity-based covari-
ance only looks at whether workers and output are allocated in less productive or
more productive firms, and this captures only part of allocative efficiency, since
workers are not the only input used in production. For the economy to achieve a
higher productivity, other inputs such as capital need to be allocated to more pro-
ductive firms as well. If a firm lays off workers who subsequently find work in more
productive firms, but keeps the machinery and equipment these workers used laying
idle, this will have a positive impact on labor-productivity-based covariance, but
not necessarily on TFP-based covariance. Due to this fact and the problems with
the measure of labor mentioned in Appendix B, where a more detailed description
of productivity measurement is available, our preferred measure of productivity is
TFP.
We define a firm-level measure of allocative efficiency, called micro covariance,
as a cross product between the percentage deviation of the firm’s market share
from the average market share in industry j and the deviation of the firm’s log
6A detailed technical description of the dataset may be found in Bartelsman et al. [2004a]. It
contains several firm demographics and productivity indicators and was prepared using firm-level
data.
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Escribano and Guasch [2004] define a similar micro covariance measure with-
out dividing by s̄t,j. The advantage of the definition in equation (2.3) is that it
is independent of scale, since it is a product of a percentage deviation and a log
deviation. The measure of allocative efficiency defined in (2.3) is interpreted as
the contribution of a firm to aggregate allocative efficiency. If the firm has above
average productivity and above average market share, then this measure is positive
and shows that the firm contributes positively to aggregate allocative efficiency. If a
firm has below average productivity, but above average market share, this measure
is negative and implies that there are some imperfections in the economy that allow
the less productive firm to keep a higher market share than would correspond to its
lower than average productivity.
Both Escribano and Guasch [2004] and Haltiwanger and Schweiger [2005] ex-
amine the empirical relationship between cross-country differences in static alloca-
tive efficiency and cross-country differences in business climate. They find that an
adverse business climate has an adverse impact on static allocative efficiency. Escrib-
ano and Guasch [2004] show that simple non-linear models with interaction terms
explain almost 30 percent of the efficiency variation between Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua.
One drawback to both of these papers is that they use survey data that over-
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represents medium and large firms and old firms, as shown in Haltiwanger and
Schweiger [2004]. In addition, the data consist only of continuing firms; entry and
exit cannot be measured. A second potential drawback is that the business climate
indicators are based on the qualitative, subjective responses of firm administrators,
and measure the perception of firms about the business climate in the country,
not the actual business climate. For certain purposes that is precisely what is
desired, but the causal interpretation of the link between the perception of the
business climate and firm performance is problematic. On the one hand, firms may
be convinced that an adverse business climate is the main culprit for their woes
and use it as an excuse not to take steps to improve performance. On the other
hand, a firm that is doing well will probably be satisfied with the business climate.
Perception of the business climate might also depend on who answers the survey and
his or her attitude towards the government. The advantage of our chapter is that
it uses administrative census firm-level data on state aid and firm characteristics.
2.2.2 Dynamic Allocative Efficiency
Reallocation of output from less productive to more productive firms is facili-
tated by reallocation of output among continuing firms as well as by entry and exit,
as Olley and Pakes [1996] note. Griliches and Regev [1995] decompose the growth of
14











































where ∆ now represents a change between year t − k and year t,8 pit is the i -th
firm’s productivity level, sit is the i -th firm’s share of output, C, N , and X are
sets of continuing, entering and exiting firms, respectively, and Pt is the aggregate
productivity level in year t. The first term is the within-firm effect, which reflects
within-firm productivity growth weighted by the average output share. The sec-
ond term is the between-firm effect, reflecting the gains in aggregate productivity
coming from the expanding market shares of high productivity firms, or from low
productivity firms’ shrinking shares. The last two terms capture the contribution
of entering and exiting firms, respectively.
Using the already mentioned World Bank dataset on firm demographics and
productivity, Bartelsman et al. [2004b] find that most productivity growth (using a
five-year window) is explained by the within-firm component, but the net contribu-
tion of entry and exit is far from negligible - it is generally positive and accounts
for between 20 to 50 percent of total productivity growth. Schumpeterian “creative
7Other versions of this decomposition are shown by Baldwin and Gorecki [1991], Baldwin [1995]
and Foster et al. [2001].
8Note that in equation (2.1), ∆ represents a deviation from an unweighted average, and is a
cross-sectional difference.
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destruction” is thus occuring, as more productive entrants appear to displace less
productive exiting businesses.
However, this does not mean that it is not worth looking at countries with a
low contribution of entering and/or exiting firms. In that case, the reallocation of
output happens predominantly among continuers, and the fact that the contribu-
tion of entering and/or exiting firms is low could indicate there are some important
frictions in the economy. Indeed, existing studies find that market institutions play
an important role. Disney et al. [2003b] find that increased competition boosts pro-
ductivity and, on the flip side, that keeping poorly performing plants alive removes
an important contribution to productivity growth. Similarly, Olley and Pakes [1996]
find that deregulation in the telecommunications industry “improved performance
by inducing a reallocation of capital to more productive plants” (p. 1292).
We follow standard conventions in the literature to define continuing, entering
and exiting firms. We determine continuing firms, entering, exiting, and one-year
firms on the basis of the availability of their accounting data, using the following
conventions:9
9Since some firms have missing data for some years, strictly applying the above rule would result
in spurious entry and exit. We account for such missing years in our measurement procedure. For
example, if firm A is in the sample in t − 1 and t, as well as in t + 2, but not in t + 1, we treat
firm A as a continuing firm in t. We rely on firm birth data in combination with the above rule to
identify entering firms. We use the online Business Register and the Official Gazzette to determine
whether a firm actually exited or ceased to exist as a result of a merger or acquisition, in which
case we do not classify it as an exiting firm.
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Firm Type Definitions
Continuing firm (CO) Exists in t− 1, t, and t + 1
Entering firm (EN) Exists in t and t + 1, but not in t− 1
Exiting firm (EX) Exists in t− 1 and t, but not in t + 1
One-year firm (OY) Exists in t, but not in t− 1 and t + 1
2.2.3 Aid for the Rescue and Restructuring of Firms and Allocative
Efficiency
Theories of market selection (for example, Jovanovic [1982] and Caballero and
Hammour [1994]) point out the productivity-survival link as a “crucial driver of
productivity growth” (Foster et al. [2003]): more productive firms grow while less
productive firms shrink and eventually cease to exist. Aid to firms in difficulty can
prolong the life span of firms and thus have an impact on allocative efficiency. It
may help low productivity firms obtain higher market shares, stifling the market
shares of high productivity firms, and have a negative impact on static allocative
efficiency. The measure proposed in Section 2.2.1 has the advantage of addressing
both the market share and productivity channels of impact on aggregate produc-
tivity succinctly, and could as such be a good indicator for the impact of aid. Its
disadvantages are that it provides no information on which one of the two channels
is actually affected by aid and that it provides no information on the impact of aid
on exit.
There are a couple of alternative ways of gauging the impact of aid on real-
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location: through its impact on exit decisions or through its separate impacts on
the growth of market shares and productivity. We define the growth rate of market
shares using the Davis et al. [1996] definitions as:
sit,j − sit−1,j
0.5 ∗ (sit,j + sit−1,j)
.
This growth rate measure ranges from -2 to +2 and treats expansion and contraction
symmetrically, unlike the conventional growth rate measure. The growth rate of
productivity is defined as the difference in log productivity, pit − pit−1.
We consider all of the above mentioned indicators in this chapter. Before
proceeding to the estimation methodology and results, we describe the data and the
relevant background information, that forms the basis of our estimation strategy.
2.3 Data Sources and Institutional Background
2.3.1 Data Sources
The data for our research come from six major sources: PASEF - The Data
Analysis Service of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Ljubljana; CSAC
- Commission for State Aid Control at the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of
Slovenia; the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (henceforth SORS); the
Business Register of Slovenia (henceforth BRS); the Ministry of the Economy, and
the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia On-line. We describe each of these
data sources below, including the variables and/or information they contain and
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problems, if applicable.
The PASEF database contains balance sheets and income statements for all
businesses (excluding sole proprietors and the banking industry), in Slovenia from
1995 to 2003. For reasons mentioned in the introduction (most of the non-agricultural
state aid has been oriented towards manufacturing, special attention paid to manu-
facturing), we will only use data for manufacturing firms.10 In addition to accounting
data, the database contains a unique 7-digit firm ID number,11 a 5-digit industry
code,12 information on ownership (co-operative, private, social, state, and mixed)
and source of capital (domestic, foreign, or mixed) prior to 2001, the municipality
and region in which the firm is located, and the average number of persons in paid
employment based on hours worked. According to the Law on Enterprises, all firms
that are registered in any given year are supposed to provide balance sheets and
income statements to the relevant government agency, regardless of whether they
were in business the entire year.13
Our data on state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty
were prepared by CSAC, and cover the period from 1998 to 2003.14 The data in-
10PASEF obtained the data from SORS, which collected these reports until July 2002, and from
AJPES (Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services), which
collected the data from July 2002 onwards.
11This 7-digit number identifies the firm uniquely. It is given to the firm at the time of its
registration for the first time and may not be used for a different/new firm once the original firm
ceases to exist. However, there are two exceptions: i) if firm A merges with firm B, the combined
firm gets a new 7-digit ID, ii) if firm A acquires firm B, the ID of firm B ceases to exist and the
new firm has the ID of firm A. Hence, we cannot keep track of mergers and acquisitions from this
database.
12Refer to Appendix E for the names of the industry codes. The classification used is NACE
Rev. 3.
13Firms that go into bankruptcy are required to provide this information at most 2 months
after their bankruptcy. However, there are on average 5 percent of all firms every year that fail
to provide their accounting information and are required to pay a fee according to the Law on
Enterprises.
14Until 2003, firms in difficulty were able to obtain state aid for rescue and restructuring from a
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clude registration numbers of the providing agency and aid recipient,15 date of aid
approval, date of aid provision, legal foundation, documentation, legal act, instru-
ment and purpose of aid, and the amount of state aid. The dataset has its flaws
and most likely underestimates state aid to firms in difficulty,16 but according to
the CSAC staff, its coverage and quality is getting better every year, and it is the
best source available.
We obtain a list of firms considered to be labor intensive in 1996 from the
Ministry of the Economy. Labor intensive firms had priority in the aid allocation
process, so we use this list to define an indicator for these firms.
From SORS we obtain price indices and data on the registered unemployment
rate by region and municipality. The producer price index (PPI) is publicly available
for our sample period only at the 2-digit industry level; since 2001 SORS has also
published the PPI at the 4-digit industry level, although the data are confidential
in some industries due to the small number of firms. The intermediate goods price
index (IGPI) and the capital goods price index (CGPI) are available only for the
total economy and for Mining and Quarrying (10-14), Manufacturing (15-37), and
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply (40-41).
From the Business Register of Slovenia (BRS) we obtain data on the year in
which each business was first registered (i.e., the birth of the firm). For some firms
number of different agencies, depending on their circumstances. Since 2003, ME has been the only
agency that can give aid to firms in difficulty (in cooperation with other agencies), which makes
the state aid data more transparent.
15The latter equals the unique 7-digit firm ID number from the PASEF data.
16In earlier years when work on the database started, some aid donors kept poor or no records of
the aid they gave to firms. In manufacturing, the coverage is likely to be better than in agriculture,
because the ME kept quite good records from 1995 onwards and was one of the two major donors.
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the reported birth year varies from year to year; our data assumes that the earliest
reported birth year is valid. Large state firms that were broken up into smaller units
also create problems; for example, a number of firms that were supposedly registered
for the first time in 1999 were parts of larger firms prior to 1999, and hence are not
truly entering firms. Similarly, some firms appear to exit in 1998, but were actually
merged with their parent company. The detection of such firms is tedious, requires
knowledge of events in Slovenia and has to be done on a case-by-case basis. Under
these circumstances, we have decided against using the actual age of firms as one
of our control variables; instead, we use a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is at
least 10 years old and 0 otherwise.
The Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia On-line was our resource for
legislation, regulations, public tenders and other measures pertinent to state aid for
the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty, as well as information that helped
us determine whether an exiting firm actually exited or only initiated bankruptcy
procedures.
2.3.2 Institutional Background
In Slovenia, state aid first became officially available after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, when the country took its first steps on the path towards a market
economy. Prior to 1989, firms could count on the government to save them if they
got into financial trouble, though such aid was not officially called state aid.
In this chapter, our focus is on the rescue and restructuring aid in manufactur-
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ing. Such aid can only be given to firms in difficulty and has officially been available
since 1995.17 Until 2003, firms in difficulty were eligible to get state aid from various
agencies under certain conditions, defined either in legislation or public tenders,18
and using a number of different instruments.19,20
Conditions under which rescue and restructuring aid could be granted differed
somewhat among different aid agencies. However, there were also a number of
common criteria. Only medium and large firms were eligible for such aid, and
these were defined using number of workers, revenue and assets (see Appendix D
for details). Priority was given to labor intensive firms, where labor intensity was
defined as “employing a lot of workers who earn low wages” (according to a personal
conversation with Igor Naglič from the Ministry of the Economy), rather than having
a high ratio of labor to capital.
Priority was also given to firms with losses in at least two out of three con-
secutive years and firms with a higher share of debt financing than the industry
average.21 Given that firms in difficulty required a lot of labor restructuring, pri-
17A firm is defined to be in difficulty when it is not able, with its own resources or resources
it is able to obtain from its owners/shareholders or creditors, to halt negative business trends
that without state intervention would threaten the survival of the firm. Newly founded companies,
companies formed through liquidation of a previous company and related companies are not entitled
to rescue and restructuring aid, unless it is possible to demonstrate that the causes of the difficulties
are in the enterprise itself and not the result of arbitrary reallocation of costs between them.
18We present an abbreviated version of these conditions here; more detail is available upon
request.
19These instruments were: a) grants, direct interest subsidies, loan remission, b) tax deferrals,
tax exemptions and relief, exemptions and relief on the payment of social security contributions,
c) equity investments, conversion of debt into equity participation, d) soft loans from public and
private sources, loans to companies in difficulty, e) guarantees for non-commercial and/or commer-
cial risks, payment of guaranteed obligations, and f) other sources of aid.
20Most of the aid was given by the Ministry of the Economy (ME) and the Development
Corporation of Slovenia (DCS); together, these two agencies accounted for more than 80 percent
of all such aid. Other donors were the Ministry for Labor, Family and Social Affairs (MLFSA),
the Employment Services of Slovenia (ESS) and the Ministry of Finance (MF).
21Depending on the aid program, industry was sometimes defined at the 4-digit level, and
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ority was given to firms in regions with an above average unemployment rates or
in lower development. Finally, firms with survival and growth potential were given
priority, though the legislation and/or public tenders did not specify the criteria
according to which potential would be judged. The selection criteria were used
primarily to exclude firms from obtaining state aid, and were sometimes applied
selectively based on the political preferences of the people involved in the process.
However, we will establish below that the official criteria were still relevant.
As a share of GDP, aid allocated was relatively negligible, and this share was
generally decreasing over time, but the percentage of firms that received aid was far
from negligible in certain sectors, as Figure 2.1 illustrates. In addition, these firms
employed about one sixth of workers in manufacturing and also accounted for one
tenth of total manufacturing output prior to 2002, as Table 2.1 shows. Within some
2-digit industries, more than 40 percent of workers were employed in aid-receiving
firms.22
There was a sharp decrease in both the aid allocated and the number of recip-
ients in 2002. New restrictions on state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms
in difficulty were officially adopted in July 2000.23 These restrictions were adopted
to harmonize Slovenian legislation with the EU restrictions, and were part of the
process by which Slovenia prepared for membership in the EU (Slovenia joined the
sometimes at the 2-digit level.
22The presence of aid thus also likely had an impact on the timing and magnitude of job flows,
the analysis of which is not part of this chapter, but will be part of future analysis.
23Decree on the purposes and conditions for the granting of state aid and on the appointment
of the ministries responsible for managing individual aid schemes, The Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No. 59, 2000, June 30, 2000.
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EU on May 1, 2004).24 Under these new restrictions, aid for resolving financial
problems could be granted only once, and aid for restructuring could be repeated
only after ten years absent exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances over which
the firm has no control. Prior to 2000, several firms in our data received aid multiple
times.
Other major changes occured earlier. The process of trade liberalization had
begun in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia prior to 1991, and Slovenia
continued the liberalization of import regimes and the removal of import charges and
numerous tariff exemptions when it became independent. The previous protection
policy was nontransparent, which led to a number of undesireable outcomes, such
as inefficient use of factors of production and inappropriate development of the
structure of the economy. Prior to independence, Slovenian producers enjoyed high
levels of protection, and nonprice measures (quotas, licenses, etc.) were extremely
important. In 1986, free imports represented only 3 percent of import value; this
increased to 78 percent by 1990, to 97 percent in 1993 and 98 percent in 1996 (see
Majcen and Kaminski [2004], p. 137). The only exceptions in the trade liberalization
process were the agriculture, food processing and textile industries. Even prior to
1991, Slovenia’s major trading partners were in the EU (Germany and Italy) and
a trade agreement between the EU and Slovenia was in effect by January 1, 1997;
exports had never been strictly directed towards the Eastern bloc.
24Slovenia declared its goal of joining the EU upon its declaration of independence in 1991, it
signed the European Agreement in 1996 and negotiations to join the EU officially began in 1998.
Hence, changes in legislation were to be expected, and there was presumably no jump in firms’
perceptions about the likelihood of Slovenia joining the EU when the actual changes in legislation
on state aid occured.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Firms that Received State Aid for the Rescue and Re-
structuring to Firms in Difficulty by Firm Size and 2-digit Industry,
1998-2003
Note: Refer to Appendix E for the names of 2-digit industries.
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF databases.
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Table 2.1: Percentage of Firms that Received Aid - Manufacturing, 1998-2003
Labor Intensive & Medium or Large &
Year Received Aid Received Aid Received Aid
Firms Labor Output Firms Labor Output Firms Labor Output
1998 1.586 15.204 11.251 1.315 14.352 10.689 1.503 15.165 11.218
1999 2.867 16.422 10.395 2.197 14.128 8.603 2.469 16.137 10.313
2000 2.605 18.263 11.344 1.918 15.794 9.372 2.376 18.013 11.284
2001 1.091 9.910 4.605 0.823 9.223 4.170 1.029 9.875 4.598
2002 0.140 2.959 0.748 0.120 2.898 0.743 0.120 2.898 0.743
2003 0.196 3.332 0.783 0.196 3.332 0.783 0.157 3.225 0.759
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
Table 2.2: Number of Firms that Received Aid Pre- and Post-2002, Manufacturing
Size Labor Intensity
Medium or Large Small Labor Intensive Non-Labor Intensive
Pre-2002 354 37 300 91
2002-2003 16 1 16 1
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
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Slovenia’s labor market reform was slow and cautious. The government re-
tained strict employment protection legislation, maintained a costly unemployment
benefits system, imposed a heavy tax burden on labor (tax wedge of 48 percent), and
kept minimum wages relatively high (40 percent of average wages). The 1991 Labor
Code remained in power until 2003, with minor modifications, and the 2003 Labor
Code still makes it hard for employers to lay off workers for “economic reasons” (see
Vodopivec [2004] for more details).
The allocation of aid also differed by region,25 as Table 2.3 illustrates.26 Re-
gions that received disproportionate amounts of state aid in general had high un-
employment rates (Podravska, Pomurska, Zasavska, Spodnjeposavska) and/or were
underdeveloped as measured by gross value added per capita (Podravska, Zasavska,
Pomurska).27,28 Regional differences in aid receipt are partly due to differences in
the distribution of industry across regions. In addition, some regions were hit harder
than others by the disintegration of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and other
political changes at the beginning of the 1990s. Hard-hit regions such as Gorenjska,
Savinjska, Podravska, Koroska and Zasavska were characterized by large manufac-
turing firms that had problems adjusting to the market economy and finding new
markets. The Pomurska region, meanwhile, has always been the least developed
25The capital, Ljubljana, is located in the Osrednjeslovenska region.
26Regional classification changed in 2000. Southern parts of the Osrednjeslovenska region were
classified together with the Dolenjska region as the Jugovzhodna region. Other regions remained
the same. In the chapter, we use the pre-2000 classification.
27Gross domestic output per capita by region would be a better measure of development, but
SORS has only calculated GDP by region for 1999 and 2001, and their methodology changed in
between. We have calculated gross value added per region using the entire PASEF database on all
firms in Slovenia, and used the data on population by region from SORS to calculate gross value
added per capita.
28Gorenjska did not have a higher than average registered uneployment rate and/or a lower
than average gross value added per capita; however, the steel industry was concentrated there.
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Table 2.3: Ratio of Share of State Aid Received vs. Share of Output Produced by
Region, 1998-2003
Year
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Dolenjska 0.038 0.207
Gorenjska 0.595 1.513 0.736 0.870 7.830 1.488
Goriska 0.155 0.313 0.648 0.142 0 1.490
Jugovzhodna 0.722 0.078 0 0.068
Koroska 0.474 2.179 1.208 0.312 4.931 0
Notranjsko-kraska 0.086 0.280 0.699 0 0 0
Obalno-kraska 2.180 0.559 0.173 0.805 0 7.662
Osrednjeslovenska 1.548 1.388 0.884 1.733 0 0.201
Podravska 1.239 0.804 2.928 1.154 1.027 0.121
Pomurska 0.141 0.105 0.274 0.017 0.401 9.763
Savinjska 0.133 0.378 0.599 0.051 0.010 0.076
Spodnjeposavska 0.934 0.676 1.235 0.754 0.058 1.483
Zasavska 0.180 1.681 1.409 0.012 0 0
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
region in Slovenia, with mostly agricultural activity and limited opportunities even
prior to the 1990s.
2.4 Estimation Methods
Evaluating the impact of state aid on static and dynamic allocative efficiency is
difficult due to the lack of a counterfactual and because of selection bias. The former
asks what would have happened if the firm had been subject to an alternative policy
(for example, if a firm received aid, what would have happened to its behavior if it
had not received aid, and if the firm did not receive aid, what would have happened
to its behavior had it received aid). The latter arises from the fact that firms that
receive aid usually differ from firms that do not receive aid along other dimensions.
The average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as the difference of the expected
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outcomes with aid and without aid:
ATE = E
(




Y 0 |D = 0
)
, (2.5)
where Y 1 indicates outcome with aid, Y 0 indicates outcome without aid and D is a
binary indicator equal to 1 if a firm receives aid. This estimate includes the effect on
firms for which aid was never intended. The average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT ) focuses explicitly on the firms that received aid and is defined as:
ATT = E
(




Y 0 |D = 1
)
. (2.6)
Under the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, ATT is identical to ATE,
but this is not the case under the assumption of heterogeneous treatment effects
(Blundell and Costa Dias [2000]).
In general, experimental evaluation is the preferred method to estimate treat-
ment effects; however, given that firms are not assigned randomly to a group that
receives aid and a control group that does not receive aid, experimental data are
not available. We have to use non-experimental evaluation estimators and rely on
the information on how firms actually performed after some of them received aid
and others did not. Non-experimental treatment effects estimators can be grouped
under two categories based on how they handle selection bias. The first category
contains estimators that rely on selection on observables and the second category
contains estimators explicitly allowing selection on unobservables (Caliendo and Hu-
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jer [2005]).
2.4.1 Selection on Observables
OLS regression implicitly relies on the assumption of selection on observables.29
The equation of interest can be written as:
yit = β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit, (2.7)
where i denotes firm, t denotes time, y is the outcome variable of interest (micro
covariance, growth of market share or growth of productivity), AID is a dummy




1 if firm receives aid in t;
0 otherwise,
(2.8)
and X is a vector of controls.
The assumption needed to identify the average treatment effect of aid is that
conditioning linearly on X suffices to eliminate selection bias. This assumption
might fail and lead to biased estimates. In our case, the direction of bias is not
clear, since different scenarios are possible:
1. Self-selection among firms: applying for state aid is a time- and money-
29Another estimator assuming selection on observables is the matching estimator. It is based
on an identifying assumption that conditional on X, the outcome is independent of AID, but it
does not assume any particular functional forms as the linear regression model does.
30We decided to use an indicator for aid instead of amounts of aid because there are a number
of cases in which aid was given to a holding company, and there is no further information available
on which firms within a holding company received aid.
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consuming process, since by law applying firms need to prepare a restruc-
turing plan. If only inherently good firms apply, then the OLS coefficient will
be biased upwards.
2. If firms that are inherently bad are more likely to seek out political connec-
tions and if connections increase the likelihood of receiving aid conditional on
applying, and if firms are more likely to apply when the likelihood of success
is high, the OLS coefficient will be biased downwards.
3. If the government prefers to give aid to firms that it suspects to be inherently
bad, but that are located in regions with high unemployment rates and thus
potential social problems, the OLS coefficient will be biased downwards.
Whether firms are inherently “good” or inherently “bad” is not observable, so
estimators that account for selection on unobservables might be more appropriate.
2.4.2 Selection on Unobservables
The underlying instrumental variables identification strategy is to find a vari-
able that determines treatment participation but does not influence the outcome
equation. The model can be written as:
yit = β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit
AIDit−1 = φ0 + Zit−1η + Xit−1ϕ + εit−1 (2.9)
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where Z is a vector of instrumental variables and the rest is the same as in equation
(2.7).
IV requires the existence of at least one independent variable Z affecting AID,
but not directly affecting the outcome. The vector Z thus has to have a non-zero
coefficient in the decision rule in equation (2.9), and it must be uncorrelated with
the error terms u and ε given X. A good instrument is hard to come by, since it has
to predict participation, but not otherwise influence the outcome equation. If the
instrument is correlated with ε, the IV estimate will be biased.31
Our identification strategy involves using variables that affect the likelihood of
getting aid prior to 2002, but not afterwards when aid became less available. These
variables may be directly correlated with outcomes, but β1 can still be identified as
long as the direct impact of these variables on outcomes did not change in 2002. We
exploit the variation in aid receipt driven by three factors: (1) differential likelihood
of getting aid pre- and post-2002, (2) differential likelihood of getting aid for labor
intensive firms versus non-labor intensive firms, and (3) differential likelihood of
getting aid for medium and large firms versus small firms. We discuss each of these
factors in turn.
First, firms were more likely to get aid prior to 2002. As described in sec-
tion 2.2.3, new restrictions on state aid were officially adopted in 2000, but they
actually had a major effect on aid availability only when the largest donor, the
31Under the constant treatment effects assumption (i.e., the impact of treatment is the same for
every unit in the population) the IV estimate represents a population average. In a heterogeneous
treatment effects world, where the instrument is correlated with the impact and monotonicity
holds, the IV estimator gives the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), defined as a mean
impact of treatment on compliers (those who respond to the instrument by taking the treatment
when they otherwise would not) (Angrist et al. [1996]).
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Development Corporation of Slovenia (DCS), ceased to exist in 2002. These restric-
tions, as well as the closure of DCS, were “dictated” by the process of joining the
EU and are hence a source of exogenous variation. However, other things changed
over this period that could lead to differences in the outcomes of interest. For ex-
ample, substantial changes in the Bankruptcy Code were implemented in July 1999,
and although that had an immediate impact on the number of bankruptcies, the
response was again delayed, because the courts in Slovenia are relatively slow and
therefore bankruptcy takes time. Using pre-post 2002 variation thus may not satisfy
the exclusion restriction by itself.
Second, labor intensive firms were given priority in the aid allocation process,
and as Table 2.2 shows, they were over 3 times more likely to get aid than non-labor
intensive firms. Labor intensive firms were defined by the Ministry of the Economy
(ME) as firms employing a lot of workers who earn low wages. We use a list of
labor intensive firms dated in 1996 obtained from the ME to identify such firms in
our sample. While some firms that potentially fit this criterion after 1996 are not
defined as labor intensive, our definition has the advantage of keeping the measure
of labor intensity free from possible whims of politicians in later years and thus free
from additional selection bias. An indicator variable for labor intensive firms might
be a potential instrument. However, it fails the exclusion restriction, since transition
and/or competition may have induced more downsizing of labor intensive firms and
thus may have had an impact on outcomes directly.
Third, medium and large firms were almost 10 times more likely to get aid
than small firms. The eligibility criteria stated that only medium and large firms
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could receive aid, but in reality, some small firms also received it (either directly or
through the holding companies to which they were related).32 An indicator variable
for medium and large firms might be a potential instrument, but it fails the exclusion
restriction. Existing studies show that size of firms has an impact on the likelihood
of exit (for example, Baily et al. [1992] and Disney et al. [2003a]) and also indicate
that size matters for allocative efficiency.33.
The interaction of a pre-2002 dummy variable and an indicator for labor inten-
sive firms, controlling for baseline differences, is a valid instrument if it has no direct
effect on the outcomes of interest, which is plausible, since there are no indications
that the direct effect of labor intensity should have changed pre/post 2002. Simi-
larly, the interaction of a pre-2002 dummy variable and an indicator for medium and
large firms, controlling for baseline differences, is a valid instrument, if the effect of
size of firms on the outcomes of interest did not change pre/post 2002.
To summarize before proceeding to the estimation results, we define our two
instrumental variables, Z1 and Z2, in the following way:
Z1,it =

1 if a labor intensive firm & year prior to 2002;
0 otherwise,
(2.10)
32In Slovenia, the firm size is defined according to the Law on Enterprises (see Appendix D
for details). Since the official firm size definition changed significantly in 2002, we measure size
according to the 1997 criteria to avoid blurring the impact of aid on outcomes.
33Haltiwanger and Schweiger [2005] find that in some countries, small firms have higher static





1 if a medium or large firm & year prior to 2002;
0 otherwise.
(2.11)
Before proceeding to estimation results, we need to mention that although
AID is a binary variable, we use a linear probability model in the first stage and
not a probit or logit model. The reason for this lies in the low incidence of aid,
especially after 2002, as illustrated in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Since the probability of
receiving aid drops close to zero after 2001, maximum likelihood has a hard time
identifying the coefficients on the instruments and it wants to push them towards
either plus or minus infinity. Angrist [2001] argues that for binary endogenous
regressors, “if the covariates are sparse and discrete, linear models and associated
estimation techniques like 2SLS are no less appropriate for LDV’s than for other
kinds of dependent variables” (p. 3).
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Aggregate Properties and Summary Statistics
In aggregate terms, the static allocative efficiency of Slovenian manufacturing,
calculated as a weighted average of 2-digit industry aggregate covariances terms
using TFP and time-invariant value-added weights, was positive, as Table 2.4 il-
lustrates. The covariance measure remained roughly constant until 2001, when it
declined by 6.8 percent, then started to improve.34
34Labor productivity based covariance (not reported here, but available upon request) was
positive and increasing over the period.
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Our estimates are roughly comparable to other available estimates for Slove-
nia. Bartelsman et al. [2004b] find that the labor-productivity-based Olley and
Pakes [1996] covariance in Slovenian manufacturing was negative from 1992-1997
and positive from 1998-2001, and that it was increasing throughout the period.
Results are similar for TFP. The magnitudes differ, because their sample is only
a subsample of ours, since they were interested in three- and five-year changes in
productivity growth, whereas we are looking at one-year changes. In addition, we
use services as one of the factors of production, whereas they only use labor, capital
and materials.
Growth of TFP was positive from 1999 onwards (see column (4) of Table 2.4).
De Loecker and Konings [2003] estimate the growth rate of TFP to be 0.2 percent
on average in the period 1998-2001. However, they use “employment market shares”
rather than “sales market shares” (p. 20) in addition to using a production function
with only labor and capital as inputs, which makes it harder to compare the results.
Using employment shares instead of sales shares as weights in Slovenia is bound to
produce different results, since there were significant differences between the two in
a number of 2-digit industries.
Column (5) of Table 2.4 shows the unweighted exit rates of firms in manufac-
turing from 1998 to 2003. The exit rate is defined as follows:35
exit rateuw,t =
No. of exiting firms between t and t + 1
1/2 (Total no. of firms in t− 1 + Total no. of firms in t)
(2.12)
35Since an exiting firm in t exists for the last time in t, exiting firms exit at some time between
t and (t + 1).
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The exit rate increased to about 2.9 percent in 1999, dropped to about 2.0
percent in 2001, and then increased again. These rates are relatively low compared
to exit rates in manufacturing in most OECD and transition countries, as reported
by Bartelsman et al. [2004b]. Bartelsman et al. [2004b] report the exit rate for
Slovenia to be around 4 percent in manufacturing firms with at least 1 employee in
the period 1992-2000. De Loecker and Konings [2003] find exit rates in the period
1998-2000 to be about 1 percentage point higher than what we report here. We
trust our results more, since we were very careful in measureing true exit and did
not rely solely on the availability of the accounting data, which has missing firm-year
observations.
Table 2.5 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation for
the overall sample, by aid receipt and by firm status. We define a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm-level share of debt financing (the ratio of the sum of long-
term provisions, long-term financial liabilities, current liabilities and accrued costs,
expenses and deferred revenues to the sum of total liabilities and equity) is higher
than the firm’s 4-digit industry average and equal to 0 otherwise. We measure the
importance of firm in its region as the firm’s percentage of total regional employment.
The standard deviation of the micro covariance is very high relative to its mean
(the coefficient of variation is 8.38 overall, 8.28 in firm-years with aid and 14.42 in
firm-years without aid). The growth rate of market share is on average negative,
but more so for firm-years with aid. TFP growth, on the other hand, is positive for
firm-years without aid and negative for firm-years with aid. The standard deviations
of these variables indicate that there is a lot of heterogeneity among firms.
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Table 2.4: Olley-Pakes Covariance and Exit Rates in Manufacturing, 1998-2003
Weighted TFP Unweighted TFP Covariance TFP Growth Exit Rate
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1998 2.819 2.702 0.117 -0.039 0.024
1999 2.825 2.710 0.115 0.022 0.029
2000 2.875 2.758 0.117 0.061 0.028
2001 2.894 2.785 0.109 0.041 0.020
2002 2.907 2.789 0.118 0.024 0.022
2003 2.935 2.781 0.155 0.050 0.029
Source: Own calculations based on PASEF data.
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics - Overall, by Aid Receipt and by Firm Status
Firm-Years Overall Without Aid With Aid Continuers Entrants Exiters
Mean [Std. Dev.] Obs (1) Obs (2) Obs (3) Obs (4) Obs (5) Obs (6)
Dependent Variables (Outcomes)
Micro Covariance (TFP) 29335 0.144 28927 0.145 408 0.105 27807 0.134 926 0.302 602 0.374
[1.207] [1.202] [1.514] [1.219] [0.991] [0.891]
Growth of Market Share 27704 -0.011 27305 -0.010 399 -0.075 27125 -0.003 579 -0.392
[0.450] [0.451] [0.384] [0.439] [0.737]
Growth of TFP 27704 0.013 27305 0.013 399 -0.003 27125 0.016 579 -0.158
[0.434] [0.436] [0.255] [0.424] [0.762]
Explanatory Variables
Aid 29335 0.014 28927 0 408 1 27807 0.015 926 0.002 602 0
[0.117] [0] [0] [0.120] [0.046] [0]
TFP 29335 2.920 28927 2.921 408 2.832 27807 2.934 926 2.662 602 2.606
[0.840] [0.841] [0.776] [0.824] [1.092] [1.038]
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics - Overall, by Aid Receipt and by Firm Status (continued)
Firm-Years Overall Without Aid With Aid Continuers Entrants Exiters
Mean [Std. Dev.] Obs (1) Obs (2) Obs (3) Obs (4) Obs (5) Obs (6)
Dependent Variables (Outcomes)
Labor Intensive Firms 29335 0.149 28927 0.140 408 0.775 27807 0.153 926 0 602 0.181
[0.356] [0.347] [0.418] [0.360] [0] [0.385]
Labor Intensive Firms 29335 0.104 28927 0.095 408 0.735 27807 0.106 926 0 602 0.150
x Pre-2002 [0.305] [0.293] [0.442] [0.308] [0] [0.357]
Medium and Large Firms 29335 0.220 28927 0.210 408 0.907 27807 0.226 926 0.064 602 0.174
[0.414] [0.408] [0.291] [0.418] [0.244] [0.380]
Medium and Large Firms 29335 0.139 28927 0.129 408 0.868 27807 0.143 926 0.045 602 0.130
x Pre-2002 [0.346] [0.335] [0.339] [0.350] [0.208] [0.336]
Old Firms (10+ Years) 29335 0.384 28927 0.382 408 0.542 27807 0.398 926 0 602 0.302
[0.486] [0.486] [0.499] [0.490] [0] [0.460]
Loss in at least 2 out 29335 0.146 28927 0.142 408 0.414 27807 0.147 926 0 602 0.341
of 3 Consecutive Years [0.353] [0.349] [0.493] [0.354] [0] [0.474]
Share of Debt Financing higher 29335 0.576 28927 0.575 408 0.625 27807 0.569 926 0.692 602 0.728
than 4-Digit Industry Average [0.494] [0.494] [0.485] [0.495] [0.462] [0.446]
Regional Unemployment 29335 0.301 28927 0.299 408 0.434 27807 0.299 926 0.308 602 0.377
Rate higher than Average [0.459] [0.458] [0.496] [0.458] [0.462] [0.458]
Percentage of Regional Labor 29335 0.122 28927 0.110 408 0.985 27807 0.125 926 0.049 602 0.106
Force Employed by the Firm [0.657] [0.579] [2.560] [0.670] [0.028] [0.364]
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
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TFP is on average higher for firm-years without aid. 77.5 percent of firm-
years with aid are labor intensive, compared to 14 percent of firm-years without aid.
90.7 percent of firm-years with aid occur in medium or large firms, compared to 21
percent of firm-years without aid. Percentages of old firms, firms with losses in at
least 2 out of 3 consecutive years and firms with a higher share of debt financing
than the 4-digit industry average are higher for firm-years with aid. 43.4 percent of
firm-years with aid are located in regions with a higher than average unemployment
rate, and these firms also employ a higher percentage of their region’s labor force.
Summary statistics for continuing, entering and exiting firms are shown in
columns (4)-(6) of Table 2.5. It is interesting to note that both entering and exiting
firms have a higher micro covariance than continuing firms, and there is also less
heterogeneity among them in that respect (the coefficient of variation is 3.28 for
entering firms and 2.38 for exiting firms, compared to 9.09 for continuing firms).
Growth of market share is close to zero for continuing firms; it is significantly lower
for exiting firms. Exiting firms also have lower TFP growth and lower TFP on
average, though there is a lot of heterogeneity among them. The share of labor
intensive firms is a bit higher among exiting firms than among continuing firms, but
the share of medium and large as well as old firms is smaller. 34.1 percent of exiting
firms have losses in at least 2 out of 3 consecutive years, and they have more debt
than continuing and entering firms. Exiting firms are more likely to be located in
regions with a higher than average uneployment rate. Overall, Table 2.5 shows that
there is substantial heterogeneity among firms.
As explained in Section 2.4, we estimate the impact of state aid on allocative
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efficiency, controlling for two digit industry, region, year, and the growth rates of 2-
digit industry output and regional gross value added in all estimations. Coefficients
on industry, region, calendar year and growth rates are not reported to save space,
but are available upon request. In all estimations, standard errors are clustered at
the firm identification number level to take into account the panel nature of the
data. Explanatory variables are lagged one period in Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.
2.5.2 Impact of State Aid on Exit Decisions
As shown in column (5) of Table 2.4, exit rates were relatively low in Slovenia.
The exit margin was thus not the one where the bulk of the reallocation happened.
Due to the fact that none of the aid-receiving firms exited during 1998-2003, we
cannot estimate the impact of state aid on exit decisions directly. However, we can
estimate the probability of exit using a probit model of exit on a sample of firm-
years without aid and then use the estimated coefficients to calculate the predicted
probability of exit for firm-years with aid based on their fundamentals. The gap
between this implied probability and the actual (zero) incidence of exit among firms
receiving aid will reveal something about the impact of aid on exit. Average marginal
effects from estimating a probit model are shown in Table 2.6.
The estimated coefficients are in general in line with the predictions from
the theories of market selection and other empirical studies: more productive firms
and medium and large firms are less likely to exit, whereas firms with consecutive
losses are more likely to exit. Economic fundamentals thus did matter in the firm
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Labor Intensive Firms 0.026∗∗∗
[0.008]
Medium and Large Firms -0.014∗∗∗
[0.004]
Old Firms (10+ Years) -0.003
[0.002]
Loss in at least 2 out of 0.030∗∗∗
3 Consecutive Years [0.004]
Share of Debt Financing higher 0.013∗∗∗
than 4-Digit Industry Average [0.002]
Percentage of Regional Labor -0.001
Force Employed by the Firm [0.001]
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.002
Higher than Average [0.010]
Observations 23836
Firms 5812
Clustered standard errors in brackets. Control variables: 2-digit indus-
try and growth of its output, region and growth of regional GVA, year.
∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Predicted probability of exit for firm-years without aid 0.025
Predicted probability of exit for firm-years with aid 0.036
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
decision to exit. However, the predicted probability of exit is 2.5 percent for firm-
years without aid and 3.6 percent for firm-years with aid. This result indicates that
according to their economic fundamentals these firms were more likely candidates
for exit, but they did not exit, suggesting that aid delayed exit and kept inefficient
firms alive.
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2.5.3 Impact of State Aid on Static Allocative Efficiency




∆pit,j = β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit,
where i denotes firm, t denotes time,
∆sit,j
s̄t,j
∆pit,j is a measure of static allocative
efficiency, AID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm receives aid and 0 otherwise,
and X is a vector of controls. These estimates assume selection on observables.
Aid has a negative and significant impact on static allocative efficiency: receipt
of aid is associated with a 0.29 percent drop in micro covariance.36 This is consistent
with the notion that state aid hinders the efficient allocation of resources to more
productive businesses.
IV estimates in column (2) of Table 2.7 allows for selection on unobservables
and use the interactions between a pre-2002 dummy variable and dummy variables
for labor intensive firms and for medium and large firms as instrumental variables
for AID. They are based on:
∆sit,j
s̄t,j
∆pit,j = β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit,
AIDit−1 = φ0 + Zit−1η + Xit−1ϕ + εit.
The IV estimate of the coefficient on aid in column (2) of Table 2.7 is negative
36We obtain this magnitude by dividing the estimated coefficient by the standard deviation of
micro covariance from Table 2.5, and multiplying the result by 0.01.
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and statistically significant, and is almost 4 times higher than the OLS estimate:
receipt of aid is associated with a 1.09 percent drop in micro covariance. This result
indicates that the OLS estimate of the impact of aid (column (1)) is biased towards
zero.
The first stage estimates, reported in column (2a) of Table 2.7, indicate that
firms with losses in at least two out of three consecutive years, firms whose share of
debt financing is higher than their 4-digit industry average and firms employing a
higher percentage of their region’s labor force were more likely to get aid, as were
labor intensive and medium and large firms prior to 2002. This is an important
result in itself, because it indicates that the allocation of aid was not “ad-hoc”
and that official criteria were followed. The instruments are significant, have the
expected sign, and are uncorrelated with the error process (i.e., the joint hypotheses
of correct model specification and the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected).
The micro covariance measure depends on both the productivity and market
share of the firm, so a logical next step is to separate these two channels. However, we
do not run regressions with levels of productivity or market share or their deviations
from industry averages as dependent variables. Due to the nature of unobserved
heterogeneity, it would be much harder to achieve identification for such regressions
using levels. This is especially true in the case of market shares. In the following
two sections, we look at the impact of aid on the growth of market share and on the
growth of TFP instead to learn more about the channel through which aid affects
static allocative efficiency.
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Labor Intensive Firms -0.206 -0.172 0.001
[0.126] [0.132] [0.004]
Labor Intensive Firms 0.040∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.010]
Medium and Large Firms 0.496∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ -0.002
[0.113] [0.112] [0.002]
Medium and Large Firms 0.045∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.007]
Old Firms (10+ Years) 0.059 0.064 0.004
[0.040] [0.040] [0.003]
Loss in at least 2 out of 0.035 0.059∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
3 Consecutive Years [0.030] [0.030] [0.004]
Share of Debt Financing higher -0.056∗∗ -0.052∗ 0.004∗∗
than 4-Digit Industry Average [0.027] [0.027] [0.002]
Percentage of Regional Labor 0.183 0.199 0.017∗∗∗
Force Employed by the Firm [0.141] [0.141] [0.004]
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.117∗ 0.111 -0.001
Higher than Average [0.068] [0.069] [0.009]
Observations 23226 23226 23226




p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.152
Clustered standard errors in brackets. Control variables: 2-digit indus-
try and growth of its output, region and growth of regional GVA, year.
∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
2.5.4 Impact of Aid on Growth of Market Share




0.5 ∗ (sit,j + sit−1,j)
= β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit,
where i denotes firm, t denotes time, AID is a dummy variable defined as in (2.8),
and X is a vector of controls. The OLS specification assumes selection on ob-
servables. The estimated OLS coefficient on AID is positive, but insignificant.
Estimated coefficients on the indicators for labor intensive firms, old firms, firms
with losses in 2 out of 3 consecutive years firms whose share of debt financing is
higher than their 4-digit industry average are all negative and significant, while the
estimated coefficient on the indicator for medium and large firms is positive and
significant.
The IV estimates in column (2) of Table 2.8 use the interactions between a
pre-2002 dummy variable and a dummy variables for labor intensive firms and for
medium and large firms as instruments for aid. The IV estimate of the coefficient
on aid is positive and statistically significant, and the point estimate is much larger
than that obtained under the assumption of selection on observables. This suggests
that aid receiving firms had higher market share growth than they would have had
had they not received aid. The instruments are significant and have the expected
sign, and the instruments are uncorrelated with the error process (i.e., the joint
hypotheses of correct model specification and the orthogonality conditions cannot
be rejected).
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Labor Intensive Firms -0.043∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.001
[0.011] [0.013] [0.004]
Labor Intensive Firms 0.040∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.010]
Medium and Large Firms 0.032∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.002
[0.009] [0.011] [0.002]
Medium and Large Firms 0.045∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.007]
Old Firms (10+ Years) -0.066∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.004
[0.007] [0.007] [0.003]
Loss in at least 2 out of -0.086∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
3 Consecutive Years [0.010] [0.011] [0.004]
Share of Debt Financing higher -0.013∗∗ -0.016∗∗ 0.004∗∗
than 4-Digit Industry Average [0.006] [0.006] [0.002]
Percentage of Regional Labor 0.001 -0.009∗ 0.017∗∗∗
Force Employed by the Firm [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.010 -0.001
Higher than Average [0.040] [0.040] [0.009]
Observations 23182 23182 23182




p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.174
Clustered standard errors in brackets. Control variables: 2-digit indus-
try and growth of its output, region and growth of regional GVA, year.
∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
2.5.5 Impact of Aid on Growth of TFP
TFP is another channel through which static allocative efficiency can be af-
fected by aid. The regression reported in column (1) of Table 2.9 is based on the
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following version of equation (2.7):
pit − pit−1 = β0 + β1AIDit−1 + Xit−1γ + uit,
where i denotes firm, t denotes time, p is firm-level TFP, AID is a dummy variable
defined as in (2.8), and X is a vector of controls. The OLS specification assumes
selection on observables. The estimated OLS coefficient on AID is positive, but
statistically insignificant. Estimated coefficients on indicators for old firms and firms
with losses in 2 out of 3 consecutive years are negative and statistically significant,
while the estimated coefficient on the percentage of the regional labor force employed
by the firm is positive and significant.
The IV estimate of the coefficient on aid, reported in column (2), is negative
and lower than that obtained under the assumption of selection on observables but
is statistically insignificant. The joint hypotheses of correct model specification and
the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected. Overall, these results suggest that
aid did not have a significant effect on TFP growth.
2.5.6 Summary of Results and Macroeconomic Implications
Table 2.10 contains the estimates of the coefficient on aid in the models with
micro covariance, growth of market share and growth of TFP as outcomes, using the
OLS and IV estimators.37 Both estimation methods yield a negative and statistically
significant impact of aid on micro covariance. However, the IV point estimate is
37For the IV estimator, we present results using both instruments mentioned in section 2.4.2,
and the results are similar in both magnitude and level of significance if only one of them is used.
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Labor Intensive Firms 0.004 0.009 0.001
[0.007] [0.009] [0.004]
Labor Intensive Firms 0.040∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.010]
Medium and Large Firms 0.005 0.009 -0.002
[0.006] [0.008] [0.002]
Medium and Large Firms 0.045∗∗∗
x Pre-2002 [0.007]
Old Firms (10+ Years) -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.004
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003]
Loss in at least 2 out -0.024∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
of 3 Consecutive Years [0.009] [0.010] [0.004]
Share of Debt Financing higher 0.005 0.006 0.004∗∗
than 4-Digit Industry Average [0.005] [0.005] [0.002]
Percentage of Regional Labor 0.004∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
Force Employed by the Firm [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.026 -0.027 -0.001
Higher than Average [0.034] [0.034] [0.009]
Observations 23182 23182 23182




p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.956
Clustered standard errors in brackets. Control variables: 2-digit indus-
try and growth of its output, region and growth of regional GVA, year.
∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
much larger than the OLS point estimate.38
The IV estimator allows selection on unobservables and is as such preferable
38The results are in general similar for labor productivity-based measures (available upon re-
quest), but given the measurement problems described in Appendix B, we prefer TFP-based mea-
sures.
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Table 2.10: Summary of Results: Estimated Treatment Effects of Aid
OLS IV
Micro Covariance -0.355∗∗∗ -1.315∗∗∗
[0.131] [0.508]
Growth of Market Share 0.012 0.616∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.184]
Growth of TFP 0.003 -0.119
[0.012] [0.153]
Clustered standard errors in brackets. Control vari-
ables: 2-digit industry and growth of its output, region
and growth of regional GVA, year. ∗significant at 10%,
∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data.
to the OLS estimator, since the process of aid allocation is not completely trans-
parent and it is likely that some unobserved factors affecting aid receipt also affect
outcomes. Correcting for selection is thus important.
The IV estimates indicate that aid had a negative impact on static allocative
efficiency, and it could be that the restricted availability of aid after 2002 was behind
the improvement in the Olley and Pakes [1996] covariance, beginning in 2002 (see
column (4) of Table 2.4).
It appears that aid had an impact on the micro covariance through its impact
on market shares, and not so much through productivity. With the observed zero
exit rate of firms that received aid, this suggests that aid prolonged the life span
of these firms, and enabled them to have higher market shares than they would
have had otherwise. In short, aid for rescue and restructuring of firms appears
to have been distortive. Recent events indicate that it might have been better to
“pull the plug” earlier on weak firms in industries such as textiles, clothing and
leather, prior to being “forced” to do so by the EU, in order to give workers a better
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chance of finding new jobs elsewhere, or to start their own businesses or acquire
new qualifications (Damijan and Polanec [2003], Damijan [2003], Grgič [2005]). Our
estimates appear to be in accordance with this view.
To estimate the impact of state aid on aggregate allocative efficiency, a general
equilibrium model is needed, taking into account the fact that in the absence of
aid less productive firms would not be able to keep their market share and would
eventually exit, and more productive firms would be able to grow faster. At this
point, this is beyond the scope of this chapter and is intended for future work.
However, to give some idea, we use the coefficients from column (2) in Table 2.7 to
create two counterfactuals: one in which all the firms receive aid and one in which
none do.
Table 2.11 shows the “simulated” aggregate covariance term from the Olley
and Pakes [1996] decomposition of aggregate productivity under the assumptions
of no firms receiving aid, all firms receiving aid and the actual number of firms
receiving aid (see Table 2.1 for details on the percentage of firms that received aid).
If everyone receives aid, the impact on the aggregate covariance term is enormous
compared to the case in the absence of aid. Using the actual aid-receiving firms, the
aggregate covariance term is about 1 to 30 percent lower than the no-aid aggregate
covariance, depending on the year.
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Table 2.11: Aggregate Static Allocative Efficiency in Manufacturing under Different
Assumptions on Who Receives Aid, 1999-2003
Percentage of Firms Receiving Aid
Year 0 100 Actual
1999 0.128 -1.129 0.101
2000 0.136 -1.115 0.092
2001 0.140 -1.123 0.102
2002 0.138 -1.098 0.126
2003 0.143 -1.099 0.141
Source: Own calculations based on CSAC and PASEF data and Table 2.7.
2.6 Conclusion
The literature on the effect of institutions on firm performance is relatively
small, because micro level data on both firm performance and market institutions
are not widely available. In this chapter, we use a unique census micro level data
set on a potentially very distortive market institution, namely state aid for firms in
difficulty. We examine its impact on the static and dynamic allocative efficiency of
Slovenian manufacturing in the period from 1998-2003.
We use an Olley and Pakes [1996]-inspired measure of static allocative effi-
ciency, which takes into account both productivity and the allocation of inputs and
outputs across businesses. This measure is comparable across firms and sectors,
and it provides an informative and compact measure of allocative efficiency that
could be used by policy makers when allocating aid to firms. Even though Slovenia
is among the most successful transition economies, analysis reveals that aid had a
negative and significant impact on static allocative efficiency.
Aid also appears to have postponed the exit of firms, since none of the firms
that received aid exited, even though the predicted mean probability of exit based
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on fundamentals was higher for receipients than for firms that did not receive aid.
The growth rate of market share was higher for aid-receiving firms, which suggests
that aid had a distortive effect on the market structure, because it allowed less
efficient firms to grow faster than more efficient firms and thus shifted the burden
of structural adjustment onto firms that managed without aid.
To estimate the impact of state aid on aggregate allocative efficiency and
productivity growth, a general equilibrium model is needed, taking into account the
fact that in the absence of aid less productive firms would not be able to keep their
market share and would eventually exit, while more productive firms would be able
to grow faster. This is beyond the scope of this chapter and is intended for future
work. Future work also includes looking at the impact of state aid on investment
and job flows, given that aid-receiving firms employed up to 18 percent of all workers
in manufacturing.
There are a couple of limitations that need to be mentioned. First, these esti-
mates assume homogenous treatment effects (i.e., the impact of aid is assumed to be
constant across firms). While this may be appropriate as a first step in the direction
of studying the treatment effects of aid, we plan to relax this assumption and allow
the impact of aid to differ across firms (at least for treated and untreated firms).
Second, the impact of aid might depend on where the firm is in the distribution of
productivity or micro covariance. Since only a small percentage of firms actually
received aid, however, the data do not allow the estimation of more sophisticated
models, such as a quantile regression model, for example. Third, the period of
analysis is relatively short.
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Working with firm-level datasets presents many challenges, since such data
usually have restricted access and are not readily available or even prescreened for
errors as some household level datasets are. There is a lot of heterogeneity among
firms. Missing firm-year observations and measurement error are part and parcel
of every firm-level dataset and the quality of estimates critically depends on the
way these are dealt with. In addition, aid affected only a small number of firms,
and estimating treatment effects pushes the data quite hard. However, it is an
instructive exercise and in time, the quality of micro level data on both firms and
institutional measures is likely to improve as we learn more about both.
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Chapter 3
Assessing the Job Flows Across Countries: The Role of
Industry, Size and Regulations1
3.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, a growing body of evidence has accumulated suggesting
that the reallocation of factors of production - including labor - plays a major role
in driving productivity growth (see e.g. Olley and Pakes [1996], Griliches and Regev
[1995], Foster et al. [2001], Foster et al. [2002] and Bartelsman et al. [2004b]). New
firms enter the market and create new jobs, while other unprofitable firms exit
the market contributing to job destruction. Incumbent firms are in a continuous
process of adaptation in response to the development of new products and processes,
the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive forces (Davis and
Haltiwanger [1999]). Market conditions and institutional factors play a major role
in shaping the magnitude of job flows and their characteristics (Davis et al. [1996]).
For example, smaller businesses are inherently more dynamic, in part because they
tend to be young ventures and adjust through a learning-by-doing process (Dunne
et al. [1988], Dunne et al. [1989]). In addition, some industries have inherently
higher job flows (Foster et al. [2002] report that the job flows in the United States
1This chapter draws heavily on a joint paper with John Haltiwanger and Stefano Scarpetta
with the same title.
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retail sector are 1.5 times higher than in the manufacturing sector) than others in
all countries, given the smaller size of their typical business and lower inherent entry
costs.
Technological and market driven factors are coupled by a host of regulations
in driving job flows. For example, regulations affecting start up costs or bankruptcy
procedures are likely to affect firm turnover and the associated labor mobility. Like-
wise, employment protection legislation may stifle labor reallocation by raising labor
adjustment costs. Assessing the role of regulations in affecting job flows, over and
above that played by technological and market driven factors is of great importance.
While labor reallocation is indeed important to promote productivity growth, it is
also painful for the affected workers, who face significant search and other adjust-
ment costs (see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides [1999a], Mortensen and Pissarides
[1999b] and Caballero and Hammour [2000b]). Several models predict that labor
regulations reduce gross job flows (e.g. Bertola [1992], Hopenhayn and Rogerson
[1993]), but the empirical evidence is still inconclusive. While several empirical pa-
pers find a negative effect of employment protection legislation on unemployment
(Bentolila and Bertola [1990], Nickell and Layard [1999]), the effects on job real-
location are more nuanced (Bertola and Rogerson [1997], Boeri [1999]): countries
with different types of labor regulations are observed to have fairly similar gross job
flows. The lack of a causal relationship between regulations and gross job flows at
the aggregate level may be due to different elements. Stringent labor regulations
may be associated with other regulatory and institutional factors that also affect
job flows. For example, Bertola and Rogerson [1997] argue that countries with strict
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regulations also tend to have institutions that restrict the ability of firms to adjust
wages in response to a shock (e.g. centralized wage bargaining). A more funda-
mental problem is that cross country analyses of job flows may be flawed by severe
omitted variable problems and measurement errors, including differences in the dis-
tribution of activity across industries and size of firms as well as different cut-off
points in the enterprise surveys from which job flow data are obtained.
In this paper, we draw from a harmonized and integrated firm-level dataset
including 16 developed, emerging and transition economies. With these data, we
explore the industry and size dimensions of the job flows in detail and relate them to
institutional differences across countries.2 To give a preview of our results, we find
that countries share a number of features of job flows along the industry and size di-
mensions. All countries are characterized by large job flows. These vary significantly
and systematically across industries, pointing to technological and market-driven
factors, but especially across firms of different sizes. However, there are notable
cross-country differences even after controlling for industry and size effects. Thus,
we develop a formal test of the links between hiring and firing regulations and job
flows in this chapter, and also test for the robustness of our results to the inclusion
of other regulations affecting business operations. We use a difference-in-difference
approach whereby we identify an industry and size class’s baseline job reallocation
2To our knowledge, the only other paper that econometrically analyzes the effects of labor
regulations on gross job flows across countries is Micco and Pages [2004]. Their paper exploits
sectoral gross job flows data for manufacturing for 18 countries. We extend their work by also
including the service industry for a subset of countries and, more importantly, by controlling for
industry specific differences in firm size. In addition, our data allow distinguishing between jobs
flows generated by the entry and exit of firms and those generated by the reallocation of labor by
incumbent firms. As shown in the paper, this sheds additional light on labor reallocation and the
role of regulations in labor and product markets.
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from the United States data. Under the assumption that regulations in the United
States are among the least restrictive in our sample, the baseline should proxy for
the technological and market driven job turnover in the absence of policy induced
adjustment costs. Under the additional assumption that this technological and mar-
ket driven demand for labor reallocation carries over to other countries, we assess
whether industries that require more labor mobility are disproportionately affected
by regulations that raise adjustment costs. The advantage compared with standard
cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies is that we exploit within country dif-
ferences between industry/sizes based on the interaction between country and in-
dustry/size characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country and industry/size
effects, thereby minimizing the problems of omitted variable bias and other mis-
specifications. Interestingly, we find support for the general hypothesis that hiring
and firing costs reduce turnover, especially in those industries that require more fre-
quent labor adjustment. Regulations also distort the patterns of industry/size flows.
Within each industry, medium and large firms are more severely affected by strin-
gent labor regulations, while small firms are less affected, probably because they are
partially exempt from such regulations or can more easily circumvent them. More-
over, stringent labor regulations have more of an impact on job flows by small and
medium entering and exiting firms, as well as continuing firms of all sizes, whereas
product market regulations are more important for shaping the job flows of large
entering and exiting firms, and do not play much of a role for continuing firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
our harmonized firm-level dataset and discusses the different concepts we have used
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to characterize labor reallocation. Section 3.3 analyzes the main features of job
flows, highlighting the role of firm dynamics, industry and size compositions. Sec-
tion 3.4 presents the results from the analysis of variance. Section 3.5 introduces
the difference-in-difference approach used in the econometric analysis and discusses
the empirical results for the baseline and policy augmented specifications of the job
flow equations. It also describes a battery of robustness tests. Finally, Section 3.6
provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
Our analysis of job flows draws from a harmonized firm-level database that in-
volves 16 industrial, developing and emerging economies (Germany, Finland, France,
Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Slovenia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) and covers the 1990s
(time period covered varies by country - see Table 3.1).3 The data collection was
conducted by an active participation of local experts in each of the countries, and
involved the harmonization of key concepts to the extent possible (such as entry and
exit of firms, job creation and destruction, and the unit of measurement), as well as
the definition of common methods to compute the indicators (see Bartelsman et al.
[2005] for details).4
3The database also includes Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan (China) as well as the Nether-
lands, Canada, Denmark, Romania and Venezuela, but annual data on job flows are not available
for these countries or are not fully reliable.
4Micco and Pages [2004] compiled a dataset from different country sources covering 2-digit
manufacturing sector information for 18 countries. Their dataset does not include transition coun-
tries, and does not allow differentiating job flows by firm status and firm size for all the countries.
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Table 3.1: Data Sources Used for Firm Demographics and Job Flows
Max. industry coverage
Country Source Period (number of industries) Threshold
OECD
Finland Business register 1988-1998 All (17) Emp ≥ 1
Turnover:
France Fiscal database 1989-1997 All (17) Man: Euro 0.58m
Serv: Euro 0.17m
Germany (West) Social security 1977-1999 All but civil service, Emp ≥ 1
self employed (11)
Italy Social security 1986-1994 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Portugal Employment-based 1983-1998 All but public Emp ≥ 1
register administration (19)
United Kingdom Business register 1980-1998 Manufacturing (10) Emp ≥ 1
United States Business register 1988-1997 Private businesses (19) Emp ≥ 1
LAC
Argentina Register, based on Integrated 1995-2002 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
System of Pensions
Brazil Census 1996-2001 Manufacturing (13) Emp ≥ 1
Chile Annual Industry 1979-1999 Manufacturing (13) Emp. ≥ 10
Survey (ENIA)
Colombia Annual Manufacturing 1982-1998 Manufacturing (13) Emp. ≥ 10
Survey (EAM)
TRANSITION
Estonia Business register 1995-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Hungary Fiscal register (APEH) 1992-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Latvia Business register 1996-2002 All (18) Emp ≥ 1
Mexico Social security 1985-2001 All (17) Emp ≥ 1
Slovenia Business register 1992-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
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The key features of the micro-data underlying the analysis are as follows:
Unit of observation: Data used tend to conform to the following defi-
nition:“an organizational unit producing goods or services which benefits
from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the
allocation of its current resources” (EUROSTAT [1998]). Generally, this
will be above the establishment level.
Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person busi-
nesses (firms without employees), others omit firms smaller than a cer-
tain size, usually in terms of the number of employees (businesses without
employees), but sometimes in terms of other measures such as sales (as is
the case in the data for France). Data used in this study exclude single-
person businesses. However, because smaller firms tend to have more
volatile firm dynamics, remaining differences in the threshold across dif-
ferent country datasets should be taken into account in the international
comparison.
Industry coverage: Special efforts have been made to organize the data
along a common industry classification (ISIC Rev.3) that matches the
OECD-Structural database (STAN). In the panel datasets constructed
to generate the tabulations, firms were allocated to the single STAN
industry that most closely fit their operations over the complete time-
span.
The firm-level and job flows data come from business registers (Finland, United
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Kingdom and United States, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia), social security databases
(Germany, Italy, Mexico) or corporate tax rolls (Argentina, France, Hungary) (Ta-
ble 3.1). Annual industry surveys are generally not the best source for firm demo-
graphics, due to sampling and reporting issues, but have been used nonetheless for
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Data for Portugal are drawn from an employment-
based register containing information on both establishments and firms. All these
databases allow firms and jobs to be tracked over time because addition or removal
of firms from the registers reflects the actual entry and exit of firms.
We define four size classes based on the number of firm’ employees: 1- 19
workers, 20-49 workers, 50-99 workers, and 100 or more workers. We define the job
creation rate, job destruction rate, net employment growth, job reallocation rate,
and excess job reallocation rate (also by firm status: continuing, entering and exiting
firms) as follows (see also Davis et al. [1996]):
















Net Employment Growth: netsic = possic − negsic
Job Reallocation Rate: sumsic = possic + negsic
Excess Job Reallocation Rate: excsic = possic − |negsic|
where i represents industry, s represents size class, c represents country, t represents
time and E denotes employment. Capital letters S and C refer to a set of size
62
classes or countries, respectively. The symbol ∆ denotes the first-difference operator,
∆Et = Et − Et−1. We take averages of pos and neg, and then calculate net, sum
and exc.
3.3 Basic Facts about Job Turnover in Industrial and Emerging Economies
of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe
This section explores the main stylized facts emerging from our analysis across
countries, industries and firm size: 1) the large magnitude of job flows in all coun-
tries, 2) the significant role that firm entry and exit play in total job flows, 3) the
different job turnover across firms of different sizes, and 4) the similarities in the
industry ranking of job turnover across countries. We review these stylized facts
in turn below to motivate our multivariate analysis aimed at assessing the possible
role of labor market regulations for job turnover and the magnitude and efficiency
of the allocation of labor.
3.3.1 Large Job Turnover in All Countries
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for job flows across industry, size classes
and countries, for the total economy. Figure 3.1 summarizes country level job flows
and compares them across countries.
The first noticeable fact emerging from this cross country comparison is the
large magnitude of job flows in all countries. Gross job flows (the sum of job creation
and job destruction) range from about 25 percent of total employment on average
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Figure 3.1: Decomposition of Job Creation and Destruction by Continuing, Entering
and Exiting Firms, 1990s, Total Economy and Manufacturing
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
in the OECD countries, to 29 percent in Latin American countries and to about 30
percent in the transition economies. By contrast, net employment changes were very
modest if not nil in the OECD and the Latin America samples, while the transition
economies recorded a significant net job growth in the period covered by the data,
after the substantial job losses of the early phases of the transition.
3.3.2 Firm Dynamics Plays a Major Role in Total Job Flows
The second main stylized fact emerging from our analysis of job flows is the
strong contribution of the creative destruction process. Indeed, entering and exiting
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Table 3.3: Average Job Flows in the 1990s, Overall and by Region, Total Economy
OVERALL
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Job Creation Rate 1048 0.147 0.067 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 1048 0.131 0.062 0.000 0.419
Net Employment Growth 1048 0.015 0.065 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.278 0.112 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.231 0.098 0.000 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 1048 0.055 0.043 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 1048 0.046 0.029 0.000 0.216
OECD
Job Creation Rate 448 0.127 0.046 0.033 0.288
Job Destruction Rate 448 0.127 0.060 0.029 0.411
Net Employment Growth 448 0.000 0.046 -0.282 0.148
Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.254 0.096 0.072 0.57
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.223 0.085 0.058 0.472
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 448 0.045 0.030 0.003 0.195
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 448 0.045 0.028 0.000 0.216
LAC
Job Creation Rate 300 0.148 0.061 0.033 0.431
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.140 0.066 0.041 0.419
Net Employment Growth 300 0.008 0.053 -0.214 0.286
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.288 0.114 0.086 0.785
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.248 0.103 0.066 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.056 0.040 0.000 0.227
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.053 0.032 0.003 0.152
TRANSITION
Job Creation Rate 300 0.174 0.088 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.128 0.061 0.000 0.385
Net Employment Growth 300 0.046 0.087 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.303 0.123 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.227 0.109 0.000 0.608
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.070 0.056 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.039 0.025 0.000 0.135
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
firms account for about 30-40 percent of total job flows. Within the OECD sample,
the entry of new firms played a particularly strong role in total job creation in
Finland in the 1990s (46 and 51 percent of total job creation in total economy and
manufacturing, respectively), Slovenia (42 and 46 percent of total job creation) and
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Portugal (41 and 38 percent of total job creation). At the same time, the exit of
obsolete firms also accounted for a significant fraction of overall job destruction,
particularly so in Argentina (42 and 38 percent of total job destruction), Finland
(39 and 41 percent of total job destruction) and Portugal (38 and 40 percent of
total job destruction). In transition countries, entry was more important in the
early years of transition and exit in the second half of the 1990s, both for the total
economy and in manufacturing.5
The large job flows in the transition countries are not surprising. The process
of transition started in the early 1990s and it included downsizing of existing firms as
well as new firms emerging as the economies were moving towards a market economy.
Indeed, 40.2 percent of jobs were created by entering firms in transition countries,
compared to 35.4 percent in the OECD countries. In addition, job destruction due
to exit represented 35.4 percent of total job destruction in the OECD countries, but
only 30.5 percent in transition countries. Findings are similar if we focus only on
industries within manufacturing.
3.3.3 Small and Large Firms Contribute the Most to Job Flows
Small firms account for the vast majority of total firm dynamics in all countries
in our sample. However, their contribution to overall job reallocation, while still
important, is less dominant. Figure 3.2 presents job reallocation rates by firm size
classes. In general, job reallocation is highest in firms with less than 20 employees,
5This was especially so in Slovenia, a lot of entry occurred in the early 1990s, since private
firms were few and far in between prior to that; exit did not keep up with that early on and was
relatively low compared to OECD and other transition countries.
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and the lowest in firms with 100+ employees. In the United States, job turnover
declines monotonically with firm size, and the decline is particularly marked among
large units (100+). Latin American countries follow similar patterns to those of the
United States, while the European countries, with the exception of France, have a
less marked drop of job reallocation among larger units. The transition countries,
on the other hand, show a steeper slope in smaller size classes, especially in the early
years of transition.
The analysis of size specific job reallocation rates should be complemented with
a decomposition of the overall job reallocation into that due to firms of different sizes.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the percentage of job creation/destruction/reallocation
in each size class as a share of total job creation/destruction/reallocation for total





where i denotes industry, s denotes size class and c denotes country. X stands
for POS, NEG or SUM , where POS is the number of jobs created, NEG the
number of jobs destroyed and SUM the total number of jobs reallocated (cre-
ated+destroyed).6
In manufacturing, the highest share of jobs was created/destroyed/reallocated
by firms in the largest size class, 100+. At the same time, however, the second
6Note that for Chile, Colombia and France, we do not observe some of the smallest firms (in
the first two countries, we do not observe firms with less than 10 workers, and for France, firms
with sales below a certain threshold are excluded from the sample).
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Figure 3.2: Job Reallocation across Firms of Different Sizes, Total Economy
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
most important size class in terms of job reallocation is firms with less than 20
employees. In fact, it seems that the number of jobs created/destroyed/reallocated
has a U-shaped relationship with size class in manufacturing. The importance of the
smallest size class increased in transition countries over time, and the importance
of the largest size class decreased.
At the level of total economy, the highest share of jobs was created/destroyed/-
reallocated in the smallest size class in a number of countries (Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Argentina, Estonia, Latvia), followed by the largest size class. Again, a
similar pattern is observed for transition countries: the smallest size class gained in
importance over time, while the largest size class declined in importance.
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Table 3.4: Percentage of Job Flows in a Certain Size Class, Total Economy, 1990s
Gross Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction
Country <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+
Germany 0.467 0.140 0.093 0.300 0.440 0.149 0.102 0.309 0.51 0.129 0.082 0.278
Finland 0.394 0.103 0.067 0.436 0.419 0.088 0.055 0.438 0.369 0.12 0.080 0.431
France 0.173 0.133 0.110 0.584 0.130 0.085 0.103 0.682 0.220 0.185 0.119 0.477
Italy 0.522 0.130 0.073 0.276 0.492 0.142 0.085 0.280 0.568 0.116 0.059 0.256
Portugal 0.457 0.153 0.097 0.292 0.471 0.152 0.094 0.283 0.449 0.152 0.099 0.300
United States 0.315 0.131 0.087 0.467 0.279 0.132 0.089 0.499 0.361 0.130 0.085 0.423
Argentina 0.397 0.154 0.106 0.342 0.367 0.158 0.112 0.362 0.433 0.147 0.097 0.322
Mexico 0.377 0.137 0.099 0.386 0.319 0.137 0.103 0.442 0.462 0.138 0.094 0.307
Estonia (1990s) 0.365 0.172 0.125 0.337 0.414 0.167 0.114 0.306 0.318 0.180 0.139 0.363
Hungary (1990s) 0.273 0.134 0.118 0.475 0.296 0.144 0.107 0.453 0.251 0.125 0.127 0.497
Latvia (1990s) 0.383 0.141 0.104 0.371 0.390 0.137 0.101 0.372 0.376 0.150 0.112 0.363
Slovenia (1990s) 0.227 0.088 0.100 0.585 0.293 0.100 0.090 0.517 0.169 0.076 0.112 0.643
Estonia (late 1990s) 0.365 0.172 0.125 0.337 0.414 0.167 0.114 0.306 0.318 0.180 0.139 0.363
Hungary (late 1990s) 0.317 0.142 0.108 0.433 0.337 0.149 0.106 0.408 0.294 0.132 0.111 0.463
Latvia (late 1990s) 0.421 0.143 0.107 0.328 0.437 0.139 0.107 0.317 0.398 0.150 0.109 0.343
Slovenia (late 1990s) 0.287 0.104 0.099 0.510 0.328 0.121 0.084 0.467 0.244 0.085 0.116 0.555
We do not observe firms with sales below a given threshold in France.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
69
Table 3.5: Percentage of Job Flows in a Certain Size Class, Manufacturing, 1990s
Gross Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction
Country <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+
Germany 0.344 0.136 0.098 0.422 0.307 0.141 0.110 0.442 0.399 0.135 0.088 0.378
Finland 0.199 0.093 0.073 0.635 0.205 0.088 0.065 0.642 0.201 0.099 0.083 0.618
France 0.258 0.156 0.109 0.477 0.227 0.139 0.105 0.530 0.286 0.175 0.113 0.426
United Kingdom 0.198 0.116 0.102 0.583 0.209 0.116 0.103 0.572 0.183 0.113 0.101 0.604
Italy 0.427 0.142 0.078 0.353 0.421 0.154 0.082 0.343 0.445 0.133 0.074 0.348
Portugal 0.306 0.193 0.137 0.364 0.335 0.197 0.132 0.337 0.289 0.186 0.138 0.386
United States 0.161 0.116 0.096 0.626 0.146 0.119 0.099 0.635 0.180 0.114 0.094 0.612
Argentina 0.331 0.164 0.115 0.389 0.318 0.174 0.123 0.385 0.346 0.155 0.108 0.392
Brazil 0.288 0.145 0.100 0.466 0.290 0.162 0.105 0.443 0.297 0.127 0.092 0.484
Chile 0.069 0.163 0.158 0.610 0.051 0.154 0.154 0.640 0.091 0.174 0.163 0.572
Colombia 0.126 0.172 0.163 0.538 0.095 0.160 0.161 0.585 0.162 0.186 0.165 0.487
Mexico 0.258 0.124 0.103 0.515 0.201 0.115 0.100 0.584 0.343 0.137 0.106 0.414
Estonia (1990s) 0.227 0.172 0.142 0.459 0.246 0.180 0.146 0.429 0.206 0.164 0.137 0.493
Hungary (1990s) 0.159 0.121 0.111 0.609 0.165 0.135 0.117 0.583 0.154 0.107 0.106 0.633
Latvia (1990s) 0.431 0.155 0.110 0.305 0.451 0.157 0.120 0.272 0.400 0.154 0.092 0.354
Slovenia (1990s) 0.100 0.072 0.100 0.728 0.146 0.091 0.102 0.661 0.069 0.058 0.102 0.771
Estonia (late 1990s) 0.227 0.172 0.142 0.459 0.246 0.180 0.146 0.429 0.206 0.164 0.137 0.493
Hungary (late 1990s) 0.172 0.128 0.109 0.591 0.177 0.136 0.111 0.576 0.169 0.119 0.108 0.604
Latvia (late 1990s) 0.453 0.146 0.107 0.293 0.467 0.147 0.120 0.265 0.434 0.146 0.085 0.336
Slovenia (late 1990s) 0.128 0.082 0.108 0.682 0.173 0.112 0.106 0.609 0.099 0.062 0.11 0.729
We do not observe firms with less than 10 workers in Chile and Colombia, and firms with sales below a given
threshold are excluded from the sample in France.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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3.3.4 Large Disparities in Job Flows Across Industries
To assess the possible role of policy and institutions in shaping the magnitude
and effectiveness of job flows, we need to identify the intrinsic need for job mobility
that certain industries may have compared to others. Certain industries are exposed
to greater variability in demand; may be more exposed to macro shocks; and may be
facing a higher pace of technological progress that imposes more frequent retooling
of the production process and the associated adjustment of the workforce.
To illustrate the cross industry variation in job flows, we highlight the U.S.
industries with the highest (wood) and the lowest (transport equipment) job flows
within manufacturing, as well as the trade and restaurants sector (see Table 3.6). In
wood, the job reallocation rate was 26 percent in the United States, and ranged from
only 13 percent in Germany to 37 percent in Brazil. In the United States, incumbent
firms were responsible for more than 70 percent of job reallocation, whereas in Great
Britain, 53 percent of reallocation was due to entry and exit of firms. In transport
equipment, the job reallocation rate was 11.9 percent in the United States, and
ranged from 8.3 percent in Germany to 34 percent in Latvia. In Mexico, incumbent
firms were responsible for more than 85 percent of job reallocation, whereas in
Slovenia, almost 53 percent of reallocation was due to entry and exit of firms. In
trade and restaurants, job reallocation ranged from 22.2 percent in Slovenia after
1996 to 38.8 percent in France. In all countries, reallocation in this industry was
mostly due to incumbent firms, but this share differs among countries.
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Table 3.6: Cross-Industry Variation in Job Flows
HIGH - WOOD LOW - TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT TRADE AND RESTAURANT
Gross Job Entry & Gross Job Entry & Gross Job Entry &
Country Reallocation Continuers Exit Reallocation Continuers Exit Reallocation Continuers Exit
EU & USA
Germany 0.130 0.105 0.027 0.083 0.071 0.012
Finland 0.252 0.156 0.096 0.249 0.135 0.113 0.264 0.158 0.106
France 0.248 0.146 0.102 0.238 0.174 0.064 0.388 0.305 0.083
United Kingdom 0.289 0.132 0.154 0.199 0.109 0.089
Italy 0.215 0.141 0.074 0.125 0.091 0.034 0.259 0.161 0.098
Portugal 0.226 0.121 0.105 0.197 0.135 0.061 0.260 0.146 0.114
United States 0.260 0.185 0.074 0.119 0.108 0.010 0.256 0.176 0.080
LAC
Argentina 0.224 0.134 0.090 0.197 0.156 0.041 0.271 0.151 0.121
Brazil 0.370 0.236 0.134 0.228 0.162 0.066
Chile 0.287 0.151 0.136 0.272 0.163 0.109
Colombia 0.223 0.133 0.090 0.187 0.135 0.052
Mexico 0.346 0.228 0.118 0.234 0.200 0.033 0.311 0.182 0.129
TRANSITION, 1990s
Estonia 0.242 0.140 0.102 0.166 0.117 0.050 0.295 0.194 0.101
Hungary 0.290 0.176 0.114 0.244 0.186 0.058 0.375 0.238 0.137
Latvia 0.292 0.219 0.074 0.330 0.243 0.087 0.298 0.222 0.076
Slovenia 0.191 0.119 0.072 0.252 0.118 0.133 0.263 0.161 0.103
TRANSITION, late 1990s
Estonia 0.242 0.140 0.102 0.166 0.117 0.050 0.295 0.194 0.101
Hungary 0.262 0.159 0.102 0.259 0.193 0.065 0.338 0.211 0.127
Latvia 0.266 0.192 0.074 0.348 0.280 0.068 0.277 0.208 0.070
Slovenia 0.165 0.109 0.056 0.194 0.107 0.087 0.222 0.146 0.076
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Table 3.7: Pairwise Correlations with the U.S. Job Flows, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation by Job Destruction by
Reallocation Reallocation Entering Firms Exiting Firms
OECD 0.7057 0.6577 0.5851 0.6900
Germany 0.8183 0.8074 0.7815 0.8525
Finland 0.6852 0.6025 0.0509 0.4277
France 0.4745 0.3531 0.5845 0.7815
United Kingdom 0.8471 0.8247 0.7129 0.7737
Italy 0.5954 0.5782 0.5504 0.7031
Portugal 0.8134 0.7804 0.8301 0.6012
LAC 0.8290 0.7773 0.7848 0.8024
Argentina 0.7670 0.7214 0.7851 0.7527
Brazil 0.9048 0.8383 0.9035 0.7768
Chile 0.7264 0.5556 0.6013 0.7632
Colombia 0.9121 0.8835 0.8780 0.8534
Mexico 0.8345 0.8878 0.7562 0.8660
TRANSITION, 1990s 0.7057 0.6961 0.623 0.4413
Estonia 0.6036 0.6554 0.4761 0.1641
Hungary 0.8168 0.8157 0.8174 0.6911
Latvia 0.6616 0.6962 0.5919 0.5960
Slovenia 0.7406 0.6172 0.6065 0.3140
Late 1990s 0.6771 0.6981 0.5859 0.4500
Estonia 0.6036 0.6554 0.4761 0.1641
Hungary 0.7911 0.7970 0.8070 0.6622
Latvia 0.5919 0.6644 0.5886 0.6108
Slovenia 0.7216 0.6755 0.4718 0.3629
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Table 3.8: Rank Correlations with the U.S. Job Flows, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation by Job Destruction by
Reallocation Reallocation Entering Firms Exiting Firms
OECD 0.7007 0.6330 0.5445 0.7030
Germany 0.8186 0.8154 0.7950 0.8789
Finland 0.6450 0.5269 -0.0089 0.5028
France 0.5083 0.3688 0.5654 0.7423
United Kingdom 0.8672 0.7937 0.6713 0.8168
Italy 0.5880 0.5515 0.5443 0.5999
Portugal 0.7770 0.7418 0.6996 0.6773
LAC 0.8371 0.7908 0.8035 0.8121
Argentina 0.8611 0.8255 0.7897 0.7774
Brazil 0.8868 0.7913 0.8956 0.7828
Chile 0.6743 0.5619 0.6358 0.7608
Colombia 0.8996 0.8812 0.8624 0.8586
Mexico 0.8636 0.8940 0.8342 0.8810
TRANSITION, 1990s 0.7174 0.6978 0.6240 0.4702
Estonia 0.6785 0.6186 0.5161 0.2981
Hungary 0.8200 0.8108 0.7676 0.7223
Latvia 0.6304 0.7137 0.5481 0.5560
Slovenia 0.7407 0.6479 0.6640 0.3045
Late 1990s 0.6925 0.6874 0.5832 0.4807
Estonia 0.6785 0.6186 0.5161 0.2981
Hungary 0.7925 0.7711 0.7529 0.6955
Latvia 0.5854 0.6671 0.5945 0.5792
Slovenia 0.7136 0.6927 0.4691 0.3498
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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3.3.5 The Correlation of Industry/Size Job Flows Across Countries
We next look at the correlation of industry/size level job flows across countries.
A strong influence of market-driven and technological factors in shaping industry
job flows should result in a strong correlation across countries. However, as we will
see below and as stressed in previous studies (e.g. see Micco and Pages [2004]), in-
dustry/size job flows are also influenced by the policy and institutional environment.
Lack of correlation may not therefore imply that market-driven and technological
factors do not play a significant role, but rather that policy and institutions distort
job flows. Job flows are part-and-parcel of the creative destruction process, and
an unfavourable institutional environment will cause this process to stagnate (Ca-
ballero and Hammour [2000a]). To minimize the possible interference of the policy
environment, we also present the rank correlation of industry job flows, which may
provide a better proxy for the true correlation if the policy environment affects levels
but not the rank order of industry/size flows.
Table 3.7 presents the industry/size pairwise level correlations, using the U.S.
as the benchmark, for several flow indicators: gross job reallocation, excess job
reallocation, job creation by entering firms and job destruction by exiting firms.
We use 2-digit industry and four size classes. It is noticeable that the cross-country
correlations are very high for most countries. Focusing on gross job reallocation, the
correlation between the EU average and the United States is 0.71; that between Latin
American countries and the United States is 0.83 and that for transition countries
is 0.71. Rank correlations (Table 3.8) are slightly lower than levels correlations for
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some Latin American countries and higher for the others, but are on average still
the highest among regions. Correlations are on average higher if we focus only on
manufacturing (not reported here). Industry/size-level correlations with the U.S.
are particularly strong for some Latin American countries, e.g. Brazil (0.90) and
Colombia (0.91), despite the very different degree of economic development, as well
as for Great Britain (0.84). Some of the lowest correlations are found for some EU
countries, in particular France (0.47).7
It is also interesting to see that transition economies had a much stronger
correlation of their job flow pattern by industry and size class with the United
States in the sample that covers the entire 1990s, than in the sample focusing on
the 1996-2001 period. This could be surprising, since the early phases of transition
were characterized by massive job reallocation and the unique need to change the
structure of the economy from central planning to the market based system. One
working hypothesis that we develop later in the chapter is that after the initial
phases of transition, these countries have moved towards the flow patterns observed
in EU countries, with whom they share several policy and institutional factors.
7We cannot compare the reported results directly with Micco and Pages [2004], since our
analysis includes the size dimension in addition to the industry dimension. However, we also
conducted the analysis excluding the size dimension (not reported here, but available upon request
from the authors), and we find that the pairwise correlation of with U.S. gross job reallocation
is highest for Mexico (0.91), followed by Brazil (0.84) and Great Britain (0.74). They find the
correlation to be the highest with Canada, Great Britain and New Zealand, but our sample covers
different time-period.
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3.4 Analysis of Variance
In the previous section, we have explored the different dimensions of the job
flow data across countries, industries and size classes. The next logical step is to
assess the relative importance of these different dimensions in explaining the overall
variance in our dataset. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present the analysis of variance of job
flows, for the unbalanced total economy8 and manufacturing samples, respectively.
We consider industry, size, country and industry*size effects separately, and, in
addition, differentiate the analysis of variance by region (OECD, transition, Latin
America).
It is noticeable that technological and market structure characteristics that
are reflected in the industry-specific effects explains only 6.8 percent of variation in
overall cross-country gross job reallocation (Table 3.9), although they account for
a higher share in Latin America (23.3 percent). By contrast, differences in the size
structure of firms explain as much as 40.0 percent of the total variation in cross-
country gross job reallocation in all regions, and play an even more important role in
transition countries at the beginning of the 1990s. This fact is again in accordance
with the characteristics of transition, as already mentioned in the previous section.
Even country effects explain more of the variation in gross job reallocation than
the industry effects, except in Latin America, so even though there are similarities
among countries within a region, there is still variation between them. Overall, the
combined industry*size effects can explain the bulk of the variation in gross job
8The total economy sample is unbalanced in the sense that it covers manufacturing only for
United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile and Colombia - see Table 3.1 for details.
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reallocation: 55.6 percent overall, 55.8 percent in OECD countries, 73.3 percent in
Latin American countries and 72.3 percent in transition countries (66.9 percent, if
we look only at the second half of the 1990s).
Gross job reallocation consists of job creation and job destruction, so we now
turn to these two categories of job flows for further insight. We also further distin-
guish job creation by new firms and by incumbents and job destruction by exiting
firms and by those that survive but downsize (we only report results for job creation
by new firms and job destruction by exiting firms; other results are available upon
request from the authors). A number of interesting features emerge:
• Industry effects explain about 6.7 percent of variation in job creation and 6.1
percent of variation in job destruction, but there are significant differences
among the three regions. Industry effects account for a much larger share of
the overall variation (30.8 percent) in job creation in Latin America, slightly
less than half of this in OECD countries, and only 7.3 percent in transition
countries. In the early phases of transition, creation of jobs occurred across all
industries, whereas they were more concentrated in certain industries in OECD
and especially in Latin America: 14.4 percent of variation in job destruction
in Latin America can be explained by industry effects, but only 8.9 percent in
OECD countries.
• Size effects. Both in the case of job creation and job destruction, size effects
alone account for a significant share of the total variation (30.0 and 41.0 per-
cent, respectively). Looking at results by region reveals that size effects can
account for 54.0 percent of variation in job creation in transition countries,
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but only 28.6 percent of variation in job destruction. In Latin America, the
results are the opposite: size effects can account for 63.0 percent of variation
in job destruction, but only for 21.4 percent of job creation.
• The role of entry and exit of firms. Size heterogeneity plays a particularly
strong role in explaining the variation of job creation by new firms and job
destruction by exiting firms. Size heterogeneity is particularly important in
Latin America, where it accounts for 59.5 percent of the heterogeneity in job
creation by new firms and 70.0 percent of the variation in job destruction
by exiting firms. In the OECD countries, size heterogeneity plays a smaller
role in both job creation and destruction by entering and exiting firms. In
the transition economies there is a strong difference between job creation and
destruction. The variation of job creation by entrants is strongly influenced
by size heterogeneity, while the importance of size effects for variation in job
destruction by exiters is relatively small.
How should one interpret these different sources of variability of job flows?
Not surprisingly, in all regions size heterogeneity looms large among new firms de-
pending on market conditions, but also upon regulations that may affect the optimal
size of entry. This seems particularly the case in Latin America in which industries
with many new micro entrants coexist with those where entry size is larger. But
size heterogeneity also explains a significant fraction of the variance in job destruc-
tion due to firm exit: some industries see large failures of small young businesses
while others see the decline of more mature large firms. By contrast, in transition
economies there is more variability in the size structure of new firms than among
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those that exit the market. A large number of new businesses entered the market
filling different niches of activities that were largely underdeveloped under central
planning, while job destruction involved firms of different sizes more evenly, with the
closure of many large obsolete firms but also of many relatively small new ventures.
It is also noticeable that in the transition economies, country effects account for 20.3
percent of variation in job destruction by exiting firms, but only 6.5 percent of varia-
tion in job creation by entering firms. This is suggestive of cross-country differences
in the enterprise restructuring and its impact on firm closure and downsizing.9
To summarize, the analysis of variance of job flows suggests a significant role
for the size composition - a factor that was not considered in previous studies - as
well as differences across and within regions. Technological and market structure
characteristics (e.g. the industry effects) seem to play a relatively smaller role in
explaining cross-country differences in job flows.
9See Haltiwanger and Vodopivec [2003] and World Bank [2004].
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Table 3.9: Analysis of Variance, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Job Job Net Employment Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation Job Destruction
Creation Destruction Growth Reallocation Reallocation - Entry - Exit
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0670 0.0613 0.0554 0.0675 0.0538 0.0164 0.0500
OECD 0.1492 0.0892 0.1164 0.1104 0.0509 0.0229 0.0706
LAC 0.3076 0.1438 0.1568 0.2327 0.1655 0.1159 0.1049
Transition (1990s) 0.0644 0.0931 0.1525 0.0341 0.0877 0.0486 0.0938
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0731 0.0665 0.1350 0.0344 0.0790 0.0399 0.0827
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3003 0.4100 0.0021 0.4706 0.4591 0.4325 0.3373
OECD 0.3027 0.3738 0.0605 0.4139 0.4468 0.4439 0.3127
LAC 0.2142 0.6300 0.2557 0.4777 0.5093 0.5950 0.7000
Transition (1990s) 0.5400 0.2861 0.1443 0.6149 0.4706 0.4858 0.1236
Transition (late 1990s) 0.4309 0.2488 0.0708 0.5268 0.4945 0.4412 0.1441
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.2138 0.1252 0.1975 0.1648 0.1435 0.1453 0.1996
OECD 0.1576 0.2009 0.1113 0.2019 0.1885 0.1253 0.2829
LAC 0.3041 0.0419 0.1808 0.1588 0.1276 0.1133 0.0255
Transition (1990s) 0.0570 0.0867 0.0974 0.0512 0.0865 0.0653 0.2031
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0997 0.0445 0.0681 0.0851 0.0933 0.0645 0.1719
INDUSTRY*SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3861 0.4964 0.0904 0.5558 0.5263 0.4624 0.4097
OECD 0.4888 0.5041 0.2421 0.5579 0.5215 0.5018 0.4053
LAC 0.5574 0.8079 0.5062 0.7326 0.6998 0.7364 0.8478
Transition (1990s) 0.6856 0.4685 0.3998 0.7233 0.6186 0.5956 0.3004
Transition (late 1990s) 0.5978 0.4736 0.3417 0.6692 0.6493 0.5676 0.3189
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
81
Table 3.10: Analysis of Variance, Manufacturing
Job Job Net Employment Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation Job Destruction
Creation Destruction Growth Reallocation Reallocation - Entry - Exit
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0126 0.0432 0.0431 0.0207 0.0129 0.0093 0.0484
OECD 0.0377 0.0681 0.1729 0.0358 0.0136 0.0135 0.0691
LAC 0.0397 0.0429 0.0626 0.0371 0.0172 0.0196 0.0464
Transition (1990s) 0.0344 0.072 0.0902 0.0257 0.0577 0.0402 0.0655
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0387 0.0469 0.0695 0.0251 0.0529 0.0244 0.0666
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3307 0.4572 0.0046 0.5231 0.4903 0.4120 0.3555
OECD 0.4202 0.4786 0.0727 0.5254 0.5053 0.4083 0.3252
LAC 0.3112 0.6997 0.2919 0.5946 0.5737 0.6780 0.7441
Transition (1990s) 0.5315 0.2608 0.1302 0.5940 0.4678 0.4327 0.1031
Transition (late 1990s) 0.4188 0.2257 0.0660 0.5116 0.5086 0.3937 0.1217
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.2627 0.1217 0.2310 0.1868 0.1783 0.1620 0.2351
OECD 0.1937 0.1710 0.0757 0.1981 0.2164 0.1680 0.3753
LAC 0.454 0.0538 0.2244 0.2157 0.1874 0.1446 0.0388
Transition (1990s) 0.0458 0.1033 0.0947 0.0508 0.1062 0.0589 0.2157
Transition (late 1990s) 0.1113 0.0449 0.0999 0.0761 0.1112 0.0608 0.1919
INDUSTRY*SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3649 0.5265 0.0811 0.5641 0.5171 0.4371 0.4274
OECD 0.4862 0.5894 0.3134 0.5930 0.5408 0.4505 0.4171
LAC 0.3724 0.7695 0.4003 0.6519 0.6081 0.7143 0.8235
Transition (1990s) 0.6548 0.4303 0.3295 0.7029 0.5831 0.5407 0.2536
Transition (late 1990s) 0.5563 0.4489 0.2741 0.6605 0.6390 0.5214 0.2797
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 The Estimation Model
In this section, we develop a formal test of the causal relationship between
regulations in the labor market and job flows. We base our empirical analysis on
two important results discussed in the previous sections: 1) a significant share of the
total variance in job flows observed in the data is explained by industry*size effects,
and 2) there is a high correlation of industry/size job flows across countries. These
two results are consistent with the hypothesis that the distribution of idiosyncratic
profit shocks impacting desired employment and the adjustment costs impacting the
adjustment to such shocks varies systematically by industry and size class. Some
industries show much more churning of firms in all countries, and likewise, small
businesses are more volatile than large businesses in all countries.
While industry and size effects play a major role, they are far from the en-
tire story. Adjustment costs governing responses to idiosyncratic shocks vary not
only by industry and size, due to underlying market and technological factors, but
also across countries, due to differences in institutions. To the extent that insti-
tutions vary more by country than industry and size, our working hypothesis is
that the impact of institutions that impede adjustment in any given country will
be more binding on industry/size cells with the greatest propensity for reallocation
in that country. In this section, we develop a formal test of this working hypoth-
esis. That is, we explore the links between the regulatory environment in which
firms operate and job turnover that exploits these observed industry/size variations
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through a difference-in-difference approach (see Rajan and Zingales [1998]).10 The
test is constructed as follows: we identify an industry/size propensity for job re-
allocation from the United States data. Under the assumption that regulations in
the labor and goods markets in the United States are among the least restrictive
in our sample, variation in job reallocation across industry/size cells in the United
States should proxy for the technological and market driven differences in job re-
allocation in the absence of policy induced adjustment costs. Under the additional
assumption that these technological and market driven differences in the demand
for job reallocation carry over to other countries, we assess whether industry/size
cells that have a greater propensity for job reallocation are disproportionally affected
by regulations that raise adjustment costs. This would imply that, ceteris paribus,
industry/size cells with more volatile idiosyncratic profit shocks and more frequent
adjustment of factors should be more strongly affected by regulations raising ad-
justment costs than those industry/size cells with less volatile idiosyncratic profit
shocks and less frequent adjustment. The advantage of our approach compared to
standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies is that we exploit within
country differences between industry/size cells based on the interaction between
country and industry/size characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country
and industry/size effects, thereby minimizing problems of omitted variable bias and
other misspecifications.
To estimate our model we of course need an appropriate measure of underlying
10The difference-in-difference approach has already been used in the corporate literature (e.g.,
Classens and Laeven [2003]), in the analysis of firm dynamics (Klapper et al. [2004]) and in the
analysis of job flows (Micco and Pages [2004]).
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market and technology driven differences in reallocation by industry/size cells. Since
the United States is generally considered to be the country with the least restrictive
regulations in the labor market and often in the goods market, we use United States
industry/size job flows as the benchmark for the propensity for job reallocation.
Our different model specifications used in the empirical analysis can be sum-
marized as follows:
i) baseline specification
JF lowsic = β0 + β1USJF lowsi +
C∑
c=1
γcDc + εsic (3.2)
where Dc are country c (c = 1, . . . , C) dummies, USJflowsi is the U.S. job
flow variable in size class s and industry i, and ε is the iid error term. This
specification will give us a sense about the link between cross industry/size
differences in gross job flows between the United States and other countries in
our sample.
ii) cross-sectional analysis of regulation
JF lowsic = β0 + β1USJF lowsi + β2Regulationc +
M∑
m=1
δmDm + εsic (3.3)
We have now added a regulatory variable that only varies across countries
and thus requires removing the country dummies. To partially control for the
omitted fixed effect, we can introduce regional dummies (Dm, m = 1, . . . ,M),
although we have shown before that there is significant heterogeneity within
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each region.
iii) difference-in-difference with interaction





Here we examine whether the difference in industry/size job flows between high
and low volatility industry/size cells is smaller in highly regulated countries
compared to the U.S. benchmark. By including the regulatory variable only
in interaction with the U.S. job flow measure, we can control for unobserved
country fixed effects.
The multivariate version of this specification, in which we consider more than
one regulatory variable together, can be written as follows:








where k = 1, . . . , K is the number of regulatory variables used.
The measure of job flows used in the empirical analysis is the sum of job cre-
ation and job destruction rates (sum). In Appendix G, we also report the same
specifications discussed above for excess job reallocation, i.e. the difference between
the sum and the (absolute value of) net employment change. As shown in Ap-
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pendix G, the results are largely unaffected by the use of this alternative measure
of job flows.
All our variables are time averages over the available annual observations.
The sample is unbalanced and covers fewer years for some countries than others
(see Table 3.1). Time averaging allows us to reduce the possible impact of business
cycle fluctuations in the years for which we have the data and the possibility that
such fluctuations were not synchronized (and thus could be captured by common
time dummies). We also consider two sample periods: 1) 1989 to 2001, and 2) the
same sample for OECD and Latin American countries and the sample from 1996
onwards for the transition economies. The choice of the second sub-sample for
the transition economies is motivated by two interrelated factors. First and as
discussed in the previous section, the initial years of the transition process (1991-
1995) were characterized by unprecedented reallocation of labor - and other factors
of production - across industries, firms and locations. The magnitude and direction
of the observed flows were only temporary and, indeed, job flows declined towards
the standard of the OECD countries, and also became more balanced within each
industry/size cell. Second, the early years of transition were characterized by major
regulatory reforms to conform countries’ institutional settings to those of market
economies. For these two reasons, focusing on the second half of the 1990s for the
transition economies is more appropriate in our comparative analysis of job flows.
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3.5.2 Regulations in Labor and Product Markets
Before moving into the analysis of the empirical results, we briefly discuss
our regulatory indicators. We consider synthetic indicators of the stringency of
regulations in the labor and product markets, as well as the degree of enforcement
of laws and regulations. Our primary source for these is the “Economic Freedom
of the World (EFW)” database (see Gwartney and Lawson [2004]). This has been
developed under the auspices of the Canadian Fraser Institute with the aid of a
worldwide network of economists and research institutes. In particular, we use
indicators referring to hiring and firing practices, regulation of business activities
and integrity of the legal system.
Despite other indicators available in the literature for developing and emerging
economies (e.g., the World Bank Doing Business database), the EFW tracks changes
in regulations over time and is thus more suitable for our analysis of job flows that
have indeed been influenced by policy changes over the period covered by our data
(see Table 3.11 for details on the regulatory variables).
The EFW indicator of hiring and firing restrictions is measured on a scale from
0 to 10, with 10 being the worst (most restrictive). The average of this indicator is
the highest in transition countries (5.70), followed by the OECD sample (5.43) and
Latin America (4.68). This synthetic indicator passes simple validation tests: for
example, its correlation with a similar indicator of employment protection legislation
developed by the OECD is 0.85, statistically significant at the 1 percent level.11
11We check the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure of employment pro-
tection legislation, the OECD EPL index. Since this measure is not available for Latin America
and transition countries in the early 1990s, we augmented it in two ways. First, for transition
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Table 3.11: Institutional Variables, 1990s
OVERALL
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.261 1.515 2.878 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 4.113 2.019 0.000 7.209
Business Regulations 3.490 1.389 1.100 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.490 1.233 0.000 4.600
Law and Order 2.280 2.818 0.000 10.000
EU & USA
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.427 1.804 2.878 7.400
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 5.084 1.559 2.878 6.600
Business Regulations 3.074 1.682 1.100 5.600
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.822 1.349 1.100 4.600
Law and Order 0.469 1.121 0.000 3.000
LAC
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.679 0.943 3.230 5.740
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 2.249 1.642 0.000 4.431
Business Regulations 4.206 1.297 2.617 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 1.811 1.321 0.000 3.320
Law and Order 4.949 2.769 2.280 10.000
TRANSITION
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 5.696 1.705 3.586 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.742 1.846 3.079 7.209
Business Regulations 3.323 0.669 2.650 4.200
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.757 0.716 1.776 3.486
Law and Order 1.763 1.119 0.637 3.300
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database and Gwartney
and Lawson [2004].
In the sensitivity analysis, we also consider an EFW synthetic indicator of reg-
ulations in the product market. Regulations affecting markets for goods and services
have a strong impact on the degree of competition and the pace and effectiveness
of reallocation of resources, including labor. Thus, more restrictive regulations that
stifle product market competition are also likely to influence job flows. The business
regulation indicator is a simple average of five different indicators: price controls;
countries we used data on EPL collected by Haltiwanger et al. [2003]. Second, for Latin America
we imputed EPL by regressing a measure of hiring and firing practices from the Fraser Institute
on EPL for transition and OECD countries and then using the estimated coefficient to calculate
EPL. EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, with 4 being the worst (most restrictive). It is on
average the strictest in OECD (2.35) and the least strict in Latin America (1.73).
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administrative conditions and new business; time with government bureaucracy;
starting a new business; and irregular payments. These five indicators are designed
to identify the extent to which regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures
limit competition and the operation of goods and services markets. Business regu-
lation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most restrictive. This
indicator is on average the highest in Latin America (4.21), followed by transition
countries (3.32) and OECD (3.07).
The EFW indicator of law and order is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with
10 being the worst. The average of this indicator is highest in Latin America (4.95),
followed by transition countries (1.76) and the OECD sample (0.47). Appendix F
contains more detailed definitions of the variables used in our analysis.
3.5.3 The Baseline Specification
In our empirical investigation, we start with a baseline specification in which
we only include the U.S. job flow benchmark and the country dummies (equation
(3.2). We then test for differences in the estimated coefficient of the U.S. job flow
benchmark across the three regions for which we have data (OECD, Latin America
and transition economies). Further, we allow the coefficient of the U.S. job flow
variable to vary by firm size class.
Table 3.12 presents the results for these three alternative specifications and for
the two samples discussed above (1989-2001 for all countries, and restricted to 1996-
2001 for transition economies). As expected, the estimated coefficient of the U.S.
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job flow is highly significant, confirming the bivariate correlation analysis discussed
above. However, the estimated coefficient is significantly less than one, suggesting
that, other things being equal, the responsiveness to market and technologically
driven factors that affect reallocation in the U.S. is less than one. This finding is
interesting by itself since it suggests that market driven and technological factors
are not perfectly correlated across countries. Or put differently, it is consistent with
the view that countries around the world have factors that impede the reallocation
process.12
If we then allow the coefficient on the U.S. job flow to vary by region (EU, Latin
America and transition economies), we notice that there is a closer link between cross
industry/size differences in gross job flows between the United States and the Latin
American countries than between the United States and the European countries.
If we restrict the analysis to the 1996-2001 period for the transition economies, we
see that the estimated coefficient on U.S. job flows (column (5)) declines to a level
that is not statistically different from that of the EU countries. In other words,
as the process of economic transformation has progressed, the patterns of cross-
industry/size job flows in transition economies have diverged from those in the U.S.
The next step in our preliminary analysis is to differentiate the coefficient on
the U.S. job flow by firm size. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that the coefficient is
the highest for the smallest size class (1-19 employees) and declines monotonically for
the larger size classes. In other words, the patterns of cross industry job flows in the
12Appropriate caution needs to be used in interpreting the magnitude of the coefficient since
measurement error can drive the coefficient below one. Still, we find it interesting that this co-
efficient is, in general, less than one, and that the pattern of variation in the magnitude of this
coefficient across regions and size classes is consistent with our interpretation.
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United States and other countries are more similar among small firms than among
larger firms, possibly because small firms are exempted from certain regulations
and/or can more easily avoid other regulations. Hence, small firms show patterns
of cross-industry job flows more similar to those in the U.S. - the least regulated
economy. For larger firms, regulations are likely to be more binding, especially in
those industries that are inherently more volatile.
3.5.4 Regulations and Job Flows
The next step in our analysis is to look at the possible impact that labor reg-
ulations have on observed job flows (Table 3.13). We focus on the restricted sample
for the transition economies as discussed above. The first specification (column (1))
is a simple cross-country estimate in which we include the U.S. job flow benchmark
and the labor regulation indicator, but we do not interact the latter with the U.S.
benchmark. These results are only preliminary, not least given the possible omitted
variable bias due to the exclusion of country fixed effects. The estimated coefficient
of the synthetic indicator of the stringency of hiring and firing regulations is negative
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result is largely unchanged
if we allow the coefficient on the U.S. job flow benchmark to vary across the three
regions (column (2)).
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Table 3.12: Job Flows - A Baseline Difference-in-Difference Analysis
1990s 1990s, transition late 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.1153∗∗∗ 0.1376∗∗∗ 0.1810∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0095] [0.0109] [0.0107]
USA SUM 0.7097∗∗∗ 0.6621∗∗∗
[0.0183] [0.0173]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5860∗∗∗ 0.5746∗∗∗
[0.0288] [0.0274]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.8282∗∗∗ 0.6878∗∗∗
[0.0325] [0.0308]
USA SUM ∗LAC 0.7493∗∗∗ 0.7493∗∗∗
[0.0329] [0.0312]
USA SUM ∗<20 Workers 0.5628∗∗∗ 0.5385∗∗∗
[0.0227] [0.0215]
USA SUM ∗20-49 Workers 0.3975∗∗∗ 0.3875∗∗∗
[0.0317] [0.0301]
USA SUM ∗50-99 Workers 0.3157∗∗∗ 0.3169∗∗∗
[0.0351] [0.0333]
USA SUM ∗100+ Workers 0.1764∗∗∗ 0.2090∗∗∗
[0.0566] [0.0537]
Observations 935 935 935 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.73
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation in the United
States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Table 3.13: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Difference-in-Difference Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1815∗∗∗ 0.2062∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0016 0.0513∗∗∗
[0.0341] [0.0354] [0.0290] [0.0138] [0.0100] [0.0140]
USA SUM 0.6588∗∗∗ 0.8417∗∗∗ 0.7047∗∗∗ 0.8602∗∗∗ 0.8541∗∗∗
[0.0426] [0.2010] [0.0835] [0.1016] [0.0490]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5660∗∗∗
[0.0390]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.6876∗∗∗
[0.0466]




USA SUM ∗EPL -0.032
[0.0311]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0452∗∗
[0.0182]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗EU -0.0211
[0.0138]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗EU -0.0484∗∗∗
[0.0097]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗Transition -0.0057
[0.0146]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗Transition -0.0361∗∗∗
[0.0113]
Continued on next page.
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Table 3.13: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Difference-in-Difference Analysis) (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗LAC 0.0127
[0.0182]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗LAC -0.0450∗∗
[0.0183]
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.56 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2)
include region dummies. Columns (3)-(6) include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation
in the United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring
and firing regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and firing adjusted to take into account different
degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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The next step is moving to the difference-in-difference analysis by focusing on
the variation of job flows across industry/size classes within each country. Column
(3) presents the basic model with the U.S. job flow benchmark and its interaction
with the hiring and firing labor regulation variable, plus country fixed effects (as in
equation (3.4) above). We find that the interaction term is negatively signed but
not statistically significant at the conventional level. This result holds even if we
differentiate the effect of labor regulations by region.
Previous research (see, e.g., Caballero et al. [2004], Heckman and Pages [2004])
suggests that the degree of enforcement of labor regulations - as well as other regula-
tions - varies across our sample of countries that include the OECD, Latin American
and transition economies. Not only are some firms and jobs not registered in Latin
America and increasingly in the transition economies and some Southern European
countries, registered firms may also not fully comply with the existing rules and
regulations. As an indication of the different degree of enforcement of laws and reg-
ulations, we consider the law and order indicator from the Fraser Institute (based
on the Political Risk Component I (Law and Order) from the International Country
Risk Guide, from 0 to 10, 10 being the worst).13 The indicator shows the highest
compliance with laws and regulations in the OECD sample of countries (average
of 0.56), followed with the transition economies (average of 1.76) and by the Latin
American countries (average of 4.96).
To control for possibly differing degrees of enforcement of laws and regulations
13Micco and Pages [2004] also make an attempt at controlling for different degrees of enforcement
of regulations by using an indicator of rules of laws and government effectiveness (see Kaufmann
et al. [2004]). We used the Fraser index of law and order because it is available for the time period
for which our job flows data are available for the different countries.
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Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.13 show the estimated effect of the interac-
tion between the U.S. job flow and the adjusted labor regulation variable without
and with differentiation by region. It is indeed noticeable that, once we control for
the difference in the degree of enforcement across countries, the interaction between
hiring and firing regulations and U.S. job flows becomes strongly significant overall
(column (5)), and in each of the sub regions (column (6)) when we allow the coeffi-
cient of the interaction to vary. In other words, once we control for enforcement, we
find that intrinsically more volatile industries and size classes present lower levels of
gross job turnover relative to the less volatile industries and size classes in countries
with more stringent hiring and firing regulations. It is also interesting to notice that
once we control for the enforcement of labor regulations, the estimated coefficient
of the technology variable (the U.S. job flow benchmark) is closer to unity. Thus, a
significant fraction of less than perfect correlation in the magnitude of job flows in
the countries in the sample with the United States can be explained by restrictive
labor regulations that raise labor adjustment costs.
How sizeable is the estimated impact of labor regulation on job flows? Given
our estimation approach, we consider the effect of labor regulations in reducing job
reallocation between two industries at the extremes of the labor flexibility require-
14There is no indication in Gwartney and Lawson [2004] that the original regulatory variables
consider the enforcement of regulations in addition to the statutes.
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ment. Using the coefficient on the interaction term in column (5) of Table 3.13,
we estimate that the difference in job reallocation between industry/size cells with
a high flexibility requirement (90th percentile of the flexibility distribution in the
United States) and industry/size cells with a low flexibility requirement (10th per-
centile of the same distribution) will be 4.5 percentage points lower in a country with
the highest index of hiring and firing regulations compared to the United States,
the country with the least restrictive regulations. Considering that the average job
reallocation rate is around 25 percent in the sample used in the regression, the
estimated impact is indeed sizeable.15
3.5.5 The Differential Effects of Regulations on Small and Large
Firms
The next step in our analysis is to look at the possibly different effect of labor
regulations on job flows of firms of different sizes. Table 3.14 presents regressions
in which we estimate the coefficient on the interaction between the benchmark U.S.
job flow and the hiring and firing regulatory indicator for firms of different sizes.
Column (1) considers the hiring and firing indicator without controlling for the
different degree of enforcement of laws and regulations. Interestingly, once the in-
15The estimated value is obtained as follows:
β [(USJflow90th − USJflow10th) (HFmax −HFmin)]
where β is the estimated coefficient, and USJflow and HF are the job reallocation in the United
States and the indicator of hiring and firing regulations corrected for the degree of enforcement,
respectively. Micco and Pages [2004], using a similar approach, estimated an impact of 5.7 per-
centage point. Their country sample and period of observation were different from ours but the
results are close.
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teraction effect is allowed to vary across firm size classes, the estimated effect is
negatively signed and statistically significant at the conventional level for all size
classes. Moreover, the estimated impact of stringent regulations on the variance of
job flows across industries increases with firm size. As hypothesized above, smaller
firms are often either exempt from certain regulations or can more easily stay below
the radar screen of regulators and law enforcement authorities. The estimated neg-
ative impact of labor regulations on job flows is almost twice as strong in large firms
(more than 100 employees) compared to micro units (fewer than 20 employees).
Column (2) of Table 3.14 presents a similar specification in which we control
for the different degree of enforcement of regulations. Controlling for such effects
yields larger coefficients and a larger magnitude of the impact of labor regulations on
job flows. As in the previous case, the estimated effect of labor regulations increases
with the size of firms.16
Appropriate care and caution is required to interpret the interaction effects
estimated in Table 3.14 with respect to employer size. Recall that small businesses
systematically have higher job reallocation rates than larger businesses in all coun-
tries including the U.S. benchmark. As such, the results in Table 3.13 imply that
industry/size cells with a higher U.S. benchmark will have the flow reduced by labor
market regulations that are enforced. For Table 3.14, this implies that in comparing
coefficients across size class interactions, the magnitudes are comparable for a given
U.S. benchmark rate. That is, the absolute effect is larger for large businesses than
16Also in this case, the results are robust to the use of the excess labor reallocation. See
Appendix G for more details.
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small businesses for a given U.S. benchmark rate. But given that small businesses
have a higher U.S. benchmark rate this variation tends to work in the opposite
direction.
The final step in our analysis is aimed at assessing the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of regulations in the goods and services markets in our specification.
As discussed above, regulations in different markets tend to be highly correlated,
i.e. countries that impose strict rules of hiring and firing also tend to impose more
restrictive regulations on the goods and services markets. There are also specific
aspects of product market regulations that can influence job flows over and above
labor regulations. For example, since a significant fraction of overall job flows is due
to the entry and exit of firms, regulations affecting the start up of a new business,
as well as bankruptcy rules that affect the exit of low performing units, may affect
job flows. Likewise, regulations affecting price setting by firms and their relations
with the public administration and their clients can all influence incentives for firms
to expand, adopt new technologies and adjust their workforce.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.14 show the results of estimating the job flow
regressions controlling for our synthetic indicator of business regulations. We correct
both labor and product market regulations by the degree of enforcement proxied by
the law and order indicator. In column (3), we do not differentiate the interactions
between U.S. reallocation and regulations by firm size, while we do so in the last
column of the table. Including the interaction between product market regulations
and U.S. job flows does not dramatically alter our results. Whether we differentiate
the impact of regulations by firm size or not, the estimated effects of the interaction
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Table 3.14: Job Flows by Firm Size - the Role of Labor and Product Market Reg-
ulations (Difference-in-Difference Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.1225∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.1150∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗
[0.0126] [0.0131] [0.0109] [0.0147]
USA SUM 0.8379∗∗∗ 0.8579∗∗∗ 0.8401∗∗∗ 0.8371∗∗∗
[0.0700] [0.0409] [0.0988] [0.0435]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0546∗∗
[0.0203]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗<20 workers -0.0499∗∗∗
[0.0124]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗<20 workers -0.0632∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗
[0.0090] [0.0139]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗20-49 Workers -0.0739∗∗∗
[0.0129]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0649∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0188]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗50-99 Workers -0.0853∗∗∗
[0.0131]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.1012∗∗∗ -0.0793∗∗∗
[0.0104] [0.0206]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗100+ Workers -0.0997∗∗∗
[0.0148]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗100+ Workers -0.1140∗∗∗ -0.0537∗
[0.0133] [0.0319]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0235
[0.0255]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers -0.0096
[0.0225]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.037
[0.0309]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.0321
[0.0338]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers -0.1003∗
[0.0530]
Observations 940 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.73
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation in the United
States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency
of hiring and firing regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and firing adjusted to take
into account different degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text). Bus. Reg. is the
indicator of the stringency of business regulations. Bus. Reg. (Adj) is the same indicator adjusted
to take into account different degrees of enforcement of regulations.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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between U.S. job reallocation and labor regulations remain negatively signed and
highly statistically significant, while the coefficients on the product market regula-
tions are generally not statistically significant. However, once we differentiate effects
by firm size, we notice that the only statistically significant effect of product mar-
ket regulations is among large businesses (greater than 100 employees). Moreover,
controlling for product market regulations reduces the estimated impact of labor
regulations for those firms. In other words, for large firms product market regu-
lations play an important role in curbing labor reallocation over and above labor
regulations. Intermediate firms (those in between 20 and 99 employees) seem to be
the most adversely affected by stringent labor regulations that raise labor adjust-
ment costs. In terms of magnitude, note that stringent labor market regulation is
associated with a 0.5 percent drop in job reallocation for micro, small and medium
firms, and a 0.2 percent drop in job reallocation for large firms. Stringent product
market regulation, on the other hand, has the largest impact on job reallocation by
large firms: it is associated with a 0.4 percent drop.17
3.5.6 Do regulations influence the various margins of labor realloca-
tion differently?
So far we have focused on the effects of regulations in labor and product
markets on overall job reallocation. In this section we want to explore whether
such regulations have a different impact on the different margins of reallocation,
17We obtain these magnitudes by calculating the derivative of the coefficient with respect to
enforcement adjusted regulatory variables and dividing by the standard deviation of gross job
reallocation.
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namely on job flows due to the entry and exit of firms in the market and those due
to reallocation among incumbents (see Table 3.15).18 Column (1) shows that the
cross industry/size patterns of job reallocation by entering and exiting firms in the
Latin American countries (see column (1) of Table 3.14) are very similar to those
observed in the United States. This drives the result observed without distinguishing
between different types of firms. Indeed, the coefficient on U.S. job reallocation for
continuing firms in Latin America is only half of that for entering and exiting firms
(see column (2) of Table 3.15). For the EU and transition countries, there are
no significant differences in their cross-industry/size patterns of job flows between
entering/exiting and continuing firms compared to those in the U.S.
Column (3) of Table 3.15 shows the results of estimating the job flow re-
gressions for entering and exiting firms, controlling for labor and product market
regulations corrected by the degree of enforcement and differentiating the impact
of both by firm size, whereas column (4) does the same for continuing firms. The
results suggest a negative and statistically significant effect of labor market regula-
tion (interacted with U.S. job reallocation) on labor mobility generated by entering
and exiting firms for all but large firms. The coefficients are also more than twice
as large in magnitude as the corresponding coefficients in column (4) of Table 3.14,
and they are about the same magnitude for micro, small and medium entering and
exiting firms. However, in order to correctly assess the magnitude of the impact,
18We focus on the combined flows due to entry and exit of firms because of the very high
correlations between entry and exit across industries in most countries. This, in turn suggests
that entries and exits are largely part of a creative destruction process in which entry and exit
reflects within sector reallocation reflecting idiosyncratic differences across firms within sectors (see
Bartelsman et al. [2004b] for evidence based on the same dataset used in this paper, as well as
Geroski [1991], Baldwin and Gorecki [1991]).
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Table 3.15: Job Flows by Firm Size, Entering, Exiting and Continuing Firms - the
Role of Labor and Product Market Regulations (Difference-in-Difference
Analysis)
Entry & Exit Continuers Entry & Exit Continuers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0074 0.0241∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗
[0.0054] [0.0094] [0.0058] [0.0116]
USA SUM 1.0809∗∗∗ 0.4742∗∗∗
[0.0454] [0.0615]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5730∗∗∗ 0.5118∗∗∗
[0.0307] [0.0372]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.6835∗∗∗ 0.6133∗∗∗
[0.0345] [0.0418]
USA SUM ∗LAC 0.9982∗∗∗ 0.4942∗∗∗
[0.0341] [0.0427]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1542∗∗∗ -0.0018
EPL (Adj) ∗<20 workers [0.0137] [0.0179]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1483∗∗∗ -0.0418∗
EPL (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers [0.0212] [0.0219]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1636∗∗∗ -0.0557∗∗
EPL (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers [0.0277] [0.0226]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1148 -0.0722∗∗
EPL (Adj) ∗100+ Workers [0.0738] [0.0304]
USA SUM ∗ 0.1010∗∗∗ 0.0007
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers [0.0220] [0.0288]
USA SUM ∗ 0.0034 0.0404
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers [0.0347] [0.0357]
USA SUM ∗ -0.0208 0.0546
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers [0.0450] [0.0368]
USA SUM ∗ -0.2452∗∗ 0.0599
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers [0.1205] [0.0504]
Observations 946 934 946 934
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.55 0.75 0.58
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA SUM (Entry & Exit): industry/size job realloca-
tion due to entering and exiting firms in the United States. EU denotes the OECD European
countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the
countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring and firing regulations.
EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and firing adjusted to take into account different degrees
of enforcement of regulations (see main text). Bus. Reg. is the indicator of the stringency
of business regulations. Bus. Reg. (Adj) is the same indicator adjusted to take into account
different degrees of enforcement of regulations.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
we need to remember that the magnitude of job reallocation varies significantly by
size class. Taking that into account, note that stringent labor market regulation
has the biggest impact on job reallocation by micro entering and exiting firms: it
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is associated with a 0.6 percent drop in job reallocation by such firms. The impact
on small, medium and large firms is lower: stringent labor market regulation is
associated with a 0.3, 0.3 and 0.1 percent drop in job reallocation, respectively.
The estimated effects of product market regulation (interacted with U.S. job
reallocation) on job flows by entering and exiting firms is not significant for small
and medium firms, and is negative and significant for large firms, while it is surpris-
ingly positive for micro firms. The opposite effect of product market regulation on
small and large firms is consistent with the idea that regulations tend to promote
labor adjustment among small firms but reduce adjustment among large ones. For
continuing firms, labor market regulation is more important than product market
regulation, as the results in column (4) of demonstrate. The coefficients are smaller
in magnitude than the ones in column (4) of Table 3.14, but the basic result holds:
the estimated impact of stringent regulations on the variance of job flows across
industries increases with firm size. Stringent labor market regulation is associated
with a 0.2 percent drop in job reallocation by continuing large, medium and small
firms.19
These results confirm the importance of labor market regulations in shaping
labor adjustment patterns, particularly so in those industries and size classes where
technological and market factors require more frequent employment changes. How-
ever, controlling for other regulations influencing firm behavior also influences job
flows. In addition, labor market regulations are especially important for entering
19Impact is the largest for medium firms, followed by large and small firms, but it is rounded
to 0.2 percent for all of them.
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and exiting firms, especially for micro, small and medium firms, which presumably
face more hardship in adjusting to changing market conditions (for example, de-
mand) than large firms and find labor market regulations (such as firing costs) too
restrictive. Even though small firms are often either exempt from certain regulations
or can more easily stay below the radar of regulators, this appears to be easier for
continuing small firms than for entering or exiting small firms.
3.5.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In the empirical analysis, we control for country, industry and size effects, as
well as for unobservable effects using a difference-in-difference approach. Moreover,
we test the robustness of results for hiring and firing regulations by including other
regulatory variables. However, the use of quasi panel data may still run the risk that
results are driven by the inclusion of a specific country or industry in the sample
that drives the results in a given direction. The use of an unbalanced panel on the
industry dimension makes this risk potentially more serious.
To test for the robustness of results to changes in the sample, we re-estimate
our two preferred specifications - columns (2) and (4) in Table 3.14 - removing one
country or one industry at a time from the sample. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the
estimated coefficients on enforcement-adjusted hiring and firing regulations inter-
acted with job reallocation in the United States, differentiated by size classes, in the
specification without and with control for business regulations.
The results show a remarkable stability of the estimated coefficient for the
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Coefficient on Enforcement Adjusted
Hiring and Firing Regulations Interacted with U.S. Job Reallocation
and 95% Confidence Intervals, Excluding One Country or One Sector at
a Time, Labor Market Regulations (Column (2) from Table 3.14)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Coefficient on Enforcement Adjusted
Hiring and Firing Regulations Interacted with U.S. Job Reallocation
and 95% Confidence Intervals, Excluding One Country or One Sector
at a Time, Labor and Product Market Regulations (Column (4) from
Table 3.14)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
108
interaction term to changes in the sample along the country or the industry dimen-
sion. The point coefficient estimates for the interaction term are always negatively
statistically significant. The most sensitive coefficients are those for the largest size
class - 100 or more employees - where the exclusion of Portugal or Chile leads to
a stronger estimated effect of regulations. Not surprisingly given the unbalanced
nature of the sample, the exclusion of finance and business activities as well as
construction tend to strengthen the estimated negative effects of regulations on job
reallocation.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter exploits a rich new database with harmonized data on job flows
that vary by country, industry and size class. We find that all countries in our sample
exhibit sizeable annual gross job flows. Industry and size class effects together
account for a very large share of the overall variability in job flows across country,
industry and size class cells (e.g., over 50 percent of the variation in the summary
measure of job reallocation is accounted for by industry and size effects interacted
together). Interestingly, the most important factor here is employer size. Small
businesses exhibit a substantially higher pace of job creation and destruction and
this pattern is pervasive across industries and countries. Moreover, industry effects
play a large role as well. Taken together, it is clear that some form of technology, cost
and demand factors that are common across countries account for the bulk of the
variation in job flows. Nevertheless, even after controlling for industry/technology
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and size factors, there remain significant differences in job flows across countries
that could reflect differences in business environment conditions.
Our harmonized firm-level dataset for a sample of 16 industrial and emerg-
ing economies over the past decade allows us to look at one of the factors shaping
the business environment - regulations on the hiring and firing of workers. To
minimize the possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with
cross-country regressions, we use a difference-in-difference approach. The empiri-
cal results suggest that stringent hiring and firing regulations (and their consistent
enforcement) reduce job turnover, especially in industry and size class cells that in-
herently exhibit more job turnover. To capture the latter, we use the United States
patterns as a benchmark to identify and quantify industry/size class cells with in-
herently higher job turnover. Regulations also distort the patterns of flows across
industry and size classes within a country. Interestingly, even though medium and
large firms have lower average flows, holding the magnitude of the U.S. benchmark
rates constant, medium and large firms are more severely affected by stringent la-
bor regulations within a country. Small firms are less affected (for a given pace
of reallocation in the U.S. benchmark), probably because they are in some cases
exempt from such regulations or can more easily circumvent them. It is also inter-
esting to point out that both labor and product market regulations have different
effects on the different margins of firm and job mobility. Thus, labor regulations
effect disproportionally the entry and exit of firms and the associated job mobility,
while stringent business regulations seem to affect more the entry and exit of larger
businesses and the associated job reallocation.
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Much work remains to be done to understand the implications of our findings.
Our findings provide evidence that stringent labor regulations have an impact on
reallocation dynamics. It is a much larger step to demonstrate that stringent labor
regulations have an adverse impact on the efficient allocation of labor in a manner
consistent with the predictions of Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]. To explore the
latter, we need to measure not only reallocation but also productivity at the mi-
cro level. A number of studies have found that allocative efficiency is important
for understanding differences across time, industries and countries in the level and
growth of productivity (see, e.g., Foster et al. [2001] and Bartelsman et al. [2005]).
Putting those findings together with those in this chapter certainly suggests that
stringent labor market regulations may have an important adverse impact on al-
locative efficiency and in turn productivity levels and growth. However, much work
(including additional data infrastructure development) is needed to bring all of the
pieces together to explore these important issues.
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Chapter 4
Impact of Changes in Wage Setting Policies on the
Structure of Wages in Slovenia1
4.1 Introduction
It is a well established empirical fact that worker flows are large relative to
job flows and that job flows underlie a big fraction of worker flows (see, e.g., Davis
and Haltiwanger [1999]). However there are worker flows above and beyond those
needed to accomodate job flows. Empirical evidence also shows that within-firm
productivity growth accounts for the majority of aggregate productivity growth
(see, e.g., Foster et al. [2001] and Bartelsman et al. [2005]). Putting these two
empirical facts together, it is possible that within-firm productivity growth is driven
by worker reallocation, which might reflect match quality turnover (i.e., workers
leave firms because the jobs are not challenging enough for them or firms lay off
workers because they cannot handle the job). Wage structure may induce workers
to either stay with the firm or leave: if a match between a worker and the firm is
bad, lower wage may induce the worker to leave.
Research on the structure of wages has a long history, but recent availability
of comparable longitudinal micro-level datasets across countries has brought about
1This chapter draws heavily on a joint paper with John Haltiwanger and Milan Vodopivec with
the same title.
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a renaissance in both theoretical and empirical work on this subject (see, for exam-
ple, Heckman et al. [2003]). Overviews of empirical work on differences in wages
and changes in the wage structure can be found in Autor and Katz [1999] or, more
recently, Autor et al. [2005]. In the 1940s and 1950s, empirical work on the wage
structure focused on occupation and industry wage differentials. In the 1960s and
1970s, differences in wages by education and potential experience came to the fore-
front as a result of increased availability of micro-level datasets with information
on earnings and worker characteristics. Mincer [1974] found that more educated
workers have higher earnings and that wage-experience profiles are upward sloping
and concave. Availability of longitudinal matched employer-employee data took
this research further; Abowd and Kramarz [1999] have shown that it is important
to use appropriate estimation techniques to eliminate biases resulting from omitting
unobservable firm and person fixed effects from the specification.
Over the past decade or two, changes in the economic systems of transition
countries provided an interesting “natural experiment” on the impact of institutional
factors on the wage structure and its changes. Socialist governments constrained the
labor supply mechanism: it was everyone’s duty to work and jobs were provided for
everyone; firing was not allowed. Moreover, “economy-wide wage rates were assigned
for all classes of jobs” (Orazem and Vodopivec [1994], p. 1). The collapse of the
command economy and subsequent transition to the market economy brought about
significant changes in the wage structure. Existing studies on the wage structure
in transition economies rely on sample micro-level data (for example, Münich et al.
[2005] and Flanagan [1995] for the Czech Republic, Jones and Ilayperuma Simon
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[2005] for Bulgaria, and Orazem and Vodopivec [2000] for Estonia and Slovenia)
and focus mostly on a year or two prior to and after the beginning of transition.
The above mentioned studies find that market forces become more important in the
wage determination process and consequently that the wage structure changes as
transition progresses.
However, transition did not end in the early 1990s for most of these countries.
Indeed, there were significant changes in employment protection legislation, unem-
ployment benefits, collective bargaining systems and union density in the late 1990s
in most transition countries (see, for example, Haltiwanger et al. [2003]) and all of
these could potentially have an impact on the wage structure. None of these studies
covers the late 1990s. The only exception is Vodopivec [2004] for Slovenia, who
uses a matched employer-employee dataset, but only estimates a standard Mincer
[1974] model. In this chapter, we use the same dataset, covering the period from
1992 to 2000, and we extend the standard wage structure analysis by including firm
and person fixed effects in the model. In addition, we exploit changes in the wage
setting system in 1997 to compare the wage structure in 1992-1996 with the one
in 1997-2000. We find that there were significant changes in the wage structure in
the late 1990s, with the most educated groups gaining the most. We show that
worker characteristics, either observable or unobservable, become more important
in explaining the variance of real wages in the late 1990s, reflecting the change in
the wage determination system.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the
institutional background of wage setting in Slovenia. Data used are described in
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Section 4.3. Estimation methods and results are discussed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Institutional Background of Wage Setting2
The late 1980s and 1990s were a period of fundamental political and economic
changes in Slovenia. These changes started in 1988, when Slovenia was still a part
of Yugoslavia, with the Yugoslav Law on Enterprises that transferred decision-
making rights from workers to equity owners, which resulted in significant changes
in both employment and wage policies. Transition continued after Slovenia declared
independence in 1991.
On the employment front, firms were given the right to lay off workers since
1988. However, large costs were associated with layoffs. One way for firms to reduce
or eliminate these costs is the use of fixed-term contracts, which were introduced
in the Labor Code of February 1991. These contracts were limited neither in the
number of successive contracts nor in the maximum cumulated duration. The use of
fixed-term contracts has increased over time. Another low- or no cost way to adjust
labor is to induce workers to leave by giving them lower wages than they could get
elsewhere. Despite allowing relatively liberal use of fixed-term contracts, Slovenian
employment protection legislation has been among the most restrictive in Europe
(see Haltiwanger et al. [2003], Riboud et al. [2002]).
Under self-management (pre-1988), the government set the firm’s wage bill
and the workers set individual wages within each firm. The objective was to even
2This section draws heavily on Haltiwanger and Vodopivec [2003].
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out differences in wage pay among firms, as well as within firms.3 As a result,
Yugoslav firms had extremely compressed wage scales. This system was replaced
by a three-component system in Slovenia in 1991, consisting of the Labor Code,
collective bargaining, and incomes policy (Haltiwanger and Vodopivec [2003], p.
258).
The Labor Code of 1991 let wages be determined by employers within the
framework set by collective agreements. The first general bargaining collective agree-
ment was ratified in August 1990, and it was followed by other general and industry
collective bargaining agreements.4 General collective bargaining agreements pre-
scribe the components of the wage (basic wage, wage supplements, supplements for
individual success and supplements based on firm success) and determine fringe ben-
efits (duration of vacation, reimbursement of transportation to work, meals, etc.).
Wages and fringe benefits of managerial workers are normally set in individual con-
tracts, which are much more flexible.
The largest component of a worker’s pay is the basic wage, which is usually
determined as a multiple of the minimum basic wage, set by the collective agree-
ments. This basic wage depends on the category to which a worker belongs on the
basis of his/her highest attained educational level. There are nine categories total,
and the basic wage for the highest category was set at three times that of the low-
est category since 1991, although some industry collective bargaining agreements
set higher ratios. Table 4.1 shows these ratios for the general collective bargaining
3Haltiwanger and Vodopivec [2003] note that “the pay of the highest pair manager was 4.54
times that of the lowest paid worker” in a firm with more than one thousand workers.
4On December 31, 1996, there were 24 valid collective bargaining agreements (Pirš [1996]).
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agreement and select industry collective bargaining agreements in 1997 (there were
very few changes in these ratios during the period of our analysis). Until 1997, firms
in bad financial standing had the right to reduce basic wage levels.
Incomes policies continued to be an important component of the wage setting
system until 1997. In 1991, the law tied the growth of the wage bill to the growth
of the cost of living and limited managerial salary to fifteen times the minimum
wage (Orazem and Vodopivec [1994]). After 1992, the growth of the wage bill was
agreed upon in collective bargaining agreements. Since 1997, the only limitation on
wage growth was the requirement that the annual growth of pay based on individual
contracts should be matched by the growth of the payroll of the workers covered by
collective agreements.
The wage-setting system in Slovenia is quite rigorous and complicated, but it
does allow firm- and worker-specific deviations from the wage guidelines set in col-
lective bargaining agreements, should the success of the firm and/or worker warrant
them. Given that the wage-setting policies changed in 1997 in two respects (firms
in bad financial standing no longer had the right to reduce basic wage levels and
limitations on the wage growth were significantly reduced), an interesting question
is whether this had any impact on the structure of wages and the importance of the
person characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and firm fixed effects. This
is precisely what we attempt to answer in this chapter. But first, we describe the
data used and its properties.
117
Table 4.1: Ratios for Basic Wage Scale in the General Collective Agreement and Select Industry Collective Agreements in 1997
Category General Paper Coal Electricity
1 Simple work (no training) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 Less demanding work (short training,
completed elementary education) 1.100 1.150 1.287 1.200
3 Medium demanding work (up to two year
professional/vocational education) 1.230 1.300 1.406 1.320
4 Demanding work (up to two-and-a-half-year
professional/vocational education) 1.370 1.450 1.582 1.550
5 More demanding work (3 years of
professional/vocational education, with a
foreman exam, or 4-5 years of such education) 1.550 1.700 1.771 1.750
6 Very demanding work (2 years
of college level education) 1.850 2.200 2.154 2.120
7 Extremely demanding work (4-5 years
of college level education) 2.100 2.600 2.170 2.740
8 Most demanding work (master degree) 2.500 3.300 3.650 3.950
9 Exceptionally important and




We use a matched employer-employee dataset, compiled from three unusually
rich administrative databases covering virtually all Slovenian workforce participants
and all business subjects. The first is a database on workers, containing employee
characteristics, employment history and earnings information. The second is a firm-
level database, containing business registry information. The third is a firm-level
database with data from balance sheets and income and loss statements. Common
identifiers allow us to combine the records from these three datasets. The resulting
dataset covers the period from 1992 until 2000.5
4.3.1 Employee Dataset
Employee dataset is maintained by the Statistical Office of the Republic of
Slovenia (SORS), as a part of the Statistical Register of Employment (SRDAP). It
is based on the records from the Pension, Disability and Medical Insurance Register,
augmented with: a) data from statistical surveys on the recipients of undergraduate
and graduate degrees, b) data from the Central Population Register (CRP) at the
Ministry of the Interior, and c) data from the Business Register of Slovenia (PRS),
now maintained by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records
and Related Services (AJPES). Data are collected by the Health Insurance Institute
of Slovenia (ZZZS) from firms or self-employed persons. Records in SRDAP are up-
dated monthly: all the changes need to be reported within 8 days of their occurence.
5Data are also available for 2001, but the coverage is much worse than in previous years, so we
exclude it from our analysis.
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Data on the recipients of undergraduate and graduate degrees are obtained from the
colleges and universities annually.
This dataset contains information on the start and end of employment (if
applicable), employee and job characteristics (gender, birth year, level of education
attained, level of professional training, type of shift, type of employment, vocation),
start and end of the reference period of earnings, earnings, and hours worked in the
reference period, including hours worked in overtime.
4.3.2 Employer Datasets
Business Register of Slovenia and firm-level accounting dataset are maintained
by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related
Services (AJPES) since July 15, 2002. Prior to that, they were maintained by
SORS.
Firms are required to submit form PRS-1 at the time of their creation, change
of their parameters, and their cessation, if applicable, by to Law on Enterprises.
They are required by law to submit form PRS-2 at the time of the creation of an
establishment within the firm, change in the establishment’s parameters and its
cessation, if applicable. According to the Law on Enterprises, all firms that are
registered in any given year are supposed to provide balance sheets and income
statements to the relevant government agency, regardless of whether they were in
business the entire year or not.
Firm identification numbers are unique and are not recycled. However, they
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do not allow transparent tracking of mergers and acquisitions. This is possible with
the additional information from the type of change.
Business register dataset includes information on the date of creation of the
establishment, industry, municipality, ownership, origin of establishment’s capital
and date of the first entry to the registry. Date of creation was acquired from
the current PRS online (http://www.ajpes.si/prs) for firms that are still active
and were missing this information. Firm-level accounting dataset contains balance
sheets and income statements for all businesses (excluding sole proprietors and the
banking industry).
4.3.3 Sample Selection and Definition of Variables
The three datasets described above in principle cover all formal sector workers
and firms in Slovenia, including sole proprietors,6 which were excluded from the
analysis, as were the workers employed by them. The reason for the exclusion is
that sole proprietors in some cases appear to “adjust” reported earnings of their
employees downward to reduce their old-age contributions.7
There were a number of workers that either held two jobs at the same time
or switched employers during the year. When two jobs were held at the same time,
we kept only their primary job, defined as the job in which they worked the most
hours, either regular or overtime, and in which they were permanently employed.
When a job switch occured during the year, we calculated the employment spell at
6We do not have accounting data for them, although they exist as well.
7These concerns were also mentioned by Orazem and Vodopivec [1994] as a reason for excluding
self-employed and workers in private enterprises.
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each job in that year and kept the observation with the highest earnings and the
longest employment spell.
Our main question is whether the structure of wages changed during the period
from 1992 to 2000. Since we have the information on hours worked during regular
time and in overtime, we can calculate hourly wages. We define the nominal gross
hourly wage of worker i in year t, nwit, as:
nwit =
earnit
hR,it + 1.3 ∗ hO,it
where earnit is the sum of gross wage and salary income,
8 hR,it denotes the number
of hours worked during regular time and hO,it denotes the number of hours worked in
overtime. Since hours worked in overtime are paid 30 percent more than the hourly
wage according to the general collective bargaining agreement, we use a factor of 1.3
to make the number of hours worked in overtime comparable to the number worked
during regular time. 9
Because monthly inflation rates were high especially during the first few years
of our sample,10 nominal earnings and prices in the first half of the year differed
significantly from those in the last half of the year. We thus calculate average
consumer price indices for the months in which earnings are observed, and then
calculate real wages by deflating nominal wages with these indices.
8Sum of gross wage and salary income includes personal income tax (payed by employee),
payroll tax (paid by employer) and social security contributions (paid by both employer and
employee).
9This factor includes personal income tax (payed by employee), payroll tax (paid by employer)
and social security contributions (paid by both employer and employee).
10In 1992, the annual inflation rate was 207 percent.
122
Education is measured as the highest attained level of education. Specifically,
we form six groups: unfinished elementary school, finished elementary school, fin-
ished vocational school, finished high school, finished 2-year college and finished
4-year college, masters or doctorate. Potential experience (EXPER) is measured
on the basis of the average number of years it takes to attain each level of education:
EXPERit =

AGEit − 15 if unfinished elementary school
AGEit − 16 if finished elementary school
AGEit − 18 if finished vocational school
AGEit − 19 if finished high school
AGEit − 22.5 if finished 2-year college
AGEit − 24.7 if finished 4-year college or more
where AGEit is age of worker i in year t.
Tenure associated with a job at employer k is calculated as the difference
between year t and the year in which the employment spell at employer k started.
Workers in our dataset are either in permanent or fixed-term employment, and we
define a dummy variable equal to one if they have a fixed-term appointment and
zero otherwise.
We also observe type of shift at the person level. There are five shift types:
a) one 8-hour shift, b) two 8-hour shifts, c) three 8-hour shifts, d) four persons work
at one job in 24 hours, and e) “turns” of 12 hours or more, followed by more than
24 hour break.
We excluded observations with exceptionally low or exceptionally high hourly
123
wages and observations with more than 50 years of potential experience from the
sample. We also excluded observations for which data on earnings, type of employ-
ment, type of shift and level of education attained were not available. The excluded
observations accounted for less than two percent of the entire sample.
Table 4.2 presents the official figures for employment from the Statistical Office
of Slovenia from 1992-2000, and compares them to the number of people employed
in our sample; columns (1) and (4) are relevant for this comparison. Our sample
covers 74.41 percent of all persons in paid employment in firms in 1992, the coverage
increases to 97.33 percent in 1996 and then falls again to 74.58 percent by 2000. The
sample covers the entire economy, with the exception of the banking industry.
Table 4.2: Persons in Paid Employment in Enterprises and Other Organizations and
by Private Employers
Persons in Paid Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year In Firms By Sole Proprietors Total Sample
1992 658922 33157 692079 490312
1993 629016 36553 665568 506515
1994 605496 41840 647336 518377
1995 594394 47558 641952 531082
1996 581106 53545 634651 565618
1997 593086 58140 651226 564910
1998 591653 60827 652480 556836
1999 606928 64043 670971 545238
2000 615493 67549 683042 459035
Source: SORS and own calculations.
4.3.4 Summary Statistics
Some interesting facts emerge from the summary statistics in Table 4.3. Log
real hourly wages have increased during the period from 1992 to 2000, but it seems
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that, contrary to expectations, their variation has not. On average, workers stayed
in the same job for 3.4 years, but since the data is censored on December 31, 2000,
tenure may be higher if we extended our analysis beyond this date. Overall, 84.1
percent of workers finished at most high school, with the number being higher in
1992-1996, and lower in 1997-2000. The share of workers with at least a 4-year college
degree increased by 1.5 percentage points in 1997-2000 compared to 1992-1996.
The shares of workers with unfinished or finished elementary school has decreased,
indicating that the workforce was more educated at the end of 1990s than it was in
the early 1990s.
It is also interesting to note two factors that could be interpreted as a result of
adjusting to the strict labor market legislation: an increase in the share of workers
who worked at least one hour in overtime11 and an increase in the share of workers
in fixed term appointments, rather than in permanent employment. In 1997-2000,
the share of workers who worked at least one hour in overtime was 2.8 percentage
points higher than in 1992-1996. More dramatically, the share of workers in fixed
term appointments increased by 13.4 percentage points in 1997-2000, compared to
1992-1996.
11According to the general collective bargaining agreement, overtime work is limited to 20 hours
per month and 180 hours per year.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
1992-2000 1992-1996 1997-2000
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log(Real Hourly Wage) 5.6856 0.5059 5.6325 0.5032 5.7507 0.5017
Experience 17.9856 9.9833 17.8629 9.9701 18.1363 9.9974
Tenure 3.3787 2.7264 2.7011 1.9009 4.2112 3.2968
Tenure Squared 18.8489 25.8727 10.9093 13.7285 28.6029 32.9794
Elementary School 0.1779 0.3824 0.1802 0.3843 0.1751 0.3801
Vocational School 0.3110 0.4629 0.3089 0.4621 0.3135 0.4639
High School 0.2629 0.4402 0.2546 0.4357 0.2731 0.4456
2-Year University 0.0757 0.2645 0.0753 0.2639 0.0761 0.2652
4-Year University or more 0.0836 0.2768 0.0768 0.2662 0.0920 0.2890
Two 8-Hour Shifts 0.2205 0.4146 0.2236 0.4167 0.2167 0.4120
Three 8-Hour Shifts 0.0447 0.2066 0.0441 0.2054 0.0453 0.2080
4 persons work at one job in 24 hours 0.0098 0.0987 0.0096 0.0974 0.0101 0.1002
Turns of 12 hours or more, followed
by more than 24 hour break 0.0173 0.1304 0.0199 0.1396 0.0141 0.1179
Fixed Term Appointment 0.2334 0.4230 0.1734 0.3786 0.3071 0.4613
Overtime 0.2788 0.4484 0.2664 0.4421 0.2940 0.4556
Incomplete Year 0.1966 0.3974 0.2071 0.4052 0.1838 0.3873
Number of observations 4737923 2611904 2126019
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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Table 4.4: Number of Years in the Sample and Number of Firms Worked At (Num-
ber and Percentage of Observations)
Firms
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1 100479 100479
2.12 2.12
2 145454 34070 179524
3.07 0.72 3.79
3 159900 72018 12612 244530
3.37 1.52 0.27 5.16
4 239752 99540 30488 3852 373632
5.06 2.10 0.64 0.08 7.89
5 345960 130150 45310 10125 1275 532820
7.30 2.75 0.96 0.21 0.03 11.25
6 259356 151338 56670 16332 3150 312 487158
5.47 3.19 1.20 0.34 0.07 0.01 10.28
7 301756 192689 74249 20860 4823 714 56 595147
6.37 4.07 1.57 0.44 0.10 0.02 0.00 12.56
8 369848 271640 93296 24240 5320 1000 128 0 765472
7.81 5.73 1.97 0.51 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 16.16
9 858699 441657 123048 29259 5328 963 171 36 1459161
18.12 9.32 2.60 0.62 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 30.80
Total 2781204 1393102 435673 104668 19896 2989 355 36 4737923
58.70 29.40 9.20 2.21 0.42 0.06 0.01 0.00 100.00
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
Table 4.4 tabulates the observations by the number of years a worker is in the
sample and the number of firms he or she works at while in the sample. 30.80 percent
of workers were in the sample during the entire period from 1992-2000, and 58.70
percent of workers never switched their employers. However, the remaining 41.30
percent of workers have worked for at least 2 or more employers during 1992-2000.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 The Estimation Model
To assess how the wage structure in Slovenia changed in the late 1990s com-
pared to the early 1990s, we first estimate the standard Mincer [1974] model, with
observable worker characteristics and controls only, which we will refer to as our
baseline specification:
ln wit = Xitβ + Zitγ + εit (4.1)
where ln wit is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage of worker i at time t.
Xit denotes a vector of observable individual characteristics, including an intercept,
a set of dummy variables indicating different levels of formal education, years of
potential work experience (and its square, triple and quadruple) and years of tenure
(and its square). Zit denotes a vector of controls, including a dummy variable
indicating if the individual is in a permanent or a fixed-term contract position, a set
of dummy variables for the type of shift, a dummy indicating whether the individual
worked overtime, a dummy variable indicating if the individual worked less than a
full year, and a set of annual dummy variables. These job-related circumstances
could have an impact on the amount of workers’ remuneration: for example, firms
might be willing to offer a lower wage to workers employed on the basis of fixed-
term contracts than to workers in permanent employment, even though both types
of workers work in the same jobs and have comparable person characteristics.
However, specification in model (4.1) does not take into account firm-specific
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or industry-specific deviations from the wage guidelines. In order to control for
these, we include either 2-digit industry or firm fixed effects in the model:
ln wit = ϕJ(i,t) + Xitβ + Zitγ + εit (4.2)
where ϕJ(i,t) denotes either a 2-digit industry fixed effect or a firm fixed effect. We
cannot include both industry and firm fixed effects in the model at once, because we
defined 2-digit industry for each firm as the mode of 2-digit industry over 1992-2000.
Note that in this model, Xit does not include an intercept, as it is absorbed in the
industry or firm fixed effects.
Abowd et al. [2002] specify a statistical model that takes into account not only
firm fixed effects (heterogeneity), but also person fixed effects:
ln wit = θi + ϕJ(i,t) + Xitβ + Zitγ + εit (4.3)
where θi denotes person fixed effects and Xit contains time-varying individual and/or
firm characteristics. This vector does not include the level of education attained,
which is now part of θi, and it does not include an intercept. Estimation of this
model requires algorithms based on iterative conjugative gradient method to deal
with the high dimensionality of the problem. Identification of person and firm fixed
effects requires that some of the individuals in the sample switch employers, as it
uses graph theory to determine groups of connected individuals and firms (Abowd
et al. [2002], p. 3). As Table 4.4 illustrates, our sample fulfills this requirement.
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We estimate models (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) using the data from 1992-2000, and
for the two sub-periods, 1992-1996 and 1997-2000. We also ask how much variation
in log real hourly wages can be explained by the respective components in these
three models: industry and firm fixed effects, person fixed effects (both observable
and unobservable), time-varying person characteristics and controls (as applicable).
4.4.2 The Baseline Specification - Observable Worker Characteristics
We start with a baseline specification, the standard Mincer [1974] model of
log real hourly wages. We estimate the model using the entire sample, and then we
split the sample into two subsamples, 1992-1996 and 1997-2000. We also estimate
the model using the entire sample, allowing all the coefficients to vary in the two
subperiods. Table 4.5 presents the results for this specification.
As expected, returns to potential experience are positive, in accordance with
the findings from other studies (for example, Orazem and Vodopivec [2000]). On
average, one year of additional experience brought about a 4.2 percent increase in
real earnings in 1992-1996 and a 6.0 percent increase in 1997-2000. This result could
indicate that firms valued work experience more in the later period, since the general
collective bargaining agreement prescribed the minimum rate of return to seniority
of only 0.5 percent for every year of work experience. These returns are higher than
the ones Orazem and Vodopivec [2000] find for 1992.
The wage - potential experience profile is concave, and it became even more
concave in 1997-2000 compared to 1992-1996, especially for those with less than 25
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Table 4.5: Wage Model - Observable Worker Characteristics
1992-2000 1992-1996 1997-2001 Change
Intercept 4.8551∗∗∗ 4.8485∗∗∗ 4.9121∗∗∗
[0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0020]
Experience 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0583∗∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0006]
Experience2/100 -0.2846∗∗∗ -0.2306∗∗∗ -0.3834∗∗∗ -0.1526∗∗∗
[0.0028] [0.0038] [0.0040] [0.0056]
Experience3/1000 0.0860∗∗∗ 0.0711∗∗∗ 0.1151∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
[0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0020]
Experience4/10000 -0.0090∗∗∗ -0.0077∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Tenure 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004]
Tenure2/100 0.1272∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗ -0.0602∗∗∗ -0.0260∗∗∗
[0.0020] [0.0040] [0.0025] [0.0047]
Elementary 0.0814∗∗∗ 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0784∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0015]
Vocational 0.2494∗∗∗ 0.2554∗∗∗ 0.2511∗∗∗ -0.0042∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0014]
High school 0.5125∗∗∗ 0.5152∗∗∗ 0.5176∗∗∗ 0.0024
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0015]
University (2 years) 0.8315∗∗∗ 0.8225∗∗∗ 0.8519∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0018]
University (4 years) 1.1618∗∗∗ 1.1390∗∗∗ 1.1933∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0018]
Fixed Term Appointment -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗ -0.0726∗∗∗ -0.0428∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0008] [0.0006] [0.0010]
Overtime 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.1015∗∗∗ 0.0910∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0008]
Incomplete year -0.0925∗∗∗ -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0010]
Shift effects YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES
Industry effects NO NO NO
Firm effects NO NO NO
Observations 4737923 2611904 2126019
R-squared 0.4695 0.4282 0.5090
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%,
∗∗∗significant at 1%. Omitted group of education are workers with unfinished
elementary school. The model also includes controls for the type of shift and
year fixed effects.
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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years of potential experience. For those with more than 25 years of potential experi-
ence but less than 35 years of potential experience, the marginal returns are almost
the same in both sub-periods, while returns decreased in 1997-2000 for those with
more than 47 years of potential experience. This indicates that marginal returns
to a year of potential experience rise for the least experienced but fall for the most
experienced. Panel A of Figure 4.1 shows precisely this pattern.
Firm tenure also had a positive impact on wages - an additional year of “ser-
vice” at the same firm brought about a 3.1 percent increase in earnings during
1992-2000, 3.3 percent during 1992-1996 and 2.2 percent during 1997-2000. These
results indicate that seniority in the firm became less valued (while perhaps indi-
vidual skills became more important) in the late 1990s. The wage - tenure profile
is concave as well, meaning that marginal returns to a year of tenure rise less than
proportionately with the length of tenure.
Average returns to education rose more for the most educated groups relative
to the least educated groups. Consistent with findings from Orazem and Vodopivec
[1994], we find that those with four years of university education or more gained the
most in relative earnings, followed by those with two years of university education.
Returns to education increased by 5.6 percent for the first group and by 1.0 percent
for the second relative to those who did not finish elementary school. Those with
finished elementary school or vocational school actually lost 1.1 and 0.4 percent
relative to those who did not finish elementary school. These results indicate that
the wage scale was not as compressed in the late 1990s as it was at the beginning
of transition.
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4.4.3 Industry and Firm Fixed Effects
The next step in our analysis is to look at the impact of industry and firm
fixed effects using model (4.2). Firms are allowed to deviate from the prescribed
minimum basic wage and the basic wage differs by industry, since there are a number
of industry collective bargaining agreements in force. We again estimate the model
for the entire period, and for the two sub-periods.
Table 4.6 contains the results for the Mincer [1974] model with 2-digit industry
fixed effects (refer to Appendix E for the list of 2-digit industries). Compared to
the model without industry fixed effects, the returns to potential work experience
are larger in 1992-1996, about 4.6 percent for each additional year of potential
experience, but slightly smaller in 1997-2000. The wage - potential experience profile
is still concave, as Panel B of Figure 4.1 illustrates, and only workers with 25 to 35
years of potential experience do worse in 1997-2000 than in 1992-1996. Tenure with
the firm has a positive impact on log real wage in both sub-periods, and the wage -
tenure profile is concave.
Average returns to education still follow the same general pattern as in Ta-
ble 4.5, but they are lower. One possible explanation is that some industries attract
more educated workers or have on avergae a better educated workforce than others,
and the omission of industry fixed effects causes the coefficients on education to pick
up some of this correlation.
On the other hand, it is also plausible that there are differences not only
between industries but also between firms in the types of workers they are able
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Table 4.6: Wage Model - Observable Worker Characteristics and Industry Fixed
Effects
1992-2000 1992-1996 1997-2001 Change
Experience 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0006]
Experience2/100 -0.2962∗∗∗ -0.2618∗∗∗ -0.3753∗∗∗ -0.1262∗∗∗
[0.0026] [0.0036] [0.0038] [0.0053]
Experience3/1000 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.0819∗∗∗ 0.1121∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0019]
Experience4/10000 -0.0096∗∗∗ -0.0091∗∗∗ -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0028∗∗∗
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Tenure 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0177
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004]
Tenure2/100 -0.1523∗∗∗ -0.1211∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗
[0.0019] [0.0038] [0.0024] [0.0045]
Elementary 0.0765∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ -0.0094∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0014]
Vocational 0.2329∗∗∗ 0.2359∗∗∗ 0.2368∗∗∗ -0.0056∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0013]
High school 0.4544∗∗∗ 0.4560∗∗∗ 0.4599∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0014]
University (2 years) 0.7793∗∗∗ 0.7742∗∗∗ 0.7940∗∗∗ 0.0189∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0017]
University (4 years) 1.0937∗∗∗ 1.0716∗∗∗ 1.1221∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗
[0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0017]
Fixed Term Appointment -0.0458∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0681∗∗∗ -0.0394∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0009]
Overtime 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.1004∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007]
Incomplete year -0.0753∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0010]
Year effects YES YES YES
Industry effects YES YES YES
Firm effects NO NO NO
Observations 4737923 2611904 2126019
R-squared 0.5260 0.4919 0.5630
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%,
∗∗∗significant at 1%. Omitted group of education are workers with unfinished
elementary school. The model also includes controls for the type of shift and
year fixed effects.
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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to attract. Table 4.7 presents the results of Mincer [1974] model estimation with
firm fixed effects. The returns to potential experience are even larger than in the
model with industry fixed effects, overall and in both sub-periods, but the difference
between the two subperiods is now only 1.1 percentage points.
It is interesting to note, however, that the returns to education for all groups
relative to the least educated group are lower than in the baseline model and the
model with industry fixed effects. In addition, all groups gain relative to those with
the least education in 1997-2000 compared to 1992-1996, with the most educated
workers gaining the most, 5.6 percentage points. Figure 4.2 shows the change in
returns to education by the highest educational level attained in 1997-2000 compared
to 1992-1996, for models (4.1) and (4.2).
These findings suggest that there indeed is a firm fixed effect present in the
wage structure, but person fixed effects are likely to be important as well, for which
an Abowd et al. [2002] model estimation is necessary. This is what we do next.
4.4.4 Firm and Person Fixed Effects
Firms are also allowed to make worker-specific deviations from the wage guide-
lines set in collective bargaining agreements if they want to reward the worker for
his/her success. Hence, it is necessary to include not only observable worker het-
erogeneity (for example, level of education attained), but also unobservable worker
heterogeneity in the model. The approach pioneered by Abowd et al. [2002] allows
us to estimate both firm and person fixed effects, and our sample fulfills the require-
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Table 4.7: Wage Model - Observable Worker Characteristics and Firm Fixed Effects
1992-2000 1992-1996 1997-2001 Change
Experience 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0621∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0005]
Experience2/100 -0.3318∗∗∗ -0.3313∗∗∗ -0.3834∗∗∗ -0.0743∗∗∗
[0.0021] [0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0043]
Experience3/1000 0.0979∗∗∗ 0.1000∗∗∗ 0.1115∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗
[0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0015]
Experience4/10000 -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0010
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002]
Tenure 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003]
Tenure2/100 -0.1423∗∗∗ -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.1178∗∗∗ -0.0589∗∗∗
[0.0016] [0.0033] [0.0022] [0.0037]
Elementary 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.0712∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011]
Vocational 0.2310∗∗∗ 0.2345∗∗∗ 0.2299∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗
[0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011]
High school 0.4406∗∗∗ 0.4470∗∗∗ 0.4397∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
[0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011]
University (2 years) 0.7729∗∗∗ 0.7754∗∗∗ 0.7804∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
[0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0014]
University (4 years) 1.0519∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.0803∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗
[0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0014]
Fixed Term Appointment -0.0783∗∗∗ -0.0748∗∗∗ -0.0852∗∗∗ -0.0239∗∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0008]
Overtime 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006]
Incomplete year -0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0008]
Year effects YES YES YES
Industry effects NO NO NO
Firm effects YES YES YES
Observations 4737923 2611904 2126019
R-squared 0.7053 0.7161 0.7298
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%,
∗∗∗significant at 1%. Omitted group of education are workers with unfinished
elementary school. The model also includes controls for the type of shift and
year fixed effects.
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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Figure 4.1: Returns to Potential Experience, 1992-1996 and 1997-2000
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
ment needed for such estimation to be possible (some workers switch employers), as
we have shown in Table 4.4.
As mentioned above, the Abowd et al. [2002] approach uses graph theory to
determine mutually exclusive groups of connected individuals and firms. Table 4.8
shows the result of applying this algorithm to our data. The largest group contains
97 percent of the sample in 1992-2000, 96 percent of the sample in 1992-1996 and 92
percent of the sample in 1997-2000. This measure can be interpreted as a measure
of worker mobility. Abowd et al. [2002] find this measure to be around 88 percent
for France and 99 percent for the State of Washington. Mobility is higher than we
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Figure 4.2: Change in Returns to Education (Relative to Those with Unfinished
Elementary School), 1992-1996 to 1997-2000
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
expected for Slovenia, but this can be explained by the fact that a lot of churning
occurred especially in the early 1990s when there was a lot of entry of small firms,
but also later on, as large firms were either downsizing or closing down.
Panel D of Figure 4.1 shows that the wage - potential experience profile is still
concave, as in the previous models, but the shape of this profile differs a lot from
previous estimations. Returns to potential experience are slightly positive and in-
creasing until about 5-10 years of potential experience, and then turn downwards and
become negative at around 13 years of potential experience. This downward slope is
steeper in 1997-2000. It appears that the estimated coefficients from previous mod-
els picked up something else besides potential experience, related to unobservable
person fixed effects (such as ability of workers), which we are now able to estimate
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Table 4.8: Results of the Grouping Algorithm
Largest Second Average of all Total of
group largest group other groups all groups
1992-2000
Observations 4615460 38 5.4 4737923
Persons 865091 38 1.3 895750
Firms 62929 1 1.0 86739
Groups 1 1 22785 22787
Estimable effects 928019 38 959702
1992-1996
Observations 2517404 60 3.4 2611904
Persons 719027 60 1.5 759506
Firms 38040 1 1.0 66502
Groups 1 1 27597 27599
Estimable effects 757066 60 798409
1997-2000
Observations 1959527 1152 4.3 2126019
Persons 651454 303 1.7 716417
Firms 34657 1 1.0 75181
Groups 1 1 38610 38612
Estimable effects 686110 303 752986
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
separately.
4.4.5 Analysis of Variance
In the previous sections, we have shown that the wage structure changed in the
late 1990s compared to the early 1990s. The big winners of the transition appear to
be the most educated workers. However, it is also interesting to analyze the variance
structure of log real hourly wages and explore whether there has been a change
in the explanatory power of observable and unobservable worker characteristics,
industry and firm fixed effects in the late 1990s compared to the early 1990s. As
we explained in section 4.2, there are differences among industries both in the level
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of the basic wage and the wage scale, the wage-setting mechanism allows firm-
and person-specific deviations, and there was a change in the wage determination
process in 1997, which could have had an impact on the explanatory power of these
characteristics.
The variance of log real hourly wages from model (4.1) can be decomposed in
the following way:
V ar (ln wit) = V ar (Xitβ) + V ar (Zitγ) + V ar (εit) (4.4)
+ 2Cov (Xitβ,Zitγ) + 2Cov (Xitβ, εit) + 2Cov (Zitγ, εit)
Similar decompositions of the variance of log real hourly wages follow from models
(4.2) and (4.3).
As a first step, we look at how much of the variation in log real wage can
be explained by industry or firm fixed effects only. As Table 4.9 shows, 2-digit
industry effects accounted for 17.20 percent and firm fixed effects for 46.56 percent
of variation in log real wage in 1992-1996. The importance of 2-digit industry fixed
effects increased by 3.75 percentage points and that of firm fixed effects by 0.71
percentage points in 1997-2000.
Table 4.9: Analysis of Variance
R-squared 1992-1996 1997-2001
Industry effects 0.1720 0.2095
Firm effects 0.4656 0.4727
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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Table 4.10: Variances of Wage Components and Share of Variance of Log Real Hourly Wages Due to Wage Components Using
Models (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3)
Worker Characteristics Worker Characteristics Firm and
Worker Characteristics and Industry Effects and Firm Effects Person Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1992-1996 1997-2000 1992-1996 1997-2000 1992-1996 1997-2000 1992-1996 1997-2000
R-squared 0.4282 0.5090 0.4919 0.5630 0.7161 0.7298 0.8448 0.8400
Variances
Var(ln wit) 0.2532 0.2517 0.2532 0.2517 0.2532 0.2517 0.2532 0.2517
Var(Xitβ) 0.0215 0.0177 0.0222 0.0175 0.0158 0.0174 0.0493 0.0990










0.0773 0.0591 0.0544 0.0373
Var(θi) 0.2329 0.3085
Var(θi,observable) 0.0986 0.1134 0.0861 0.0983 0.0825 0.0919 0.0516 0.0565
Var(θi,unobservable) 0.1813 0.2519
Var(εit) 0.1448 0.1236 0.1286 0.1100 0.0719 0.0680 0.0393 0.0403
Share of variance in ln wit accounted for by the variance of
Xitβ 0.0848 0.0702 0.0875 0.0693 0.0625 0.0691 0.1948 0.3932
Zitγ 0.0255 0.0285 0.0207 0.0207 0.0150 0.0128 0.0398 0.0223
ϕJ(it,industry) 0.0671 0.0582
ϕJ(it,firm) 0.3052 0.2348 0.2146 0.1481
θi 0.9197 1.2258
θi,observable 0.3895 0.4507 0.3400 0.3904 0.3257 0.3651 0.2037 0.2247
θi,unobservable 0.7160 1.0011
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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Table 4.10 shows the variance decomposition of log real wage, using models
(4.1), (4.2) and (4.3).12 Xit contains experience and tenure and their squares, triples
and quadruples (last two for experience only), and intercept in model (4.1). Zit
contains dummy variables for type of shift, type of employment, incomplete year,
overtime work, and year effects. Person fixed effect, θi is decomposed into observable
and unobservable person fixed effect. Observable person fixed effect refers to the
educational level attained.
Columns (1) and (2) refer to model (4.1), which includes only observable
worker characteristics and controls. In this model, the share of variance of log
real hourly wage due to the variance in observable worker characteristics decreases
by 1.5 percentage points in the late 1990s compared to the early 1990s. This pattern
is still present in columns (3) and (4), which refer to model (4.2) with industry fixed
effects, but not to the models with firm and/or person fixed effects (columns (5)-(8)).
In fact, in the model with person and firm fixed effects, the share of variance of log
real hourly wage due to the variance in observable worker characteristics increases
by almost 20 percentage points. Firm fixed effects also account for a significant
amount of variation in log real hourly wage, but their share drops by 7 percentage
points in the late 1990s compared to the early 1990s.
Which component accounts for the most variation in log real hourly wage?
Person fixed effects in both sub-periods. Models (4.1) and (4.2) only include ob-
servable person fixed effect, the level of education attained, whereas model (4.3)
allows us to estimate total person fixed effect, observable and unobservable. The
12Covariance terms are omitted from the table, but are available upon request from the authors.
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share of variance of log real hourly wage due to observable person fixed effect in-
creases in 1997-2000 compared to 1992-1996 in all model specifications, with increase
being the highest when using model (4.1). An overwhelming share of the variation
in log real hourly wage comes from the unobservable person fixed effect, especially
so in 1997-2000.
Given that unobservable person fixed effects explain almost all of the variation
in log real hourly wage, it is interesting to look at the correlation coefficients among
the wage components. The correlation between the person fixed effects and firm fixed
effects is of particular interest, since it indicates whether good workers are employed
by good firms. As Table 4.11 shows, this coefficient is positive and significant13 in
both sub-periods, but it is also very small in magnitude (0.03 in 1992-1996 and 0.02
in 1997-2000).
These results indicate that although firm effects are important, worker char-
acteristics, especially unobserved person fixed effects, became more important in
the late 1990s. Given the nature of the change in wage determination system in
1997, this is not surprising, especially in conjunction with the increase in returns to
the most educated group of workers. Those workers are namely most likely to have
individual contracts, and these were not limited as much in the late 1990s as in the
early 1990s.
13All of the correlation coefficients in Table 4.11 are significant.
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Table 4.11: Correlation Coefficients among Wage Components in a Model with Person and Firm Fixed Effects




Zitγ 0.1156 -0.1102 1.0000
ϕJ(it,firm) 0.4844 -0.0250 0.0027 1.0000
θi 0.7110 -0.5463 -0.0233 0.0341 1.0000
θi,observable 0.5324 0.1067 -0.0047 0.0535 0.4707 1.0000
θi,unobservable 0.5219 -0.6761 -0.0240 0.0102 0.8823 0.0000 1.0000




Zitγ 0.1607 -0.1566 1.0000
ϕJ(it,firm) 0.3912 -0.0232 0.0602 1.0000
θi 0.7186 -0.5928 0.0741 0.0220 1.0000
θi,observable 0.5838 0.0958 0.0157 0.0803 0.4281 1.0000
θi,unobservable 0.5185 -0.7014 0.0746 -0.0137 0.9037 -0.0000 1.0000
εit 0.2301 -0.0939 0.0108 -0.0312 -0.0909 0.0412 -0.1202 1.0000
Source: Own calculations based on matched employer-employee database.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter exploits a rich matched employer-employee dataset for Slovenia,
covering almost the entire universe of workers in the 1990s. Transition in Slove-
nia started in 1988, and continued throughout the 1990s. Most significant changes
in the labor market occured in the early 1990s, but we find that additional small
“deregulations” in the form of significantly reduced limitations on the wage growth
in 1997 also had a significant impact on the wage structure. Most notably, there
was an increase in returns to experience and in returns to the most educated work-
ers. Returns to experience increased more than in the early years of transition,
whereas returns to education increased less compared to 1987-1991 (see Orazem
and Vodopivec [1994] for the latter).
The magnitude of the returns and the changes in the wage structure depends
on the model of log real hourly wages. Specifically, variance in person fixed effects
accounted for more than 90 percent of variation in log real hourly wages, and their
explanatory power increased in the late 1990s. Firm fixed effects are important as
well, but not nearly as much as person fixed and time-variant effects. In fact, their
importance decreases in the late 1990s, and the correlation between person and firm
fixed effects, although positive, is very small. To caricature, it matters where you
work, but it matters much more how good you are at what you do.
In future work, we plan to use the estimated firm and person fixed effects to
examine the impact of worker matching on productivity growth. When a match is
made between a worker and a firm, its productivity will depend on both the firm
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effect, the worker effect and the quality of the match. Firms learn about the latter





This thesis examines the role of institutions in productivity and reallocation
dynamics. Specifically, we examine the impact of institutions on allocative effi-
ciency, job flows and wage structure. All of these can have an impact on aggregate
productivity and its growth. Aggregate productivity and its growth namely depend
not only on how productive businesses are on average, but also on whether more
productive businesses are the ones that have a higher market share.
Using a firm-level dataset with accounting information and information on
which firms received state aid for the rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty,
we first examine the impact of such aid on allocative efficiency in Slovenian manu-
facturing in Chapter 2. We measure allocative efficiency using an Olley and Pakes
[1996]-inspired micro covariance measure. The impact of state aid on allocative ef-
ficiency is difficult to evaluate due to the lack of a counterfactual and because of
selection bias. To deal with these, we use treatment effects estimators that assume
selection on observables and estimators that explicitly allow for selection on unob-
servables. In the latter models, we exploit the fact that medium and large firms and
labor intensive firms were eligibile for aid but the availability of aid dwindled in 2002
as a result of adjusting to the EU legislation to identify the impact. The empirical
analysis reveals a couple of interesting results. First, aid-receiving firms survived
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longer than they would have had they not received aid, since their economic fun-
damentals indicate a higher probability of exit than for non-aid-receiving firms, but
none of them ceased to exist until the end of 2003. Second, aid hindered the efficient
static allocation of resources. Third, aid-receiving firms grew faster than they would
have in the absence of aid. Taken together, these results suggest that aid shifted the
burden of structural adjustment onto more efficient firms who managed without it.
It had a negative impact on both the static and dynamic allocative efficiency.
Reallocation of outputs and inputs from less productive to more productive
businesses is facilitated by reallocation of inputs and outputs among incumbent
businesses as well as by entry and exit. Existing empirical evidence shows that most
of the aggregate productivity growth comes from within-firm productivity growth,
but the net contribution of entry and exit is far from negligible (see, e.g., Bartelsman
et al. [2004a]). Hence, it is also important to know the impact of institutional
environment on job flows and the structure of wages, which can induce good matches
(between workers and firms) to leave the firm.
In Chapter 3, we exploit a cross-country database with harmonized data on
job flows that vary by industry and size. We find that industry and size together
account for a very large share of the overall variability in job flows across country,
industry and size cells, with firm size being the most important factor. However,
even after controlling for industry/technology and size factors, there remain signifi-
cant differences in job flows across countries that could reflect differences in business
environment conditions. We look at the regulations on hiring and firing of workers,
one of the factors shaping the business environment. To minimize the possible endo-
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geneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-country regressions, we
use a difference-in-difference approach. The United States’ patterns of job turnover
are used as a benchmark to identify and quantify the industry/size cells with inher-
ently higher job turnover, assuming that their patterns are the least distorted by
regulation. Empirical results suggest that stringent hiring and firing regulation, and
especially their consistent enforcement, reduce job turnover as well as distort the
patterns of flows across industry and size classes within a country. Stringent labor
regulations within a country affect medium and large firms more severely than small
firms, probably because small firms are either partially exempted by such regulations
or can more easily circumvent them.
In Chapter 4, we make the first step towards understanding one of the possible
explanations for within-firm productivity growth. When a match is made between
a worker and a firm, its productivity will depend on both the firm effect, the worker
effect, and on the quality of the match. As mentioned, the within component of
dynamic productivity decomposition accounts for the bulk of productivity growth,
and the within effects may be driven by the worker reallocation, reflecting changes
in the worker match quality. One mechanism firms have for attracting and keeping
good matches are the wages. It is therefore important to understand the structure
of wages. In Slovenia, transition brought about significant changes in employment
and wage policies, and we have a rich matched employer-employee database that
allows us to study the impact of these changes on the structure of wages. Under
self-management, wage scales were extremely compressed. The wage setting system
established in 1991 allowed firm- and worker-specific deviations from the wage guide-
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lines set in collective bargaining agreements, but the incomes policies suppressed the
growth of wages, especially of the managerial workforce, until 1997. We exploit this
change in the wage setting system to compare the wage structure in the early 1990s
to the wage structure in the late 1990s. Our results suggest that the wage structure
changed significantly in the late 1990s compared to the early 1990s, regardless of
the model of wages assumed. However, it also reveals that it is extremely important
to include person fixed effects in the model, as their variation accounts for the bulk
of the variation in log real hourly wages, and their importance increased over time.
Firm fixed effects are important as well, but much less than person fixed effects.
We do not consider welfare implications of institutions in any part of our
analysis, we focus only on their role in productivity and reallocation dynamics. It
is possible that institutions have a negative impact on productivity and reallocation
dynamics, but help improve welfare. For example, state aid has a negative impact
on static allocative efficiency, but since it allowed firms to survive longer, jobs in
these firms were kept. Strict firing regulations could in theory have a similar impact
on employment. Some of the firms might have gone bankrupt had they not received
aid, but are doing well in the longer run. Analysis of the impact of aid taking
into account more than a one period lag could reveal that the impact of aid on
productivity and reallocation dynamics is positive in the longer run. Once the data
become available, we intend to re-examine the impact of aid on productivity and
allocative efficiency over time.
More work remains to be done to understand and combine the implications of
our findings. Our findings provide evidence that institutions (availability of state
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aid to firms in difficulty, labor regulations, wage setting system) have an impact
on productivity and reallocation dynamics separately. It is a much larger step
to combine the impact of institutions on productivity and reallocation dynamics
in one model to describe the precise channel through which efficient allocation of
resources affects aggregate productivity growth. To explore the latter, we need to
combine our productivity estimates from Chapter 2 with the firm and person fixed
effects estimates from Chapter 4, further exploiting our matched employer-employee
database. As mentioned, a number of studies have found that allocative efficiency is
important for understanding differences across time, industries and countries in the
level and growth of productivity and that the within component accounts for the
majority of productivity growth (see, e.g., Foster et al. [2001] and Bartelsman et al.
[2005]). Our findings suggest that firms reward good workers with higher wages,
but we do not know whether this has a positive impact on firm productivity and
consequently on the allocative efficiency in the economy. Exploration of these issues
is intended for future work.
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Appendix A
State Aid in the Members of the European Union and
Accession Candidates
Table A.1: State Aid in the EU Excluding Agriculture, Fisheries and Transport,
2000-2002
% of GDP Rank Per capita, E Rank % Sectoral‡
Old members
Belgium 0.37 17 83 12 3
Denmark 0.72 7 228 3 0
Germany 0.56 10 147 6 34
Greece 0.31 18 60 15 0
Spain 0.55 11 104 9 33
France 0.42 15 108 8 40
Ireland 0.45 14 160 5 51
Italy 0.38 16 89 11 4
Luxemburg 0.26 19 93 10 8
Netherlans 0.19 23 43 21 2
Austria 0.21 22 59 16 4
Portugal 0.55 11 130 7 61
Finland 0.17 24 46 20 2
Sweden 0.16 26 47 19 16
Great Britain 0.17 24 36 22 30
New members
Cyprus† 2.85 3 405 1 77
Czech Republic† 2.80 4 187 4 90
Estonia† 0.11 27 5 27 0
Hungary† 1.04 6 56 17 58
Latvia† 0.26 19 10 25 45
Lithuania† 0.24 21 10 25 96
Malta† 3.86 1 404 2 95
Poland† 1.29 5 63 14 76
Slovenia† 0.69 8 70 13 27
Slovakia† 0.47 13 22 23 76
Accession candidates 2000-2003
Bulgaria† 0.60 9 11 24 76
Romania 3.30 2 50 18 67
†2000-2003. ‡Including rescue and restructuring aid.
Source: State Aid Scoreboard, Spring 2004, and State Aid Scoreboard online.
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Appendix B
Sample Selection and Measurement of Productivity
TFP is calculated as a residual using the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale and using capital, labor, material and services
as inputs. The focus of our work is the impact of state aid on static and dynamic
allocative efficiency in manufacturing. State aid data is only available from 1998
onwards, so the period under study is restricted to the period from 1998 to 2003.
B.1 Sample Selection and Measurement of Inputs
Available measures for inputs and outputs are somewhat problematic, but not
much can be done given the information available. Our measure of capital, Kit,j,
includes buildings, structures, nonresidential construction, roads, machinery, trans-
port and other equipment, but does not include buildings, machines and equipment
under operating leases, and it is impossible to estimate the extent of leasing since
this information is not collected separately in Slovenia.1 The lease payments show
up in the cost of services of the lessee, S, and the value of the leased buildings,
1Balance sheet includes a category called “Capital revaluation adjustment”, but this reflects
adjustment of financial investment only. Book values that are reported in the balance sheet are
adjusted for depreciation and revaluation until 2001 according to the following formula:
Book valuet = Revaluation coefficient ∗
∗ (Book valuet−1 −Depreciation by prescribed rates by groups of fixed assets) .
The revaluation coefficient was roughly equal to the retail price index before 1998 and to the CPI
since then.
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machines and equipment shows up in K of the lessor. Aggregate measure of capital
stock at the total economy level is thus not problematic, but any measure at a more
disaggregated level will be fraught with this problem, since the leasing supply firms
are not necessarily classified under the same industry as the leasing demand firms.
Labor, Lit,j, refers to workers employed in accordance with the Law on Labor
Relations, regardless of whether they are in permanent or temporary employment.
The number of workers is calculated based on the hours worked, i.e., total hours
worked by workers as defined above are divided by the number of hours worked per
worker in a year (about 2000 hours, depending on the required hours per day (usually
8) and the number of working days in a given year). L does not include the number
of hours worked by students, who have a special status in Slovenia, and there are
some indications that some firms were using students as a part of their labor force
extensively to reduce the cost of labor, since a worker employed in accordance with
the Law on Labor Relations costs the firm 1.9-times more than a student worker.2
L also does not include workers who work on the basis of a contract for work or a
copyright contract. Separate data on these types of employment are not available at
the firm or industry level. Cost of labor, used in the calculation of factor elasticities,
does not include the cost of labor of such workers; it only includes wages and benefits
of workers employed in accordance with the Law on Labor Relations. Instead, the
2A worker receiving 100.000 SIT net pay costs the firm 115.010 SIT if the worker is a student,
and 219.191 SIT if the worker is a regularly employed worker. The difference is due to taxes and
contributions. In a survey of 134 firms, 26 percent of them said they do not need more workers
due to student labor, and this was especially true for firms with less than 10 or more than 100
workers (Stanković [2004]). New Income Tax Code, in effect since January 1, 2005, is attempting to
discourage firms from employing students on positions which actually require a full-time regularly
employed worker.
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cost of student workers and workers employed on the basis of a work contract or a
copyright contract appears under the cost of services, S.
As follows from the above, services, Sit,j, include a number of items that should
ideally be included in capital, labor, and labor cost, such as rents and student labor.
Services also include transport costs, the cost of unfinished goods produced by other
firms,and costs of maintenance, marketing and insurance. Detailed information on
these is not available.
As a result of the accounting standards which account for the above mentioned
problems with measuring inputs, there are a number of firms in my sample with
zero capital and/or zero workers and/or zero materials and/or zero services, but it is
possible that these zeros are not actually zeroes. Instead of excluding such firms from
further analysis, we adjust the production function as explained in subsection B.2.
The number of PASEF firms by year is shown in column (1) of Table B.1.
We then eliminate firms that are missing variables needed for the calculation of
productivity. First, we exclude firms with zero or negative output (Q). Then we
exclude firms for which capital (K), labor (L), cost of services (S), cost of materials
(M) and cost of labor are all zero. This reduces our sample by about 10 percent.
Within the remaining sample, on average about 15 percent of firms employ
no workers, 5 percent report zero capital, and only 0.4 percent report zero cost of
services. The final sample used to estimate the impact of aid is reported in the
final column of Table B.1. This sample is smaller than the sample in column (2) of
Table B.1 because we exclude firms in the 1st and 99th percentile of the productivity
distribution.
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Table B.1: Sample Selection
Number of firms Share of firms with
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Raw After K = 0 L = 0 S = 0 Sample
1998 6495 5787 0.037 0.154 0.006 4791
1999 6402 5769 0.036 0.153 0.007 4779
2000 6338 5765 0.042 0.143 0.006 4798
2001 6265 5805 0.049 0.137 0.006 4860
2002 6359 5893 0.055 0.138 0.002 5006
2003 6558 5967 0.059 0.141 0.002 5101
Source: Own calculations based on PASEF data.
B.2 Measurement of Productivity
For firms with non-zero inputs, TFP is calculated according to the following
equation:
lnTFPit,j = lnQit,j − ᾱK,jlnKit,j − ᾱL,jlnLit,j − ᾱM,jlnMit,j − ᾱS,jlnSit,j, (B.1)
where
i - firm, t - time, j - 2-digit industry
Qit,j Net sales revenue + change in inventories
Kit,j Book value of fixed assets
Lit,j Average number of workers based on the hours worked
Mit,j Cost of supplies and material
Sit,j Cost of services
For firms with zero labor, zero capital, and zero labor and capital, we calculate
the production function and hence TFP using the inputs that were available and
interpret the inputs as composite inputs. Equation (B.1) is thus modified according
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to:
lnTFPit,r = lnQit,r − ᾱK,rlnKit,r − ᾱM,rlnMit,r − ᾱS,rlnSit,r (B.2a)
lnTFPit,r = lnQit,r − ᾱL,rlnLit,r − ᾱM,rlnMit,r − ᾱS,rlnSit,r (B.2b)
lnTFPit,r = lnQit,r − ᾱM,rlnMit,r − ᾱS,rlnSit,r (B.2c)
where r denotes 1-digit industry3 and the rest is the same as in (B.1). Equation
(B.2a) refers to zero labor firms, equation (B.2b) to zero capital firms, and equation
(B.2c) to zero capital and labor firms.
Measures of factor elasticities, ᾱK,j, ᾱL,j, ᾱM,j, and ᾱS,j, were estimated at the
2-digit industry level (and ᾱK,r, ᾱL,r, ᾱM,r, and ᾱS,r at the 1-digit industry level)
using factor cost shares with imputed user cost of capital4 and under the assumption
of constant returns to scale. Factor shares are averaged across the years 1996-2003,
using the number of firms in 2-digit industry j (1-digit industry r) as weights to
minimize the measurement errors.5
We experimented with OLS estimation of the production function as an al-
ternative way of computing factor elasticities and TFP. We found that the rank
ordering and the quantitative variation in firm-level TFP were not very sensitive
to the estimation methodology used to calculate TFP, despite the variation in the
factor elasticities - the correlation coefficients between the various pairs of measures
3These were calculated at the 1-digit industry level to minimize measurement error due to
outliers, since there were only a few such firms in some 2-digit industries.
4Refer to Appendix C for details on the calculation of the user cost of capital.
5This approach is based on the strong assumptions that factors are paid their marginal prod-
ucts.
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were 0.80 or higher. This finding is similar in spirit to the finding of Van Biesebroeck
[2004] who finds that the distributional properties of firm-level TFP are reasonably
robust to a wide variety of estimation methods.
LP is calculated in a standard way as lnLPit = ln
Qit
Lit
. As before, we exclude
firms with LP below the 1st and above the 99th percentile from further analysis.
Using the described methodology and following Baily et al. [1992], the level of









) and pit,j is either log of TFP or log LP of firm i in industry j
at time t.
Appendix C
User Cost of Capital
User cost of capital is calculated at the level of 2-digit industry according to
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where t denotes time, j denotes 2 - digit industry, ucK is user cost of capital, P I
is capital goods price index, P P is producer price index, etr is effective corporate
tax rate, taxr is corporate tax rate (25%), sstdebt is share of short-term debt in
liabilities and equity, rstl is real interest rate on short-term debt, sltdebt is share of
long-term debt in liabilities and equity, rltl is real interest rate on long-term debt,
seq is share of equity in liabilities and equity, re is real rate of return on government
bonds, sstr is share of buildings, plants and property in tangible assets, δstr is rate
of depreciation of buildings, plants and property (2.5%), δmach is rate of depreciation
of machinery and equipment (15%). Shares of short term debt, long term debt and
equity in liabilities are calculated at the level of 2-digit industry, excluding firms
with negative equity (not a measurement error or a mistake, just a consequence of
relatively low equity requirements for the registration of the firm).
Interest rate on short term debt (rstl) is taken to be equal to the average
commercial banks’ nominal interest rate on short term working capital loans to
firms (tolar indexation clause). Interest rate on long term debt (rltl) is taken to be
equal to the average commercial banks’ nominal interest rate on long term loans
for capital assets (tolar indexation clause). Source for both of these is the Monthly
Bulletin of the Bank of Slovenia, and they are available at an annual level. Interest
rate on equity (re) is usually set equal to the risk-free rate - normally interest rate
on 10-year government bonds. However, these data are available only from 2002
onwards for Slovenia, as there were no comparable bonds issued before that (some
were issued with a euro clause). Prior to 2002, we set the interest rate on equity to
be equal to the interest rate on 181 days - 1 year time deposits (since the interest
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rates on these and on the 10-year government bonds were almost identical in 2002
and 2003).
Effective tax rates are taken from Table 24 on page 66 in Gabrijelčič [2005].
Appendix D
Definition of Small, Medium, and Large Firms According to
Article 51 of the Law on Enterprises
In the period 1993-2001, the following criteria were used to define the size of
firms in the preparation of the annual accounting reports (Article 51 of the Law on
Enterprises):
• Average number of persons in paid employment,
• Total annual revenues, and
• Average value of assets at the beginning and the end of the business year.
In 2002, these criteria were slightly modified (now Article 52 of the Law on
Enterprises) and are the following:
• Average number of persons in paid employment,
• Net sales revenue (rather than total revenue as before) in the previous business
year, and
• Value of assets at the end of the business year.
The numbers and amounts used are represented in Table D.1. In every case,
the firm has to satisfy at least two of the above criteria to be put in a certain size
class.
160
Table D.1: Criteria for Classifying Firms as Small, Medium and Large According to the Law on Enterprises
Criteria Period Small Medium Large
Average number 1993-1996 - Exceeds at least
of persons in & At most 50 At most 250 two of the criteria
paid employment 1997-2001 for medium firms
Annual revenue 1993-1996 less than less than - Banks, insurance
200.000.000 SIT 800.000.000 SIT companies, and
1997-2001 less than less than firms that must
280.000.000 SIT 1.100.000.000 SIT prepare
Average value of 1993-1996 at most at most consolidated
assets 100.000.000 SIT 400.000.000 SIT annual
1997-2001 at most at most accounting
140.000.000 SIT 550.000.000 SIT reports
Average number - Neither a small
of persons in At most 50 At most 250 nor a medium
paid employment firm
Net sales revenue less than less than - Banks, insurance
from 2002 1.000.000.000 SIT 4.000.000.000 SIT companies, and
onwards firms that must
prepare
Value of assets at at most at most consolidated
the end of the 500.000.000 SIT 2.000.000.000 SIT annual
business year accounting
reports
Source: Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia On-line.
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We applied these criteria to our data to check if the existing variable in the
database is indeed in accordance with the Law on Enterprises criteria, and found
that there are a number of discrepancies. Most strikingly, there are more small
and large firms, and fewer medium firms, than the existing variable in the database
would suggest.
Since this was the case, we contacted AJPES to find out what the procedure
for assigning a value of this variable to firms was. Prior to 2002, firms classified
themselves as small, medium, or large firms, and APP (Agency for Payments, pre-
decessor of AJPES) checked their classification “manually” by checking the firms’
classification and then checking the value of the underlying criteria. APP never
changed the classification of the firms by itself - it only did so after contacting the
firms and discussing the issue with them. This was supposedly the procedure, but it
is unclear or unknown whether all APP subsidiaries strictly followed it and if they
checked the firms’ self-classifications in the first place. It is thus likely that there
are misclassifications in the existing variable due to a “human error”.
We were told that firms would often classify themselves as small even if they
were actually medium firms because small firms were not obliged to have their
annual reports audited, and medium and large firms were obliged to do so. Hence,
it it unclear to us why the number of small firms actually increases. From 2002
onwards, AJPES uses a software to check for possible misclassifications, so there
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should be no more misclassifications assignable to human errors.
Appendix E
List of NACE Rev. 3 Codes and Their Names
Table E.1: List of NACE Rev. 3 Codes and Their Names
NACE Name
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry
1 Agriculture, Hunting and Related Service Activities
2 Forestry, Logging and Related Service Activities
Fishing
5 Fishing, Fish Farming and Related Service Activities
Mining and Quarrying
10 Mining of Coal and Lignite, Extraction of Peat
12 Mining of Uranium and Thorium Ores
13 Mining of Metal Ores
14 Other Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing
15 Food, Beverages, and Animal Feeds
17 Textiles
18 Clothes; Tanning and Treatment of Fur
19 Leather and Leather Products
20 Wood and Wood Products
21 Pulp, Paper, and Paper Products
22 Publishing and Printing
23 Coke, Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel
24 Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Man-Made Fibers
25 Rubber and Plastic Products
26 Other Non-Metal Mineral Products
27 Metals
28 Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment
29 Machinery and Equipment
30 Office Machinery and Computers
31 Electrical Machinery
32 TV and Radio Sets, and Equipment
33 Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments
34 Motor Vehicles and Trailers
35 Other Transport Equipment
36 Furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
Continued on next page.
163
Table E.1: List of NACE Rev. 3 Codes and Their Names (continued)
NACE Name
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
40 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply
41 Collection, Purification and Distribution of Water
Construction
45 Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
50 Sale, Maintenance & Repair of Motor Vehicles,
Retail Sale, Motor Fuels
51 Wholesale Trade & Commission Trade, Except of
Motor Vehicles and Cycles
52 Retail Trade, Save Motor Vehicles, Repair,
52 Personal & Household Goods
Hotels and Restaurants
55 Hotels and Restaurants
Transport, Storage and Communication
60 Land Transport, Transport via Pipelines
61 Water Transport
62 Air Transport
63 Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities, Travel Agencies
64 Post and Telecommunications
Financial Intermediation
65 Financial Intermediation, Except Insurance and Pension Funding
66 Insurance and Pension Funding, Except Compulsory Social Security
67 Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities
70 Real Estate Activities
71 Renting Machinery, Equipment w/o Operator,
Personal & Household Goods
72 Computer and Related Activities
73 Research and Development
74 Other Business Activities
Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security
75 Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security
Education
80 Education
Health and Social Work
85 Health and Social Work
Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities
90 Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation and Similar Activities
91 Activities of Membership Organizations n.e.c.
92 Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Activities
93 Other Service Activities
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Appendix F
Definitions of Institutional Variables
Table F.1: Definitions of Institutional Variables
Variable Definition
Hiring and Firing Practices Flexibility in hiring and firing (5B(ii)) from Fraser
Institute, hiring and firing practices of companies
are determined by private contract (World Eco-
nomic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report);
scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Business Regulations Regulation of business activities (5c) from Fraser
Institute (World Economic Forum: Global Com-
petitiveness Report); scale [0,10], 10 being the
worst.
Law and Order Integrity of Legal System (2e) from Fraser Insti-
tute, which is based on Political Risk Component
I (Law and Order) from the International Country
Risk Guide; scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Source: Gwartney and Lawson [2004].
Appendix G
Results for Excess Job Flows
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Table G.1: Job Flows - A Baseline Difference-in-Difference Analysis
1990s 1990s, transition late 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1048∗∗∗ 0.1351∗∗∗ 0.1513∗∗∗ -0.0279∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0256∗∗
[0.0094] [0.0106] [0.0119] [0.0090] [0.0106] [0.0118]
USA EXC 0.6900∗∗∗ 0.6795∗∗∗
[0.0186] [0.0181]
USA EXC ∗EU 0.5602∗∗∗ 0.5624∗∗∗
[0.0292] [0.0287]
USA EXC ∗Transition 0.7596∗∗∗ 0.7223∗∗∗
[0.0335] [0.0322]
USA EXC ∗LAC 0.7878∗∗∗ 0.7854∗∗∗
[0.0329] [0.0323]
USA EXC ∗<20 Workers 0.5973∗∗∗ 0.5867∗∗∗
[0.0270] [0.0259]
USA EXC ∗20-49 Workers 0.4793∗∗∗ 0.4501∗∗∗
[0.0376] [0.0360]
USA EXC ∗50-99 Workers 0.4102∗∗∗ 0.3829∗∗∗
[0.0429] [0.0410]
USA EXC ∗100+ Workers 0.3491∗∗∗ 0.3311∗∗∗
[0.0741] [0.0712]
Observations 933 933 933 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.71
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size job reallocation in the United
States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Table G.2: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Difference-in-Difference Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1649∗∗∗ 0.1946∗∗∗ -0.0217∗ -0.0104 -0.006 0.0056
[0.0278] [0.0292] [0.0113] [0.0130] [0.0113] [0.0131]
USA EXC 0.6769∗∗∗ 0.8363∗∗∗ 0.6473∗∗∗ 0.8892∗∗∗ 0.8457∗∗∗
[0.0516] [0.2100] [0.0888] [0.1267] [0.0507]
USA EXC ∗EU 0.5542∗∗∗
[0.0449]
USA EXC ∗Transition 0.7208∗∗∗
[0.0566]




USA EXC ∗EPL -0.0279
[0.0322]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0479∗
[0.0225]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗EU -0.0137
[0.0147]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗EU -0.0496∗∗∗
[0.0100]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗Transition 0.0101
[0.0156]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗Transition -0.0270∗∗
[0.0119]
Continued on next page.
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Table G.2: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Difference-in-Difference Analysis) (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗LAC 0.0319∗
[0.0190]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗LAC -0.0248
[0.0185]
Observations 937 937 937 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2)
include region dummies. Columns (3)-(6) include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size job reallocation
in the United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring
and firing regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and firing adjusted to take into account different
degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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Table G.3: Job Flows and the Role of Labor and Product Market Regulations
(Difference-in-Difference Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0490∗∗∗
[0.0128] [0.0140] [0.0081] [0.0161]
USA EXC 0.8424∗∗∗ 0.8897∗∗∗ 0.8605∗∗∗ 0.8604∗∗∗
[0.0769] [0.0436] [0.1181] [0.0464]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) -0.0619∗∗
[0.0254]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗<20 workers -0.0432∗∗∗
[0.0137]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗<20 workers -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0167]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗20-49 Workers -0.0653∗∗∗
[0.0144]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.0846∗∗∗ -0.0876∗∗∗
[0.0112] [0.0226]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗50-99 Workers -0.0772∗∗∗
[0.0148]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.1140∗∗∗
[0.0119] [0.0255]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗100+ Workers -0.0823∗∗∗
[0.0178]
USA EXC ∗EPL(Adj) ∗100+ Workers -0.0980∗∗∗ -0.0881∗∗
[0.0167] [0.0433]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0342
[0.0320]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers 0.0245
[0.0270]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers 0.0151
[0.0369]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers 0.0385
[0.0417]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers -0.0074
[0.0711]
Observations 937 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.71
Standard errors in brackets. ∗significant at 10%, ∗∗significant at 5%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size excess job reallocation in the
United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of
stringency of hiring and firing regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and firing adjusted
to take into account different degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text). Bus. Reg.
is the indicator of the stringency of business regulations; Bus. Reg. (Adj) is the same indicator
adjusted to take into account different degrees of enforcement of regulations.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized firm-level database.
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rosclerosis Matter? Institutional Reform and Labor Market Performance in Cen-
tral and Eastern European Countries in the 1990s. Social Protection Discussion
Paper 0202, World Bank, March 2002.
Robert M. Solow. Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. Review
of Economics and Statistics, 39:312–320, August 1957.
Tanja Stanković. Polovica študentov opravlja zahtevna dela (Half of Student Work-
ers Work in Jobs Requiring Skilled Workers). Delo, October 12, 2004. In Slovenian
language.
James R. Tybout. Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do
They Do, and Why. Journal of Economic Literature, 38:11–44, March 2000.
Johannes Van Biesebroeck. Robustness of Productivity Estimates. Working Paper
10303, NBER, 2004.
Milan Vodopivec. Labor Market Developments in the 1990s. In Mojmir Mrak,
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